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To secure her daughter a position on her high school cheerleading team,
Wanda Webb Holloway solicited a man to kill the mother of her daughter's
chief rival, hoping that the mother's death would distract the rival from the
competition.1 In Japan, enough people work themselves to death that the
culture has a name for this means of dying: karoshi.2 Do the forces motivating
these divergent behaviors have anything in common? If we merely describe Ms.
Holloway as wanting her daughter to cheerlead, and the karoshi victims as
1. Holloway, the organist at Channelview Missionary Baptist Church, allegedly considered having both
the mother and the rival daughter killed for $7,500 but later settled on murdering only the mother for $2,500.
Roxanne Roberts, Rah, Rah, Sis ... Boom?: In Texas, Cheerleading Is Serious Business. Maybe As Serious
As Murder, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1991, at Fl.
2. "In Japan, karoshi is recognized as a fatal mix of apoplexy, high blood pressure and stress that
doctors relate to too many hours on the job.... A recent Health Ministry report called karoshi the second
leading cause of death after cancer among Japanese workers." Ronald E. Yates, To Some In Japan, Job
Holds A Fatal Attraction, CHL TRIB., Apr. 22, 1990, at 1. An insurance company polled Japanese workers
and found that more than 40% "feared that overwork might kill them" but that "few planned to do anything
about it." Jim Impoco, Dying To Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 18, 1991, at 24. Although
karoshi has received much attention, the problem of job strain is hardly limited to Japan. See, e.g., ROBERT
KARASEK & TOREs THEORELL, HEALTHY WORK 117-57 (1990) (discussing work stress and heart disease
among American workers).
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wanting the added goods their extra work earns them, then the answer is
"no"--their desires are wholly unrelated, except perhaps that each is unusually
intense. But the thesis of this Article is that behaviors such as these are related,
and reveal an important and often-neglected aspect of human motivation. In
both cases, the psychologically richer description is that the actors seek not an
absolute end, but relative position among peers: Ms. Holloway sought for her
daughter elevated status and popularity among her classmates, while the
Japanese workers seek elevated rank and prestige among their coworkers. The
lesson of these two examples is that for some, social position is an end literally
worth killing or dying for.
Whether it is termed "status," "prestige," or "distinction," people sometimes
seek--as an end in itself-relative position; they measure their income against
the prevailing "standard of living" of their society or their peers, suffer indig-
nity at failing to "keep up with the Joneses," and generally gain or lose satisfac-
tion according to how well they do compared to others. Neoclassical economics,
however, has neglected the fact that people desire relative position. The omis-
sion of relative preferences from economic theory is part of a broader tendency
to assume that consumer preferences are independent of each other, i.e., that
individuals are concerned only about their own consumption, and are
"indifferen[t] to the welfare of others."3 Although many social scientists have
begun to challenge this concept of selfishness, they have done so primarily by
exploring ways in which preferences are positively dependent on each other,
as when empathy, altruism, or moral commitment cause one person to desire
that others be able to satisfy their own desires.4 Much less has been said about
the extent to which preferences are negatively interdependent, and the economic
consequences of such preferences. One way that preferences may be negatively
interdependent is when a person seeks as an end a position that is relatively
superior to that held by others.5 Although the existence of such relative desires
3. Kenneth E. Boulding, Economics As a Moral Science, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 6 (1969). Boulding
criticized this particular view of "[selfishness, or indifference to the welfare of others," as being "a knife
edge between benevolence on the one side and malevolence on the other." Id.
4. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 43-54 (1989); Jon Elster, Selfishness and
Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990); AM1TAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL
DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988); Jane J. Mansbridge, On the Relation ofAltruism and Self-
Interest, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra at 133; Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, in SCIENTIFIC MODELS AND MEN 1-25 (Henry Harris ed.,
1979). This sort of work is forming the basis for a new interdisciplinary field called "socio-economics."
See David Sears, SOCIO-ECONOMICS: Challenge to the Neoclassical Economic Paradigm, 2 PSYCHOL.
Sa. 12, 13 (1991) (the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics had 600 members in 18 countries
in its first year). Founded by Etzioni, the Society is an interdisciplinary group that seeks to combine
neoclassical economics with a broader view of human behavior informed by the other social sciences. Id.
For a more traditional economic account of altruism, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors,
Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEOAL STUD.
83 (1978).
5. I define relative preferences in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 14-24.
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is evident to the noneconomic social sciences,6 to literature, 7 and to popular
culture,s economics and its legal variant, law and economics, typically treat
such preferences as a minor matter that may safely be ignored.
Incorporating relative preferences into the normative welfare analysis
common to much legal theory9 challenges a conventional assumption that
greater wealth necessarily means greater social welfare. When individual
preferences are independent of each other-when one person's satisfaction is
not influenced by the consumption level of others-then we can plausibly
maximize social welfare by maximizing total wealth within society: increased
wealth will allow society to make someone (absolutely) better off without
making anyone else (absolutely) worse off.l0 When individual preferences are
interdependent, however, this simple analysis does not always work: making
someone absolutely better off may itself make others worse off if the others
prefer to maintain a certain economic position relative to the one whose wealth
6. See infra Part n(A).
7. See, e.g., JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (Frank W. Bradbrook ed., Oxford University Press
1970) (1813); CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (London, Dent 1978) (1854). See generally REN8 GIRARD,
DECEIT, DESIRE, AND THE NovEL 1-52 (Yvonne Freccero trans., 1965) (novelists reveal "triangular" nature
of desire: subject who desires, object desired, and "mediator" whose desire the subject imitates). Alexander
Pope had such desires in mind when he described the prodigal whose consumption was always directed
toward creating a certain impression with others:
Not for himself he sees, or hears, or eats;
Artists must choose his pictures, music, meats:
He buys for Topham drawings and designs;
For Pembroke statues, dirty gods, and coins;
Rare monkish manuscripts for Hearne alone,
And books for Mead, and butterflies for Sloane.
Moral Essays, Epistle IV, Of The Use of Riches, THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF POPE 171 (Henry
W. Boynton, ed., Houghton Mifflin 1903).
8. See, e.g., JANIS JOPLIN, Mercedes Benz, on PEARL (Columbia Records) ("Oh Lord, won't you buy
me a Mercedes-Benz/My friends all drive Porsches, I must make amends."). More generally, a great deal
of advertising is directed at the usefulness of a product in establishing one's position in society. See, e.g.,
Russell W. Belk, Materialism and Status Appeals in Japanese and U.S. PrintAdvertising, INT'L MARKETING
REV., Winter 1985, at 38.
9. I refer to the concepts of efficiency-Pareto optimality and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-borrowed from
welfare economics. See C.E. FERGUSON & S. CHARLES MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: THEORY AND
APPLICATION 489-90 (3d ed. 1978) (Pareto optimality exists when "there is no change that will benefit some
people without making some others worse off"); EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIER FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS 279-80 (1978) (change is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if resulting "winners" gain enough so
that they could compensate resulting "losers"). "Law and economics" employs both concepts; the latter is
the basis of Richard Posner's concept of "wealth maximization." See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 356-58 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1985).
10. I am aware of the substantial criticisms of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and wealth maximization. See,
e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 67-152 (1988); RONALD DWORKIN, IS Wealth
a Value? in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237 (1985); MARK KELMIAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
114-50 (1987); Ernest J. Weinrib, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 307
(1980). Because I believe there are strong constraints on the appropriate use of wealth-maximization, in
this Article I generally employ the less controversial welfare test of Pareto-optimality. Nonetheless, I
occasionally use the wealth maximization criterion of efficiency. Under certain constraints, I believe the
criterion is useful for determining the strength of competing claims. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 302-04 (1986). In addition, this concept of efficiency is so commonly employed in legal scholarship
that it is important to note the consequences relative preferences have on such analysis.
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is increased. If people or social groups share such relative preferences, either
for particular goods, general wealth or status, then one person or group gains
position regarding those things only at the expense of others who lose it; the
competition is zero sum. The key to understanding the potential waste of
investments in satisfying relative preferences is that, unlike spending to satisfy
conventional "nonrelative" preferences, the effectiveness of one's investment
in satisfying relative preferences depends entirely on the amount that others
invest. Thus, parallel investments by consumers can entirely nullify any posi-
tional advantage either hoped to gain by making the investment. When this zero
sum competition diverts resources that might have been used to satisfy non-
relative preferences, the investment in relative gain will, under circumstances
discussed below, represent a net loss in social welfare.
This analysis opens potentially fruitful areas of legal theory. Accepting that
satisfaction of relative preferences counts as a positive social good, competition
to satisfy such preferences may nevertheless lead to market failure. If, for
example, consumption of certain safety measures or the enjoyment of simple
leisure is generally unobservable and contributes less to one's status or prestige
than consumption of more observable goods, then people struggling for status
may sacrifice safety or leisure to obtain the other, more observable goods. If
others make the same consumption decision, however, the sacrifice does not
change one's relative position or status at all; the sacrifice is not matched by
any relative gain. Even where one party ultimately "wins" the competition for
position and achieves a relative gain, all of the investment by the losing party,
and much of that by the winning party, is wasted. Just as an arms control pact
can save adversaries the resources they might waste matching each other in an
arms race, regulations prohibiting positional investments may prevent the waste
of such resources. Alternatively, economic regulations mandating minimum
consumption levels for nonrelative goods might indirectly prevent the "arms
race" for relative position from inflicting great harm on participants."
More generally, if people care greatly about relative position, this motiva-
tion will materially influence individual choices of every variety. Economic
explanations of a multitude of disparate behaviors-how much people save,
what wages they will require, what risks they will take, how they respond to
taxation, etc.--will be seriously incomplete unless they account for the relative
effects of such decisions. A general theory of relative preferences, one that
considers how groups as well as individuals compete for status, may also
illuminate phenomena such as poverty and racism that are already thought of
by many in relative terms.
Some have lamented what they see as a tendency of legal scholars, when
borrowing from other disciplines, to rely on stale if not obsolete theory from
11. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND (1985), discussed infra Section I(C).
1992]
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those disciplines. 12 If we are to have economic analysis of law, as we certainly
do, then we should have a rich understanding of neoclassical economics,
including controversies between the margin and the mainstream of that disci-
pline. This Article sets forth such a controversy--one largely unknown to legal
scholarship-concerning relative preferences, and seeks to advance the empiri-
cal 13 and theoretical understanding of such preferences. Drawing on an array
of social science literature to describe the nature and prevalence of these
preferences, the Article explores the positive and normative implications of
relative desires, particularly with respect to law and legal theory.
After defining relative preferences more precisely, Part I examines existing
analyses of such preferences. A historical review shows that neoclassical
economics has repeatedly deferred analysis of relative preferences while
perfecting models of consumer behavior based on simpler, absolute preferences.
There has been some analysis of envy, but as I show below, envy is merely
one example of the larger phenomenon of relative preferences, and the existing
discussion of envy has restrained rather than advanced a more general analysis.
Part I ends, however, by introducing the recent work of a few economists who
have initiated a normative analysis of preferences for relative position and have
explained how competition to satisfy such preferences can be socially wasteful.
Part II expands the existing analysis in several ways. Part II(A) provides
a multi-disciplinary discussion of the source and nature of relative preferences,
reviewing the literature of social psychology, sociology, anthropology, and
economics to demonstrate the strength and pervasiveness of such preferences.
Part II(B) sketches a general theory of the market failure-termed "competitive
consumption"--that results from individual efforts to satisfy incompatible
relative preferences, and attempts to isolate the particular factors that lead to
this failure. Efforts to satisfy relative preferences do not inevitably lead to a
market failure, and in certain narrow cases, are even socially desirable. Finally,
Part II(C) offers an analysis of the conventional and special transaction costs
that impede individuals from reaching Coasean bargains that avoid the wasteful
consequences of competitive consumption where it does arise.
Part III applies the analysis of Part II to particular legal problems. After
stating general strategies for correcting the wastefulness of competitive con-
sumption, Part III focuses on the illustrative examples of income taxation and
discrimination law, demonstrating in each case how the legal scheme may be
understood as correcting for the wastefulness of competitive efforts to satisfy
12. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow
and Lee, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1988).
13. Robert Ellickson and Kenneth Dau-Schmidt have persuasively advocated incorporating other social
sciences into economics and the field of law and economics. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Relaxing Traditional
Economic Assumptions and Values: Toward a New Multidisciplinary Discourse on Law, 42 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 181 (1991); Ellickson, supra note 4. Such an interdisciplinary approach is especially necessary for
an intelligent discussion of relative preferences. See infra Section H(A).
[Vol. 102: 1
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relative preferences. Where taxation may reduce the waste of interpersonal
competition for position, antidiscrimination laws may address the related
problem of intergroup status competition. In each case, the conventional
economic claims that these regulations are inefficient are seriously incomplete,
as they fail to address the relative nature of the preferences motivating the
underlying behavior.
I. EXISTING ANALYSIS OF RELATIVE PREFERENCES
This Part reviews existing economic and jurisprudential analyses of relative
preferences. Section A briefly reviews the sporadic attention classical and
neoclassical economics have given relative preferences. Section B examines
economic and political analyses of envy, finding it to be a failed effort at
describing the larger phenomenon of relative wants. Section C introduces the
recent work of several economists who have begun investigating relative
preferences in earnest.
Initially, however, it is necessary to define more precisely what I mean by
"relative" preferences (or wants, desires or tastes), and to isolate the kind of
relative preference that is the subject of this Article. To define relative prefer-
ences, I must place the category within a larger framework of preferences. First,
I shall distinguish between self- and other-regarding preferences, and within
the latter category, between absolute and relative preferences. Finally, I shall
distinguish between positive and negative relative preferences, the second being
the main focus of this Article.
Neoclassical economic analysis commonly employs a concept of self-
interest in which people are concerned solely about their own consumption.4
Such preferences are "self-regarding." In contrast, "other-regarding" preferences
(also termed "interdependent" or "second party" preferences) concern the
consumption of others.15 A person's desire to drive at high speeds and not to
eat broccoli are self-regarding preferences because the preference may be
satisfied without any other individual engaging in an act of consumption.
Conversely, the preference that others avoid reading Madame Bovary or that
others eat sufficient food to live are necessarily not satisfied unless other people
14. See Boulding, supra note 3, at 6.
15. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 36 (1983)
(referring to altruistic and public-minded preferences as "other-regarding"); Amartya Sen, Foundations of
Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 213, 233 (Jon Elster &
Aanund Hylland, eds., 1986) (contrasting "self-centred" and "other-regarding" preferences). See also Robert
A. Pollak, Interdependent Preferences, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 309, 309 (1976) ("interdependent preferences"
are "preferences which depend on other people's consumption"); Robert Haney Scott, Avarice, Altruism,
And Second Party Preferences, 86 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1972). Note that, regardless of terminology, this category
of preferences concerns other people's consumption, not other people's preferences or their utility. For
example, A may have the relative desire to enjoy higher consumptive levels than B even though B has no
preference regarding A's consumption, and regardless of the level of B's utility.
19921
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engage or refrain from engaging in certain consumptive activities. The latter
are examples of "other-regarding" preferences.
Within this category, we may distinguish between positive and negative
other-regarding preferences. The terms "positive" and "negative" refer to the
mathematical nature of the dependency: one's satisfaction may vary positively
or negatively with the consumption of others. For example, for many people,
increased consumption by family members adds to one's own satisfaction-a
positive dependency-while increased consumption by one's bitter enemy
decreases one's satisfaction-a negative dependency. More generally, the
altruist derives pleasure from the consumption of others, 16 while the sadist
derives pleasure from depriving others of consumption. 17
Finally, we may distinguish between relative and absolute other-regarding
preferences. In 6ne sense, all other-regarding preferences are relative: one's
satisfaction is relative to what others consume. But by a "relative" other-
regarding preference, I mean a more complex function in which one derives
pleasure or displeasure from the fact of another's consumption level in relation
to one's own, i.e., where the ratio of one's consumption to the other's deter-
mines the effect on one's satisfaction. An other-regarding preference is therefore
relative when its satisfaction depends on the ratio between one's own consump-
tion (selfish consumption or "SC") and the consumption by another or the
average of several others (others' consumption or "OC"). In contrast, an "abso-
lute" other-regarding preference is a function in which one derives pleasure or
displeasure directly from the fact of another's consumption, without regard to
how that consumption compares to one's own.
The above illustrations concerning family members, bitter enemies, altruists,
and sadists are examples of positive and negative absolute other-regarding
preferences. One may gain pleasure from consumption by a family member and
feel displeasure at consumption by a hated enemy, regardless of how that
consumption compares to one's own level of consumption. There are also
positive and negative relative other-regarding preferences. Positive relative
preferences18 are probably rare, although one can imagine, for example, that
an egalitarian who enjoys greater than average consumption (i.e., SC > OC)
may gain satisfaction as the consumption of others increases (a movement
toward equality).19
16. Alternatively the altruist may derive pleasure from certain types of consumption and/or by certain
categories of others' consumption. Any of these variations are examples of positive other-regarding
preferences.
17. This locution may seem a strange way to describe the pleasure the sadist gains by inflicting pain
on others, but in economic terms, people who desire to be free from pain "consume" the conditions
facilitating the absence of pain. Sadistic preferences are therefore negative other-regarding preferences.
18. Because relative preferences can only be "other-regarding" in this taxonomy, I will henceforth use
the shorter phrase "relative preferences" to describe "relative other-regarding preferences."
19. The example assumes the egalitarian wants material equality, i.e., that he prefers that SC/OC =
1. When SC > OC, the egalitarian receives satisfaction from increases in OC, a positive relative preference.
I do not mean to suggest that egalitarianism is best defined in this manner. In general, the egalitarian is
[Vol. 102: 1
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Within this taxonomy,2° this Article addresses negative relative preferenc-
es-preferences for approaching or surpassing the consumption level of others.
These preferences are relative because their satisfaction depends on the ratio
of SC to OC; the preferences are negative because, within this ratio, their
satisfaction varies inversely with OC. A negative relative preference is therefore
a preference for a consumptive position that is favorable in comparison to that
of others. "Consumptive position" may refer to the quantity or the quality of
particular goods, including intangible goods such as prestige, or it may refer
to the sum of all goods, i.e., wealth. The "others" may include an individual,
a group, or all of society.
Because there are numerous ways of imagining positions that are relatively
favorable to those of others, negative relative preferences include a variety of
different wants. For example, people may desire a position ahead of all others,
one at least equal to the average, or simply a position ahead of the bottom. And
people may define their rank ordinally (caring only about numerical rank) or
cardinally (caring not only about rank, but the size of the gap between one's
rank and the rank of others). Desiring a "relatively favorable position" may
therefore include the desire (A) to have the highest rank, (B) to maximize the
positive difference between what one has and what others have, (C) to avoid
the lowest rank, (D) to maximize the positive difference between what one has
and what the lowest ranking others have, (E) to have at least an average rank,
or (F) to minimize the negative difference between what one has and what
average ranking individuals have. The (A) and (B) desires represent the desire
to be ahead of others, (A) representing a preference for being at the top in an
ordinal ranking, (B) in a cardinal ranking.2 The (C) and (D) desires are for
positions in an ordinal and cardinal ranking, respectively, from the perspective
of one who wants to avoid ranking at the bottom, but is not concerned with
being at the top.22 Finally, the (E) and (F) desires are for positions in an
concerned with equalizing the ratio of consumption of some members of society to the consumption levels
of other members. But where this commitment encompasses a concern that others consume at his level
(because the egalitarian is himself part of the wealthier group), we have the unusual case of a positive
relative preference.
20. The following chart summarizes the taxonomy of other-regarding preferences:
Absolute Relative
Positive e.g., love, altruism e.g., egalitarianism (under
appropriate circumstances)
Negative e.g., hatred, sadism e.g., the desire to consume
favorably compared to others
21. (A) is the desire to rank numerically ahead of others with indifference as to the distances between
ranks, while (B) is the desire to maximize one's distances ahead of others. Being ranked first in the group
would satisfy the (A) desire, but the (B) desire could, in theory, be insatiable (or satiable only when one
has everything and the others have nothing).
22. At some distance from the bottom, other than being at the top, the desire will be satisfied.
Otherwise, desires (C) and (D) would be the same as (A) and (B), respectively.
1992]
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ordinal and cardinal ranking, respectively, when the individual is concerned
only with having an "average" amount as compared to others.' Each of these
cases defines circumstances in which the consumer's welfare, at least to a point,
depends negatively on amounts consumed by others.
This Article addresses only negative relative preferences. As a matter of
simpler terminology (and because I believe that most relative preferences are
negative), I will henceforth refer to negative relative preferences simply as
"relative preferences." I will also contrast relative preferences with "absolute"
preferences. By absolute preferences I henceforth mean to include not only
absolute other-regarding preferences, but also the more conventional self-
regarding preferences. After all, self-regarding preferences are absolute in the
important sense that the pleasure one gains from consumption does not depend
in any way on the consumption of others. 24
Having defined the subject, we can now consider the existing analysis of
such preferences. The intellectual history of relative preferences is one of
neglect. Although many classical economists have recognized the existence of
such preferences in passing, the dominant tendency has been to defer consider-
ation of relative preferences, and consequently, a further tendency to overlook
the normative implications of such preferences. Against this backdrop, however,
a few economists, beginning with Adam Smith, have made important contribu-
tions.
A. Economic Analysis of Relative Preferences: An Issue Deferred
Adam Smith would undoubtedly be surprised by the near absence of
discussion of relative wants in modem economics since he viewed them as
central to understanding human behavior. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
he asks whether the rich believe that their wealth brings them greater absolute
satisfaction in life, whether they "imagine that their stomach is better, or their
sleep sounder, in a palace than in a cottage?" In Smith's view, "[t]he con-
trary has been so often observed, and, indeed, is so very obvious, that there is
nobody ignorant of it."'26 If that is so, he asks "what are the advantages which
23. Once one obtains the average, there is no additional relative satisfaction from obtaining more than
the average, but additional units may still satisfy absolute preferences.
24. There is no reason why a consumer cannot have, in the defined sense, both a relative and an
absolute preference for one object; in fact, such combinations may be more common than either purely
relative or purely absolute preferences. Thus, to say that A has a relative preference for X does not exclude
A having an absolute preference for X, but means that, independent of any satisfaction A receives from
consuming an absolute quantity of X, A will experience satisfaction from having a level of X that is
relatively favorable to others and will experience dissatisfaction from a level of X that is relatively
unfavorable to others. See infra text accompanying notes 260-261, 265.
25. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 112-13, (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie, eds.,
Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) [hereinafter SMr-, MORAL SENTIMENTS].
26. Id. at 113.
[Vol. 102: 1
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we propose by that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our
condition?"27 Smith explains:
[Ilt is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we
pursue riches and avoid poverty .... To be observed, to be attended
to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation,
are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it ....
The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally
draw upon him the attention of the world .... At the thought of this
his heart seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder
of his wealth, upon this account, than for all the other advantages it
procures him. The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his pover-
ty. He feels that it either places him out of the sight of mankind, or,
that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any
fellow-feeling with the misery and distress which he suffers.'
Smith continues this theme in The Wealth of Nations,29 and the same point
is subsequently made by major nineteenth-century economists. 0
27. Id.
28. Id. at 112-13. In sum: "It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our
joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty." Id. at 112. See
generally D.A. REISMAN, ADAM SMITH'S SOCIOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 105-16 (1976) (regarding Smith's
views on consumption and social status). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 238
(1981) [hereinafter POSNER, JUSTICE] ("Why is there less curiosity about the lives of the poor, as measured,
for example, by the frequency with which poor people are central characters in novels, than about those
of the rich? The reason, I conjecture, is that the lives of the poor do not provide as much useful information
in patterning our own lives.").
29. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin
Carman ed., Universiy of Chicago Press 1976) (1776) [hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS]. Smith
understood the concept of a "necessity" (which he contrasted with a "luxury") to include not only goods
required for physical survival, but any good the consumption of which was, by community standards,
necessary to avoid public "shame." Id. at 405 (Bk. 5, Ch. II, Pt. 11). Thus, he recognized that people have
a desire to consume at least as much of certain goods as is the community norm. Conversely, for "the greater
part of rich people," Smith recognized that "the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches,
which in their eye is never so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence
which nobody can possess but themselves." Id. at 192 (Bk. I, Ch. Xl, Pt. I). Stephen Holmes has argued
that the key purpose of THE WEALTH OF NATIONS was to "draw the political classes of Great Britain away
from envy and unreasoning animosity and toward interest--awayfrom the ideal of relative and toward that
of absolute wealth." Stephen Holmes, The Secret History of Self-Interest, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra
note 4, at 267, 341 n.57 (emphasis added). But see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J.
POL. ECON. 1063 (1974), discussed infra at notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
30. John Stuart Mill noted: "[A] great portion of the expenses of the higher and middle classes in most
countries, and the greatest in this, is not incurred for the sake of the pleasure afforded by the things on
which the money is spent, but from regard to opinion, and an idea that certain expenses are expected from
them, as an appendage of station." JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 869 (J. M.
Robson ed., 1965) (1848). See also John Stuart Mill, Posthumous Essay on Social Freedom, OXFORD &
CAMBRIDGE REV. (January 1907) ("Men do not desire to be rich, but to be richer than other men."), quoted
in A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 89-90 (1948). Karl Marx saw relative disparity of material
wealth as a great engine of social change: "A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring
houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirements for a residence. But let there arise next to the
little house a palace, and the little house shrinks into a boat." KARL MARX, WAOE-LABOUR AND CAPITAL
33 (International Pub. 1978) (based on lectures given in 1847).
Although Smith was perhaps the first economist to recognize the existence of relative desires, John
Rae was apparently the first to draw a critical normative conclusion about efforts to satisfy such preferences.
See JOHN RAE, THE NEW PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1834), reprinted in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
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Notwithstanding an early recognition of relative wants, the neoclassical
economics of this century repeatedly deferred analysis of such preferences.
Alfred Marshall, the "father of neoclassicism," '31 recognized the power and
prevalence of the human desire for "distinction.'3 2 In his seminal theory of
consumer demand, however, he offers "an elementary analysis of an almost
purely formal kind" that does not distinguish among the types of desires, and
consequently does not address the desire for distinction.33 This treatment is
typical.
34
Thus, when Thorstein Veblen, the great heterodox economist, savagely
criticized classical economics at the turn of this century, he particularly noted
its failure to recognize that in affluent societies the "dominant incentive" for
owning property was to demonstrate "pecuniary success" and thereby to obtain
"invidious distinction."35 Some 40 years later, James Duesenberry, a neoclassi-
OF CAPITAL (Charles W. Mixter ed., 1905). Rae argued that people have a desire he termed "vanity" for
achieving "superiority over others," for "hav[ing] what others cannot have." Id. at 245-46. Rae also observed
that society wasted capital by investing in the production of goods satisfying such desires. Defining
"luxuries" as goods that satisfy vanity, Rae argued that the investment in manufacturing luxuries is a waste
of capital. "Taking the whole society as a body," this production does not increase welfare because the
enjoyment it creates "is all relative; as much as one is raised by it, another is depressed, the superiority of
one man being here equivalent to the inferiority of another." Id. at 273.
31. HARRY LANDRETH, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY 281 (1976). Marshall created modem demand
theory.
32. Marshall specifically discussed the consumption of food, clothing, and housing space as means
of creating social distinction, ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 87 (9th ed. 1961) (clothing),
88 (housing), 106 (food), and decried the growing and "unwholesome desire for wealth as a means of
display which has been the chief bane of the well-to-do classes in every civilized country." Id. at 136.
33. Id. at 90. Marshall states that "[t]he higher study of consumption must come after, and not before,
the main body of economic analysis . I... Id. at 90 (raising again the subject of relative wants, but noting,
"we are exceeding the proper scope of the present Book"). He never offered a "higher study," see Becker,
supra note 29, at 1064 n.1, and this simplification of theory lasts in large measure to the present day. See
JAMES S. DUESENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 14 (1949) (while
Marshall and others recognize the interdependence of consumer preferences in passing, their comments on
the issue are "mere obiter dicta" not affecting the formal analysis).
34. See, e.g., MELVIN W. REDER, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1947). Reder
states that a "theory of welfare economics which does not take account of the importance of 'keeping up
with the Joneses' has a serious deficiency." Id. at 67. Apparently interested in avoiding such a deficiency,
Reder begins to discuss several means by which different persons' preferences may be interdependent,
including the desire to "outdo" others in the consumption of a particular good. Id. at 65. Reder grasps the
key normative implication of such preferences. When individuals are engaged in what Reder terms
"competitive consumption," the "invidious expenditure" of one will create external costs to the other by
lowering the other's relative consumptive position. Id. at 65-66. Legislation limiting such "invidious
expenditure" might increase welfare. Id. But in an almost schizophrenic manner, after briefly noting these
implications, Reder concludes that welfare economics should proceed by assuming that relative preferences
do not exist. Id. at 67 ("Economic Theory can be fruitfully discussed apart from political and sociological
considerations," so that Reder assumes "throughout [the] remainder [of the book], that the satisfaction of
one individual does not depend on the consumption of another").
35. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS
26-34 (Random House 1934) (1899). Echoing Smith, Veblen believed that once society progresses above
a subsistence level, ownership of property becomes a necessary requisite for "popular esteem" and,
eventually, self-respect. Id. at 30-31. See SMITH, supra note 25 and accompanying text. Veblen also
recognized the basic normative implication of this struggle for "invidious distinction": because individual
desires for relative wealth are insatiable, "no general increase of the community's wealth can make any
approach to satiating this need, the ground of which is the desire of every one to excel everyone else in
the accumulation of goods." Id. at 32. "[S]ince the struggle is substantially a race for reputability on the
[Vol. 102: 1
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cal economist interested in explaining consumer saving decisions, made perhaps
the most concerted effort until that time to incorporate relative preferences into
mainstream consumer theory.36 Duesenberry explicitly challenged the "inde-
pendence postulate" of consumer theory, the assumption "that the preferences
of each individual are independent of the actual purchases of others. 37 But
Milton Friedman's "permanent income" theory of savings,M an explanation
placing no reliance on relative wants, eclipsed Duesenberry's theory of savings,
and his general call for attention to relative wants went unheeded. 39 To this
day, the standard discussion of consumer preferences assumes their absolute,
nonrelative nature.' Until recently," the exceptional efforts of twentieth-
basis of an invidious comparison, no approach to a definitive attainment is possible." Id.
In perhaps the best known aspect of his theory, Veblen said that people seek "invidious distinction"
by demonstrating their wealth through the behavior of "conspicuous consumption" and "conspicuous leisure."
"P,Vjealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence." Id. at 36. By
"conspicuous leisure," Veblen meant behavior that demonstrates one's abstention from work. "Conspicuous
consumption" is the consumption of goods that are manifestly expensive for reasons not related to the
function they serve. Both behaviors evidence wealth through the actor's ability to afford waste; the choice
between the two is merely "a question of advertising expediency." Id. at 85.
36. See DUESENBERRY, supra note 33. In addition to Veblen and Duesenberry, A.C. Pigou also noted
and discussed the existence of relative preferences. See A.C. PiwOu, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 91 (3d
ed. 1952); see also PIGOU, supra note 30, at 89-90, 191 ("The satisfaction which a man derives from the
possession of a given income depends, not only on the absolute amount of the income, but also on the
relation subsisting between it and the incomes of other people"). Pigou observed the basic implications of
such desires: "Among commodities, the desire for which is partly a desire to possess what other people do
not possess, the creation of the 1000th unit adds to aggregate satisfaction less satisfaction than it carries
itself, because it makes every unit of the commodity more common." Id. at 226.
37. DUESENBERRY, supra note 33. Duesenberry argued that Americans seek to increase their standard
of living as an end in itself, apart from satisfying particular preferences for higher quality goods, and that
the standard of living is defined by what others have. Id. at 28. Acquisition of a higher standard of living
becomes necessary to the maintenance of an individual's self-esteem. Id. at 28-29. Each individual compares
his status with others based in part on his relative standard of consumption, and "inferiority feelings aroused
by unfavorable comparisons" drive the individual to seek a higher level of consumption. Id. at 30-31.
Duesenberry claims to observe two separate functions at work. First, "[o]ur social goal of a high standard
of living ... converts the drive for self-esteem into a drive to get high quality goods." Id. at 31. Second,
"the drive for self-esteem [leads to] a desire for high social status," which also requires "high quality goods."
Id. The strength of the inferiority feelings depends "on the ratio of his expenditures to those of others with
whom he comes into contact." Id.
Duesenberry uses this insight to explain why the proportion of income consumers save increases as
their income increases. He says the decision to save-not to consume-is a function of the consumer's
income relative to those with whom one has frequent contact: other things being equal, "the propensity to
save of an individual can be regarded as a rising function of his percentile position in the income distribu-
tion." Id. at 45. See also id. at 37-38. Duesenberry predicts that individuals with high levels of income
relative to the group of individuals with whom they have contact will achieve a given high level status with
less of their income than someone with only average relative income. Thus, with relatively higher income
levels, there is less pressure to consume all of one's income, and more money available for savings.
38. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF CONSUMPTION FUNCTION (1957).
39. Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 AMER. ECON.
REV. 101, 109 (1985) [hereinafter Frank, Nonpositional Goods] ("many economists felt uncomfortable with
what they regarded as a sociological theory of the consumption function [in Duesenberry's work]").
40. "The literature on interdependent preferences in demand analysis is relatively sparse. The lead
provided by James Duesenberry was never systematically explored." Poliak, supra note 15, at 310. See Jack
Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 53, 58-59 (1985) (remarking on
failure of most economists to incorporate desire for status into their models, and citing exceptions).41. See infra Section (C). ROGER S. MASON, CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION: A STUDY OF EXCEPTIONAL
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR viii-ix (1981).
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century economists at discussing relative wants-including Nobel laureates
Friedman42 and George Stigler43 -have been almost entirely in the context of
adjusting the positive theory of consumer behavior, while ignoring the norma-
tive implications of activity satisfying such wants."
Legal theory has also failed to address relative preferences in any system-
atic way. Those applying economic analysis to legal issues have followed main-
stream economists in omitting discussion of preferences for relative position.
Even those who seek to limit the use of simple market analysis have overlooked
the significance of relative preferences 5 The primary exception to this ten-
dency has been the analysis of envy.
B. A Partial Economic Analysis: The Externality of Envy
Theorists have noted that the extent of envy in society is critical in deter-
mining the effects of economic growth. Envy creates the conventional problem
of an externality or third party effect. If A envies B, then an increase in B's
wealth (demonstrated through consumptive activity) creates a social cost-A's
unhappiness or "envy pain"--which B does not bear. Gary Becker has dis-
42. Although Friedman avoided using relative wants in his savings theory, see FRIEDMAN, supra note
38, he previously resorted to the desire for relative wealth in an attempt to reconcile (risk-preferring)
consumer decisions to gamble with (risk-averse) decisions to buy insurance. See Milton Friedman & L.J.
Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948), discussed infra, text
accompanying notes 192-195. But they do not discuss the welfare implications of this analysis.
43. George Stigler and Gary Becker have described how consumption of "fashion goods" produces
social prestige or distinction, but only as a means of explaining changes in fashion without positing changes
in underlying consumer tastes. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,
67 AMER. ECON. REV. 76, 84, 88 (1977).
44. See, e.g., Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers'
Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183 (1950) (constructing demand curves given various interdependencies of
preferences). Others took passing note of relative wants. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 108 (1936) (listing but not discussing "Ostentation and
Extravagance" on list of subjective consumptive motives); John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities
for Our Grandchildren (1930), in 9 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: ESSAYS IN
PERSUASION 321, 326 (1972) (distinguishing "needs which are absolute in the sense that we feel them
whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative in the sense that
we feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows," and noting
that the "desire for superiority" may be insatiable but drawing no welfare conclusions); see also FRANK
H. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM 376-77 (1947) ("The content of the wants for the goods and services
for which people strive ... is predominantly social, conventional, cultural, and esthetic; the urge or animus
is very largely emulation and rivalry--to 'keep up with the Joneses' or to get ahead of them.").
45. For example, Cass Sunstein's exhaustive catalogue of justifications for collectively intervening in
the market do not include any potential market failure from satisfying relative preferences. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 32-73 (1990)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION]; Cass R. Sunstein, Republicanism and the
Preference Problem, 66 CHI. KENT L. REV. 181 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transac-
tions, NOMOS =OOI: MARKETS AND JUSTICE 279 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989);
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986). As another
example, Deborah Weiss recently explored the reasons why consumers fail to save optimally for retirement.
See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58
U. Cm. L. REV. 1275 (1991). Although she surveys neoclassical arguments for and against paternalistic
savings policies, she never mentions Duesenberry's relative income theory of savings or his prediction that
competition for status diminishes savings.
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cussed the effect of envy on the conventional economic assumption that in-
creased social income will increase social welfare. If the desire for "relative
income position" is sufficiently intense, a proportional increase of all incomes
"would not improve anyone's welfare," and might "actually lower wel-
fare!"'47 Some economists have offered just such a theory to explain apparent
dissatisfaction with economic growth. 48 Guido Calabresi has made a similar
point: if envy is prevalent, then the concept of Pareto optimality is of limited
use.
Even an efficiency move that makes some A wealthier without making
any B poorer-an extraordinary situation-is not a move toward a
better society unless one is prepared to make the frequently plausible,
but not necessary, assumption that the change also made that A happi-
er and did not make any B less happy, or that A is made happier and
that any B made less happy by A's greater wealth deserves to be less
happy because envy is "bad.
4 9
Others have made similar arguments against Posner's notion of wealth maximi-
zation.50
46. Becker, supra note 29, at 1089-90.
47. Id. at 1090. Actually, proportionate growth (increasing everyone's welfare by the same percentage)
could decrease welfare only if (a) envy is based on cardinal, rather than merely ordinal, differences in
position, and (b) envy is the only, or at least predominant, relative preference. As proof of (a), consider
that if people cared only about numerical ranking of economic position, proportional growth could not make
them worse off, because ordinal rankings would be preserved (while differences between ranks increased).
If people cared about the absolute wealth difference between themselves and others, proportional growth
would make them worse off by the extent to which those with higher ranks moved even further ahead in
an absolute sense. But Becker fails to note that proportional growth would also increase the absolute wealth
difference between an individual and those of lower economic rank. Thus, as limitation (b) suggests,
proportionate growth could make people worse off only if they cared more about comparisons with those
of greater wealth (i.e., are more affected by envy) than with those of lesser wealth. The desire to stay ahead
of those who rank lower economically might be called jealousy, and there is no reason, a priori, to think
that envy is stronger than jealousy.
48. See, e.g., Trygve Haavelmo, Some Observations on Welfare and Economic Growth, in INDUCTION,
GROWTH AND TRADE 65 (,V.A. Eltis et al. eds., 1970). Haavelmo argued that there could be "collective
diseconomies" from growth. He proposes an individual utility function represented by the formula, u(x, y,
x*), where x represents the totality of goods and services that the individual can afford by performing a
quantity of work represented by y. The variable x* denotes the arithmetical average of all the individual
x's in the society. Utility is related positively to x and negatively to y; with an assumption of "envy," utility
is related negatively to x* so that the higher x is for other members of society compared with the individ-
ual's x, the lower that individual's utility. Haavelmo concludes that growth may represent the aggregated
effects of individuals attempting to maximize (x - x*), and such efforts may fail because everyone else's
identical efforts continuously raise x*. If the individual chooses a higher work level y with the expectation
of increasing (x - x*), and the work of others prevent (x - x*) from rising, then it is possible that higher
levels of x do not produce sufficient utility to counter the disutility from higher levels of y.
49. Guido Calabresi, About Law And Economics: A Letter To Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
553, 556 (1980).
50. See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, The Justice of Economics: An Analysis of Wealth Maximization as
a Normative Goal, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 514-15 (1983) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE (1981)). Posner himself has noted the problem. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 437 n.2 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 344 (1990).
1992]
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There are several common rejoinders to this problem posed by envy. As
Calabresi suggests, some claim that there is insufficient evidence of the signifi-
cance of envy to reject the use of social income as a measure of social wel-
fare.51 Second, some argue that diminishing the pain of envy is not a morally
appropriate basis for restricting the liberty of others; labelling a desire as
"envy" is thus one means of delegitimizing any claims based on that desire.52
Third, Robert Nozick argues that efforts to reduce the pain of envy by mandat-
ing equality are futile. Positing a psychological "principle of the conservation
of envy," he suggests that equalizing some characteristics (such as wealth) will
drive people to intensify their comparisons along still unequal (but formerly
less salient) dimensions, thus producing the same constant level of envy pain.53
Thus, as matters stand, legal and economic analyses of negative relative
preferences have focused on feelings of envy, and the problem envy poses for
social welfare analysis has been disregarded as empirically insignificant,
morally irrelevant, or practically irresolvable. This impasse results primarily
because the problem is framed solely as one of "envy." Properly understood,
however, envy is but one class of relative preferences.
The key point is that not every negative feeling in response to the fortune
of others can properly be characterized as envy. Rawls, for example, draws a
distinction between the negative reaction those in inferior positions feel toward
the more fortunate, and the negative reaction those in superior positions feel
51. Posner, for example, seems to believe that there is not much envy in society. See POSNER,
EcONOMIc ANALYsIs, supra note 50, at 439 ("Probably the major cost of poverty... is the disutility it
imposes on affluent altruists."). Becker says he lacks the information necessary to estimate the true
significance of envy and hatred. Becker, supra note 29, at 1089. The issue of data is addressed infra Part
II(A), but it is worth noting here the particularly germane evidence of David Morawetz, who asked two
groups to explain how they would react to economic change in their community if everyone else became
richer while their economic situation remained the same. David Morawetz et al., Income Distribution And
Self-Rated Happiness: Some Empirical Evidence, 87 EcoN. J. 511, 520-21 (1977). He summarizes his
findings: "[A]fter a hypothetical Pareto-optimal change (some persons economically better off, all others
unchanged) only 7 and 12% of respondents would feel happier [in the respective groups], while 54 and 24%
would feel less happy ..... Id. at 521 n.2. Morawetz also asked people how they would react if everyone
else in their community became poorer while their own economic situation remained the same and found
that only 47 and 31% of the members of the respective groups would feel less happy, while 9 and 14%
would feel happier. Id. at 521. Thus, this "hypothetical 'Pareto-pessimal' change.. . gets a reception which
is not noticeably more hostile than that granted to the Pareto-optimal change!" Id. at 521-22 n.2.
52. Posner, for example, has at times defended wealth maximization as superior to utilitarianism because
the former is able to ignore the claims envy makes for strict equality, while the latter is not. See POSNER,
JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 82-83; see also ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 245 (1974)
(arguing that psychic pain of envy is an insufficient category of "external" harm to justify restricting liberty
of person whose conduct creates envy in others). Rawis also says that envy, with certain exceptions, is not
a "moral feeling" but one of "the vices of hating mankind." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 532-33
(1971). But the exceptions are quite significant: "benign envy" exists where one acknowledges the value
of what another has, but does not wish that the other lose the thing of value. Id. Rawls also distinguishes
the vice of envy from "excusable envy" or resentment, which exist where the "circumstances evoking envy
are so compelling" that they constitute a "wound" to self-respect such that "no one can reasonably be asked
to overcome his rancorous feelings." Id. at 534. The sense of shame and poverty discussed below has more
in common with benign envy and excusable envy than one of the "hating vices." See infra notes 55-57 and
accompanying text.
53. NOZICK, supra note 52, at 245.
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toward the improving circumstances of the less fortunate; only the former may
qualify as "envy." 54 Thus, we may divide relative preferences by distinguish-
ing between maintaining and obtaining a relatively favorable position, that is,
into (A) "jealous" or "grudging" desires to maintain a relatively superior
position, and (B) desires to obtain a favorable position one currently lacks. But
even within category (B), theorists persuasively distinguish envying from
coveting. Envy requires not only (1) that one desires or "covets" what another
possesses, but also (2) that the covetor consequently feels a threat to his self-
esteem and acts to preserve himself in a socially inappropriate manner, typically
by belittling the other or denying that the other "deserves" the thing poss-
essed.55 Simply to wish for what others have is not envy.56 Nor is it envy
to experience shame and loss of self-esteem for lacking what others have, when
one does not contest that the others deserve what they have.
57
These distinctions illuminate Adam Smith's statement that it is primarily
in "regard to the sentiments of mankind, that [people] pursue riches and avoid
poverty."58 In his analysis of envy, Becker incorrectly contrasts the views of
Adam Smith and Thorstein Veblen on the subject.59 In Becker's view, Smith
dismisses envy, malice, and resentment as "relatively minor determinant[s] of
welfare," while Veblen treats such motives as "the very stuff of life that
dominate everything else., 60 But Veblen was concerned not so much with
"envy" as with jealous preferences to maintain relative position (category (A)),
which motivated the conspicuous consumption of the leisure class. 61 And
Smith similarly notes that for "the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoy-
ment of riches consists in the parade of riches. 62 As for people who wish to
54. The latter reaction is "jealousy" or "grudgingness": "A person who is better off may wish those
less fortunate than he to stay in their place. He is jealous of his superior position and begrudges them the
greater advantages that would put them on a level with himself." RAWLS, supra note 52, at 533; see also
NOZlCK, supra note 52, at 239-40 (drawing related distinctions).
55. After reviewing diverse theories of envy, Silver and Sabini propose treating envy as a critical
reaction to the loss of self-esteem caused by another's superior accomplishment. John Sabini & Maury
Silver, Envy, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 167, 178 (Rom Harre ed., 1986) [hereinafter
Sabini & Silver, Envy]. Salovey summarizes this position, finding evidence of envy in the combination of
two components: "(a) that actor X has greater success than actor Y, and (b) that Y has acted inappropriately,
inconsiderately, or disrespectfully toward X in order to bolster Y's threatened self-esteem.' Peter Salovey,
Social Comparison Processes in Envy and Jealousy, in SOCIAL COMPARISON 261,269 (Jerry Suls & Thomas
A. Wills eds., 1991) (citing Maury Silver & John Sabini, The Perception of Envy, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL 105
(1978)).
56. See RAWLS, supra note 52, at 533 (contrasting this so-called "benign envy" with true envy, or,
"envy proper").
57. One may concede that another deserves greater success yet still find the comparison painful. The
shame one feels at the fact that one does not measure up to the contemporary standard of living of one's
society or one's peers, for example, may be all the more acute because one believes it is deserved.
58. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 25, at 112-113.
59. BECKER, supra note 29, at 1089-90.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62. SMrrH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 29, at 192 (Bk. 1, Ch. XI, Pt. I). See also MASON, supra
note 41, at 17 ("Smith and Veblen believed that ostentatious economic display is generated by specific
socioeconomic conditions which make the conspicuous display of wealth a necessary activity for those
1992]
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acquire relative position they currently lack (category (B)), Smith and Veblen
are again in agreement: such desires are best characterized not so much by
"envy" as by the desire to live up to the "canons of decency"63 and to avoid
the public "shame" 64 of falling too far behind.
Properly understood, neither Smith nor Veblen viewed envy as dominant,
yet both viewed what I call relative preferences as a fundamental human
motivation. This distinction between the broad category of relative preferences
and the subcategory of envy (developed further in Part II(A)) will permit the
analysis of this field to move beyond the impasse created by the three "envy
rejoinders" described above.65 A handful of economists have made the initial
steps toward this broader analysis by focusing on the problems generated by
the desire for relative income. Their work, however, still remains at the periph-
ery-or perhaps the "cutting edge"--of economics, and has failed so far to
penetrate the field of law and economics.
C. Beyond Envy: Recent Work Concerning Positional Preferences
In recent decades, several economists have attempted to explain the appar-
ently widespread discontent with economic growth by noting that individual
welfare depends in an important way on relative success.66 Most notably, Fred
Hirsch has offered a two-step explanation of this dissatisfaction based on his
concept of a "positional good."67 First, certain inherently scarce goods may
be purchased only by those who occupy a relatively favored economic position
within society;68 second, economic growth may be the product of people
repeatedly striving for but failing to acquire the relative wealth necessary to
obtain such positional goods.
Positional goods are scarce either for physical or social reasons. Goods are
physically scarce when there are physical limits on their creation; for example,
the supply of land is physically limited. Social scarcity, on the other hand,
seeking higher personal status and prestige within the community.").
63. VEBLEN, supra note 35, at 87. According to Veblen, the decision to engage in any form of
conspicuous waste is not, however, typically a conscious one. "[It must not be understood that the motive
on which the consumer acts in any given case is [conspicuous waste] in its bald unsophisticated form." Id.
"Ordinarily [the consumer's] motive is a wish to conform to established usage, to avoid unfavorable notice
and comment [and] to live up to the accepted canons of decency in the kind, amount, and grade of goods
consumed." Id. (emphasis added).
64. See SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 25, at 51 ("The poor man.., is ashamed of his
poverty").
65. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
66. See LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SocIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR
ECONOMIC CHANGE 189-90 (1980)); Richard Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?
Some Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
MosEs ABRAMOvrrz 89, 112-114, 121 (Paul A. David & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1974); Haavelmo, supra
note 48, at 74-75; R. Layard, Human Satisfactions and Public Policy, 90 ECON. J. 737 (1980).
67. FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS To GROWTH passim (1976).
68. Id. at 24.
[Vol. 102: 1
HeinOnline  -- 102 Yale L.J. 18 1992-1993
Relative Preferences
exists when the satisfaction a good creates depends directly or indirectly on the
fact that it is scarce.69 Satisfaction depends directly on scarcity in the case of
the snob who consciously desires goods precisely for their scarcity.70 But more
importantly, satisfaction may depend incidentally on scarcity even where one
does not consciously seek what others cannot have.7' For example, A may
desire several full-time, live-in servants for the absolute satisfaction their
services provide. In a society with individual households, we cannot all have
live-in servants-some of us would have to be servants-so such services are
a positional good. 72 Hirsch then claims that economic growth continuously
raises, and then frustrates, consumer expectations for positional goods. Wants
are frustrated either because positional goods remain too expensive for all but
the highest economic class, or because a generally increased level of consump-
tion unexpectedly devalues the good.73
Hirsch fails, however, to explain fully why the existence of positional goods
causes discontent. The claim of "frustrated expectations" rests on an unarticulat-
ed assumption of imperfect information. In a world of perfect information,
people would know (a) that they had to increase their relative, not absolute,
income to obtain positional goods and (b) whether a given course of action
would increase their relative, rather than absolute, income.74 They would
decide to sacrifice leisure time for the pursuit of more income only when the
expected value of doing so (the probability of gaining relative income times
the value of the positional good such income would secure) exceeded the value
they placed on the incremental unit of leisure. Individuals would then avoid
69. Id. at 20. Although in some sense all scarcity is social (because a good cannot be scarce unless
there is some demand for it among members of society), Hirsch means to distinguish between the factors
limiting supply. He calls the scarcity physical when the supply is physically limited as in the case of scenic
oceanside landscape or Old Masters' paintings. Practically speaking, it is impossible to make "more" of
such goods. Such goods are purchased only by the highest bidder, who naturally tends to be among those
with the greatest relative wealth; an increase in overall social wealth will increase the amount bid on such
goods, but their scarcity will continue to limit availability to the relatively well-off.
70. Id. at 20-22.
71. Id.
72. Similarly, managerial jobs require the existence of others one manages. "[W]hereas Napoleon might
wish to encourage the belief that every soldier carried in his knapsack a marshal's baton, it was obviously
impossible that every-as distinct from any-soldier could rise to the position of marshal." HIRscH, supra
note 67, at 23. Id. at 23 (citing PHILLIP H. WICKSTEED, THE COMMON SENSE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 657
(1910)). Here Hirsch relies on Sir Roy Harrod, who distinguished between "democratic wealth" that
economic growth could provide to everyone at the same time, and "oligarchic wealth" that, regardless of
growth, is achievable only by the few. Id.; see also Roy F. Harrod, The Possibility of Economic Satiety-Use
of Economic Growth for Improving the Quality of Education and Leisure, in 1 PROB. OF U.S. ECON. DEv.
207, 208-09 (Committee for Econ. Dev., 1958). Harrod concludes that economic growth cannot make more
generally available goods such as "mansions to live in, private parks and gardens, stables full of horses,
[or] yachts," use of which depends on the consumption of "a considerable amount of personal servic-
es. . . attached to them for their upkeep." Id.
73. As an example of this effect, Hirsch points out that growth greatly increased educational levels,
but decreased the value of a college degree in obtaining a job. Id. at 36-41.
74. To take one of Hirsch's examples: if the consumer knows that land is auctioned to the highest
bidder, and that general economic growth will increase the absolute value of the winning bid, he will not
expect to obtain such land unless he increases his relative wealth.
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frustration because their "expectations" would be in line with the actual likeli-
hood of future events. Even in the real world of imperfect information, it is not
clear why consumers would systematically overestimate their chances of gaining
positional goods. Hirsch does not offer a theory predicting such informational
distortion.75
Economists have subsequently noted, however, that positional goods
continue to pose an allocation problem if consumers fear that they must work
harder simply to avoid losing their existing level of positional consumption.
Most importantly, economist Robert Frank77 has moved the analysis of relative
wants beyond a critique of growth, suggesting that particular examples of
collective regulation may desirably limit wasteful investment in the pursuit of
relative gain. Where Hirsch's analysis suggests that people might sacrifice too
much leisure in a competitive race for consumptive power (because of faulty
expectations of what their new income will buy), Frank suggests that people
might wastefully sacrifice nonpositional commodities in the hope of obtaining
more positional commodities. Frank's general normative claim is that individu-
als competing for positional goods inefficiently overinvest in such goods and
underinvest in "nonpositional" goods. His methodological contribution to this
75. Indeed, one might expect that his eloquent warning of a "positional treadmill" would help correct
any distortion that exists. But see Yew-Kwang Ng, Economic Growth and Social Welfare: The Need for
a Complete Study of Happiness, 31 KYKLOS 575 (1978) (formalizing work of Hirsch). Ng concedes that
the fundamental problem is one of unrealistic aspirations-growth raises the expectations of consumers for
positional goods that proportional growth will not help them obtain-but says that in this context, claims
of perfect foresight are "dubious." Id. at 581-82.
76. Contemporaneously with Hirsch, Tibor Scitovsky noted the problem of status-seeking behavior,
where status is, in Hirsch's terms, a positional good. TIBOR SCITOVSKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY (1976).
Scitovsky observes that sometimes people seek status by a "ranking on a one-dimensional scale" such as
income or wealth. Id. at 119. The problem with wealth dependent status, Scitovsky argues, is that it
represents "a zero-sum game." in which "one person's gain in status is automatically matched by an equal
loss of status suffered by those he now outranks." Id. at 119. Because the amount of one's income is not
usually public information, part of this status game involves demonstrating income by "appropriate spending
behavior," consisting in part of emulating the wealthy. Id. Scitovsky's key insight is that "there need be
neither an end to such competitive increase in conspicuous consumption nor any gain to the players engaged
in this competitive game taken as a whole." Id. at 120 (emphasis added). Social wealth, which would include
all such expenditures, is thereby decoupled from the achievement of social welfare. Other economists have
made recent contributions to a normative analysis of the desire for status. See, e.g., Philip R.P. Coelho, An
Examination into the Causes of Economic Growth: Status as an Economic Good, 7 RES. LAW & ECON.
89 (1985); Roger D. Congleton, Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games,
11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 175 (1989); Kai A. Konrad, Statusprferenzen: Soziobiologische Ursachen,
Statuswettrfsten und seine Besteuerung, 43 KYKLOS 249 (1990); Layard, supra note 66; Ng, supra note
75; Norman J. Ireland, On Limiting the Market for Status Signals (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
77. See ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR
STATUS (1985) [hereinafter FRANK, THE RIGHT POND]; Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities, in
STRATEGY AND CHOICE 25 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) [hereinafter Frank, Positional Externalities];
Robert H. Frank, Frames of Reference and the Quality of Life, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 80 (1989) [hereinafter
Frank, Frames of Reference]; Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note 39; Robert H. Frank, Interdependent
Preferences and the Competitive Wage Structure, 15 RAND J. ECON. 510 (1984) [hereinafter Frank,
Interdependent Preferences]; Robert H. Frank, Are Workers Paid their Marginal Products? 74 Am. ECON.
REV. 549 (1984) [hereinafter Frank, Marginal Products]; Robert H. Frank, Envy and the Optimal Purchase
of Unobservable Commodities: The Case of Safety, in THE VALUE OF LIFE AND SAFETY 145 (Michael W.
Jones-Lee ed., 1982) [hereinafter Frank, Unobservable Commodities].
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analysis is to introduce the model of a prisoner's dilemma78 to explain the
means by which individuals competing for distinction inefficiently allocate
resources.
This analysis is best summarized by the case of workplace health and
safety. Frank argues that workers competing for relative income may jointly
sacrifice safety for higher nominal income either to gain or avoid losing relative
income, only to find that the parallel sacrifices of other workers cancel out the
desired relative effects. Under conditions of this "prisoner's dilemma," govern-
ment regulations mandating minimum safety standards may limit the investment
wasted in acquiring or maintaining relative income. Frank proposes the follow-
ing example. A and B are two workers each facing a choice between a job at
a "clean" mine for $150 a week and a job at a "dusty" mine for $200 a week.
A and B each have a relative preference for greater income than the other. In
such circumstances, "the payoff to each from working in a given mine will
depend in a clear way on the mine chosen by the other."79
Assume that, in the absence of concern about relative position, A and B
would each choose to work in the clean mine, valuing its healthier conditions
at more than $50 a week. Given a sufficiently strong concern with relative
income, however, each would rank his choices accordingly: (1) work in dirty
mine while the other works in clean mine (gaining the most in relative posi-
tion); (2) both work in clean mine; (3) both work in dirty mine; (4) work in
clean mine while the other works in dirty mine (losing the most in relative
position). Under these circumstances, each worker will choose to work in the
dirty mine to avoid outcome (4) and to have a chance at outcome (1).80 Their
joint decisions would produce outcome (3), in which the higher absolute income
produces no relative advantage for either. Not only do A and B each rank
outcome (3) lower than outcome (2), but moving from (2) to (3) means that
each has given up the health advantages of the cleaner mine with no compen-
sating gain. Consequently, a collective rule mandating a minimum level of the
nonpositional good of long term health, requiring that all mines be "clean,"
would prevent this misallocation of resources into individual competition for
relative position and make both workers better off. Thus, certain occupational
health and safety regulations might be Pareto efficient in providing a minimum
level of health or safety if individuals' desires for relative wealth otherwise
cause them to underinvest in such goods.81
78. For a general description of the prisoner's dilemma model, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLuTiON
OF COOPERATION 7-11 (1984).
79. See Frank, Nonposidonal Goods, supra note 39, at 102.
80. More technically, the decision to work in the dirty mine "dominates" the other decisions. If B works
in the clean mine, then A prefers the dirty mine because it secures its highest ranked outcome (1). If B
works in the dirty mine, then A prefers the same because it avoids its lowest ranked outcome (4). B's
choices are the same.
8 1. Frank draws an analogy between the mining example and one he borrows from Thomas Schelling
concerning hockey helmets. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 213-14
19921
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The analyses of Hirsch and Frank move well beyond the simple consider-
ation of envy and answer the three rejoinders discussed above. Most clearly,
the prisoner's dilemma analysis renders irrelevant Nozick's "principle of conser-
vation of envy." In the above example, Frank's justification for requiring safe
mines is not that people will feel less envious, but that the regulation prevents
workers from needlessly sacrificing health and safety by attempting to gain a
positional advantage. Workers will still want relative income and feel dissatis-
faction from failing to get it-this relative preference is "conserved" in Noz-
ick's terms-but they will not invest as much to reach whatever relati, 0
position they obtain. For the same reason, Frank's analysis provides a conven-
tional economic basis for regulation: not to diminish morally dubious feelings
of envy, nor even to reduce morally sound feelings of resentment or shame,
but to facilitate greater satisfaction of absolute preferences. In addition, if the
"envy problem" is recast as a more general desire for relative position, i.e., if
we imagine that people seek to preserve as well as acquire relative position,
then collective regulation need not merely restrict successful persons to benefit
those who envy them, but may restrict all individuals from harming each other
by investing in maintenance or acquisition of relative position.82 Third and
finally, Frank does not ask us to take the existence of such desires on faith; he
(1978). Schelling notes that in some hockey leagues, some of the same players who chose not to wear a
protective helmet supported adoption of a league rule requiring everyone to wear such helmets. Id. at 213,
223-24. Frank's explanation for such apparently inconsistent preferences is that individual hockey players
face a choice conforming to the model of a prisoner's dilemma. Wearing a helmet may significantly decrease
the risk of certain injuries, but may slightly decrease a player's vision or hearing (or the ability to project
a fierce, intimidating image). Thus, in deciding whether to wear a helmet, a player weighs the increment
of safety against a possible loss of competitive edge. Of course, where everyone (or an equal number on
each team) chooses not to wear a helmet, neither side gains a competitive advantage nor suffers a competi-
tive loss, but each side loses potential safety. The investment each team makes-forgone safety-is thus
wasted, yet under certain circumstances, we expect the players to make exactly that decision.
Similar analysis explains rules prohibiting athletes from using performance-enhancing drugs, such as
steroids. See generally Jim Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics, I MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 93, 105-07 (1990). These drugs have adverse health consequences. Id. An athlete may decide, however,
that the health costs are justified for competitive reasons: either to gain or to avoid losing an edge on other
athletes. Yet as more and more athletes begin to use steroids, the competitive effects of the drug are
eliminated; with widespread use, it is as if no one used the drug, but many suffer from the adverse health
effects. Collective prohibition, if effective, would prevent anyone from losing a competitive edge relative
to others, yet would also protect everyone from harms to health.
82. Of course, it is still possible to argue that preferences for maintaining a relatively favorable position
are also immoral. Jon Elster, for example, says that the desire for positional goods is "arguably" an
"unethical" preference. ELSTER supra note 15, at 22. "The widespread desire for positional goods can lead
to less welfare for everybody, so that such preferences fall to pass the Kantian generalization test." Id. at
22-23. Elster's point seems to apply with equal force, however, to all negative relative preferences. As I
show below, even the desire to avoid being ranked at the bottom of some scale, if people invest enough
in an effort to avoid the lowest rank, may lead to "less welfare for everybody." So, presumably, even this
somewhat tame and understandable relative preference may fail the Kantian generalization test. Although
it may be useful to pursue moral distinctions between different types of other-regarding preferences, this
Article instead focuses on the consequences of relative preferences. This consequentialist approach may
ultimately illuminate moral differences in different types of relative preferences.
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offers some evidence supporting the view that the desire for relative position
is both strong and pervasive."
Frank's work is genuinely pathbreaking. To date, however, its value has
been lost to economic analysis of law.84 Perhaps a partial (but only partial)
explanation for this omission is that Frank's analysis leaves some important
questions unanswered. To understand and accept his argument, we must obtain
a fully satisfactory answer to this question: why would people care about
relative wages or relative quantities of some goods but not about their relative
consumption of other goods such as safety? In other words, if people care about
relative income, why not include the value of safety as part of one's income?
Without fully distinguishing between them, Frank suggests two possible an-
swers that I term the "positional goods theory" and the "frame of reference"
or "status" theory. Each theory requires further elaboration.
First, people may want disposable income in order to purchase positional
goods. For example, Frank suggests that people may be inclined to seek types
of wealth that they can transfer to their children, so as to provide their children
with relative advantages over other children.8 Disposable income can be used
to purchase, for example, superior educational opportunities for one's children,
but nondisposable income-like safety-cannot. So miners A and B may wish
to purchase the "positional good" of a "superior" education, and each realizes
that he needs a relatively superior wage in order to do so.86
This version of Frank's theory is similar to Hirsch's theory of positional
goods. Relative wealth is still desired merely as a means of satisfying absolute
83. His data consists of biological studies of animals and humans showing that changes in status cause
physiological reactions, and economic surveys showing that self-rated happiness is more closely associated
with relative than absolute income. This evidence is subject to serious reservations. See infra notes 114-116
and accompanying text.
84. Susan Rose-Ackerman's textual reference to Frank's work, the most extensive discussion of his
prisoner's dilemma model in legal literature, is a brief and cursory paragraph. Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341,357-58 (1988). See
also John J. Donohue ill & Peter Siegelman, The ChangingNature of EmploymentDiscrimination Litigation,
43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1012 n.98 (1991).
85. Frank offers an evolutionary basis for such a desire:
A more general implication of [the evolutionary] view is that an element of almost overriding
importance in the structure of human motivation will be a taste for seeing to it that one's
children are launched in life as successfully as possible. Now, how successful one's children
will be in life depends much less on their skills and endowments in any absolute sense than on
how these compare with the skills and endowments of others.... Suppose we take as a working
hypothesis that a parent's utility function is programmed with an instruction something like, 'Feel
bad whenever your children are less well provided for than are the children of your peers.'
Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note 39, at 102. See also FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at
130 ("If our preferences were forged in the crucible of natural selection, then being able to provide extra
[relative] advantages for our children should indeed taste sweeter than the contemplation of an extended
old age.").
86. The relative desire for having more disposable income is merely "instrumental" to securing
financial security for one's child. Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note 39, at 103. Parents merely need
recognize that "[sluccess in the labor market.., depends much less on the quality of instruction one
receives, per se, than on how one's training compares with the training received by others," to conclude
that they need to acquire a relatively high disposable income for that purpose. Id. at 102.
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ends.87 Frank's refinement is to show, first, that the costs of investment in
positional goods may be a sacrifice of-not just leisure-but any number of
nonpositional goods, such as health or safety. Second, Frank's explanation does
not need a theory of information distortion; a prisoner's dilemma produces an
inefficient result even if the participants have perfect information.88 But the
positional goods theory is limited to whatever number of goods have the
positional qualities that create such a dilemma.89 As long as we focus on
absolute preferences for positional goods, the resulting prisoner's dilemma is
limited by the enumeration of such goods.
Frank's work, however, provides a more general explanation of why the
desire for relative income may not include a desire for relative safety, one that
approaches recognition of relative preferences. This "frame of reference" or
"status" theory is premised on the distinction between "observable" and "un-
observable" goods. Frank calls goods "observable" when they are typically
consumed in public view (e.g., automobiles, clothing, backyard swimming
pools), while unobservable goods are those typically consumed out of public
view (e.g., savings, insurance, certain kinds of safety)."° Given real world
costs of gathering or disseminating information, this simple distinction means
that people are more aware of the social level of consumption of some goods
than others. Frank then suggests two reasons why people might sacrifice un-
observable goods in order to afford more observable goods. First, Frank posits
that consumers judge how well off they are in relation to psychological stan-
dards of comparison or "frames of reference," including how much of a com-
87. For example, Frank argues that "blue laws" limiting store hours may prevent owners competing
for loyal customers from inefficiently extending store hours to an maximum of twenty-four per day. Frank,
Positional Externalities, supra note 77, at 26-27. Such competitive behavior clearly depends only on the
selfish desire to maximize profits, not relative preferences.
88. Miners A and B choose to work in the dusty mine even knowing that they would both be better
off if each worked in the clean mine. Frank reveals this dilemma with the insight that some goods, like
childhood education, are "positional" throughout the entire consumptive spectrum. For such goods, even
when a consumer determines that he cannot achieve a positional gain, he may still invest in the good to
avoid moving backward and losing ground to other individuals who seek to improve their position. Id. at
106. Further, if people care not only about their ordinal ranking but their cardinal position within the
distribution, even a consumer who knows he cannot lose his existing rank will sacrifice nonpositional goods
simply to widen (or maintain) the gap to the next lowest rank (and to narrow or maintain the gap to the
next highest rank). Id. at 106 n.6.
89. The prisoner's dilemma will appear in markets in which most consumers worry, not just about
achieving the top prize, but about falling behind their current level of consumption no matter where they
currently rank. The education one secures for one's children has this characteristic, because most consumers
worry about keeping their current "position" in this market (providing education) even if they recognize
it is futile to strive for the top position. But many of the goods Hirsch considered as "positional" do not
present this problem because so few consumers have any position to lose. For example, a small fraction
of the population currently consumes original artworks of long-dead masters; the problem of consumers
sacrificing greater leisure to avoid falling further behind in such consumption is quite small.
Frank also argues, however, that in markets in which the revenues are highly concentrated among the
top performers, participants will systematically overinvest in competing for that prize. See Robert J. Frank
& Philip H. Cook, Winer-Take-All Markets (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
90. Frank, Unobservable Commodities, supra note 77, at 146.
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modity others are consuming. 9 Frank notes: "One can't envy what one can't
see,"92 and we might add, one cannot take pride in having more of something
than others unless one knows how much the others have. Thus people are more
likely to feel that they lack commodities that others are visibly consuming than
those whose consumption is unobservable. The feeling that one has "enough"
safety may not change as others unobservably consume more safety, but the
feeling that one has an adequate level of an observable good declines as others
consume more. In the above example, the result is that A and B sacrifice safety
to raise themselves up to or above an observable standard of comparison for
those things A and B purchase with the additional wage.
Similarly, the difference between observable and unobservable goods
matters to one's social status. In a different context-a challenge to the margin-
al productivity theory of wages-Frank suggests that people desire "status"
among their peers, and that total income is a major determinant of that sta-
tus. 93 For purposes of Frank's alternative theory of wages, he assumes that
workers in a firm are aware of their coworkers' total compensation package.9"
But to whatever extent this assumption is true for coworkers, most people do
not directly know the income of their "peers" outside their workplace, but
instead must rely on inferences from observable behavior. Thus, Frank's
distinction between observable and unobservable goods suggests a second
reason for people to consume competitively the former to the detriment of the
latter: if one's social status is based not on one's income but on what others
perceive one's income to be, then observable goods will be better at "demon-
strating" purchasing power than are unobservable goods.95 People will value
the consumption of goods that favorably signal their income over unobservable
goods that do not 96
In this explanation, the critical distinction between observable and un-
observable goods, although plausible, requires further explanation. If people
compete for status by demonstrating their wealth, we might expect that individ-
uals would work to eliminate the distinction by "advertising" their unobservable
91. Frank, Frames of Reference, supra note 77, at 80-81.
92. Frank, Unobservable Commodities, supra note 77, at 146.
93. See infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
94. See Frank, Marginal Products, supra note 77.
95. Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note 39, at 101. Even within the category of observable goods,
Frank notes that "interpersonal comparisons with respect to certain types of consumption will be more
important than will others." Id. He does not explain why this is so.
96. The status explanation overcomes an objection to the frame of reference explanation. Being in the
business of mining coal, miners A and B may each know (I) the health and safety consequences of working
in a clean or dusty mine and (2) which mines are clean and which are dusty. If A and B are using each
other's consumption as a frame of reference, each may also know (3) where the other works. Under these
circumstances, workplace health and safety is as observable between these two miners as any other
consumption, and there would be no reason to expect them to sacrifice health and safety for more observable
goods. On the other hand, the rest of the (nonmining) world may evaluate the social standing of A and B
at least partly on the basis of observable consumption, not being aware of the above mining information.
To compete for this status, A and B may sacrifice health and safety measures for more commonly observable
goods.
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consumption. Advertising unobservable consumption such as safety, or even
announcing one's income or wealth directly, would permit one to obtain the
maximum status possible from one's income without sacrificing any otherwise
unobservable consumption. Absent some explanation of why such advertising
fails, the prisoner's dilemma caused by the pursuit of relative income appears
less significant. Even if such advertising has some positive cost, the magnitude
of the dilemma would appear to be limited to the cost of an announcement that
eliminates the observable/unobservable good distinction in a particular context.
Frank's work raises this question and several more. Does the social science
evidence support the existence of relative wants, and particularly, the distinction
between observable and unobservable goods? If position is important, do
individuals care about their position relative to other individuals, as Frank
asserts, or are they concerned with the position of their social groups compared
to other groups, or both? Turning to the theoretical issues, what are the specific
conditions that create a prisoner's dilemma, in which any investment in position
is wasteful? Certainly the mere existence of the desire for status, or other
relative preferences, does not inevitably lead to a collective action problem.
And there are competitions for position that the prisoner's dilemma does not
describe, as when one party, by investing more heavily than others, is made
better off by the superior position he achieves. Is there any inefficiency in such
cases when one party in a positional race actually "wins"? Finally, if consump-
tion has external costs (by lowering the relative position of others), why
wouldn't individuals privately bargain toward a solution of this problem as
predicted by the Coase Theorem? The next Part takes the work of Hirsch and
Frank as a starting point, and, organized around these questions, develops a
general theory of a market failure caused by individual attempts to satisfy
relative preferences. Part III then applies the theory to criticize some conven-
tional economic analyses of law that ignore relative preferences.
II. A SOCIOECONOMIC THEORY OF RELATIVE PREFERENCES
AND COMPETITIVE CONSUMPTION
This Part presents a theory of a market failure that I term "competitive
consumption."'97 Competitive consumption results, under circumstances de-
scribed below, when individuals compete to satisfy their relative preferences
97. See REDER, supra note 34, at 65-66 (introducing term "competitive consumption"). See also W.E.
WEYL, THE NEW DEMOCRACY, AN ESSAY ON CERTAIN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TENDENCIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 246 (1912) (discussing "a frantic competitive consumption" that "increase[s] the general
social friction and produce[s] an acute social irritation"), quoted in MASON, supra note 41, at 77-78; GRANT
MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION: NEW APPROACHES TO THE SYMBOLIC CHARACTER OF
CONSUMER GOODS AND AcTIVrITIS 15 (1988) (tracing the rise in consumerism to Elizabeth I's use of
expenditure as an instrument of government, causing the Noblemen to become "slaves of competitive
consumption").
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(e.g., "when A tries to outdo B ... in the lavishness of his home"). 98 Com-
petitive consumption is a market failure because the resources individuals invest
in attempting to satisfy certain relative preferences could produce greater
satisfaction if invested in satisfying other preferences. The analysis is organized
around three evidentiary and theoretical weaknesses in the existing work on
relative preferences.
First, Frank's review of the data concerning relative wants-and that of the
other economists recently addressing relative wants-is insufficiently rich. To
convince those skeptical of the importance of relative preferences to human
behavior, it is necessary to consider a range of social science data broader than
that which Frank and others present, especially since, for reasons explained
below, 99 their data turns out to be less persuasive than it first appears. Thus,
I call my theory "socioeconomic" because it is rooted in an interdisciplinary
description of relative preferences, drawing-in Section A below--on social
psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Besides establishing relative prefer-
ences as fundamental to human motivation, this data further illuminates the
genuine distinction between observable and unobservable goods.
Second, Section B draws on this social science literature to explain the
market failure of competitive consumption. I introduce the concept of "inherent"
preference conflict, argue that resources invested in satisfying inherently
conflicting preferences are wasted, and show that the conditions of such conflict
are often present for relative preferences. The analysis is broader than Frank's
prisoner's dilemma model both because it applies to desires for less than the
top position and because it applies to cases where one party "wins" the posi-
tional competition. The broader theoretical framework permits application of
the concept of preference conflict to phenomena more varied than competition
for relative income, such as that of race discrimination. 1°°
Finally, Section C considers the Coase Theorem. °1 Even though people
have strong preferences for relative position, if it is in their mutual interest to
limit investments in acquiring or preserving position, they will have an incen-
tive to reach private agreements to limit these unproductive investments. Section
C considers how transaction costs may prevent private solutions to the problems
posed by relative preferences and when those costs will likely be present. Some
of the costs are conventional obstacles to Coasean bargaining, but relative
preferences pose some special transaction costs as well.
98. REDER, supra note 34, at 65.
99. See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
100. See infra, Part 11(D).
101. The "Coase Theorem" derives from Ronald Coase's analysis of externalities in The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See infra note 241.
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A. The Source, Nature and Scope of Relative Preferences: Evidence from
Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, and Economics
Economic analysis typically makes assumptions that are conceded to be
unrealistic. Some simplification of reality is necessary to permit any theory
building; as long as the matter ignored is not significant, the theory may suffice.
It is essential, therefore, to demonstrate the significance of relative preferences
as an empirical matter in order to justify their inclusion in consumer theory.
While striking out to enlarge the neoclassical economic model of human
behavior, Frank and the other economists addressing these preferences have
failed to make the best case for the intensity and pervasiveness of relative
preferences.
Economists addressing relative wants have relied primarily on two types
of evidence. First, Frank and Coelho offer biological evidence to support an
evolutionary basis for relative preferences.0 2 Frank reviews biological studies
of human and nonhuman primates in which changes in social status are associ-
ated with physiological changes. 103 Coelho reviews studies of the social struc-
ture of various animals, showing that status differentiation is common. t°4 This
evidence is suggestive but incomplete. Physiological changes are certainly
significant; they provide strong confirmation of a sociological or psychological
claim that people desire status. But by themselves, the biological studies leave
unanswered the question whether physiological changes associated with status
in turn "cause" behavior,105 or whether human culture is sufficiently like
animal culture to use the latter to make useful predictions about the former.10 6
Some additional, more direct, evidence, remains essential.
Frank also points to some direct evidence: 07 Richard Easterlin's compari-
102. For Frank's explanation of a sociobiological origin of positional preferences, see supra note 85.
For Coelho's theory, see supra note 76, at 91-93. See also KONRAD, supra note 76, at 251-56. Konrad asks
as many questions as he answers, but suggests (1) that as a matter of biological perpetuation, individuals
will tend to favor mating with individuals with "especially well-suited genetic qualities," (2) that because
they lack direct knowledge of the suitability of another's genes, individuals use observable characteristics
correlated with genetic suitability, and (3) that status is such a characteristic to the extent a culture awards
status for characteristics (like strength, skill, knowledge) that aid in survival. Id.
103. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 21-26. For example, in studies of vervet monkeys
and humans, changes in a subject's group status cause changes in the blood concentration of the neurotrans-
mitter serotonin. Id. at 22-23.
104. Coelho, supra, note 76, at 92-93 & nn.8-13. Coelho states that "[tihere is not one species of social
animal that reproduces sexually that does not have hierarchies, social rankings, and dominance," and
particularly notes that "[slocia primates live in groups (tribes), have social distinctions, and are competitive
for status within their tribe." Id. at 92.
105. Existing research suggests that serotonin levels create some tendencies of behavior, but as Frank
admits, our understanding of how serotonin affects behavior is "still very much in its infancy." FRANK, THE
RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 25.
106. MASON, supra note 41, at 17-20, criticizes theories that ignore the importance of cultural
environment to conspicuous consumption, i.e., theories that "the basic drive is unlearned and would be
significant under any social conditions." Id. at 19. As his historic analysis of the United States and England
shows, conspicuous consumption has taken different forms and existed in varying intensities over time.
107. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 26-30. Frank also argues that various economic
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son of income and self-reported happiness, which found happiness more closely
associated with relative than absolute income.'08 Virtually every economist
addressing the issue of relative desires has relied heavily, if not exclusively,
on this one apparently dispositive source. 0 9 In 1974, Easterlin reviewed in-
come data and happiness surveys collected in nineteen countries over approxi-
mately 25 years." 0 Within each nation, he found that those in the highest
income group were happier on average than those in the lowest group; in other
words, income was positively related to happiness. But among the nineteen
nations, he found little relationship between income and happiness; the average
citizen of a wealthy country was not significantly happier than the average
citizen of a poor country."' Easterlin explained the conflict between the with-
in-country and among-country comparisons by a theory of relative income:
people care more about their relative than absolute income,"' but only care
about income "relative" to those around them (within their nation). Thus those
who rank above their nation's average consumption level are, on average,
happier than those who do not, but the above average wealth of one country
does not mean its inhabitants are, on average, happier than the inhabitants of
countries of below average wealth."
3
phenomena (like wages and savings) are best explained by a theory that incorporates a desire for relative
income. Id. at 58-98, 143-61. Because alternate theories may still account for the data, however, the
persuasiveness of the relative income theory of wages or savings depends in part on direct evidence of
relative preferences.
108. Easterlin, supra note 66.
109. Hirsch calls Easterlin's data "[p]erhaps the most striking indication of the significance of relative
income ...." HIRSCH, supra note 67, at 111. Coelho states that "the evidence... overwhelmingly
support[s] the proposition" that "humans have interdependent utility functions," Coelho supra note 76, at
96, but the only social science evidence he actually cites is Easterlin. Id. at I ll n.22. See also Ng, supra
note 75, at 584 (relying on Easterlin); Layard, supra note 66, at 737, nn.l-2 (1980) (stating that ' rich
countries appear to be no happier than poorer ones," citing Easterlin); FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note
77, at 26-31 (Tables 2.1 and 2.2, Figure 2.6); Frank, Interdependent Preferences, supra note 77, at 511 n.3.
This data has achieved such notoriety that it has been called the "Easterlin paradox." Moses Abramovitz,
Economic Growth and Its Discontents, in ECONOMICS AND HuMAN WELFARE 3, 7 (Michael Boskin ed.
1979).
110. Easterlin, supra note 66, at 89-90.
111. Rather than finding that wealthier nations had happier inhabitants, many of the nations, including
the poorest four, clustered around the mean happiness level. In addition to the international comparisons,
Easterlin conducted a time series study within the United States. He found no significant relationship
between income and happiness; as American income rose from 1946 to 1970, self-reported happiness
fluctuated up and down, but with only a small upward trend. See also Otis D. Duncan, Does Money Buy
Sasfaction? 2 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 267 (1975) (surveys of Detroit area housewives showed no significant
difference in satisfaction with standard of living between 1955 and 1971, despite fact that median income
in constant (1971) dollars rose by factor of 1.42 during same period); ANaus CAMPBELL, THE SENSE OF
WELL-BEING IN AMERICA: RECENT PATrERNS AND TRENDS 27-38 (1981) (time series study suggests that
there was downward drift in happiness in United States from 1957 to 1978, while there was much economic
growth).
112. Following Duesenberry, he postulates that the utility people derive from their consumption
expenditure "is a function, not of the absolute level of [their] expenditure, but of the ratio of [their] current
expenditure to that of other people." Easterlin, supra note 66, at 112.
113. The relative income thesis also explains the time series data supra note I11: average happiness
remains constant as income rises because the consumption standard against which people measure their
income is also rising. Because relative income is the concern, it is possible that those in the current lowest
income group feel less happiness than the middle class of prior decades even though their absolute income
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Easterlin seems to provide startling and definitive proof of the power of
relative wants. But the evidence is a little too startling; recent data contradicts
Easterlin's findings. Surveys from a larger number of countries reveal a distinct-
ly positive relationship between happiness and wealth among countries."'
Ruut Veenhoven has also shown that Easterlin's own data actually prove a
positive correlation between happiness and national wealth." 5 Veenhoven
concludes that absolute income strongly influences happiness, although there
are diminishing returns from income as absolute needs are satisfied." 6 Aside
from apparent empirical invalidity, the reliance on Easterlin's study focuses too
much on the desire for relative income or wealth. If we wish to establish a
broader theory of relative preferences, one that may include the desire for things
other than relative income, then we should consider the general psychological
and sociological sources of such preferences.
Questioning the Easterlin results does not mean that people do not have
relative wants. But rejection of Easterlin does require a renewed inquiry into
the existence and significance of relative preferences. To some extent the
Easterlin data made the proof appear too easy and forestalled a broader review
of the social science literature.
is higher. Easterlin, supra note 66, at 112.
114. See George Gallup, Human Needs and Satisfactions: A Global Survey, 40 PUB. OP. Q. 459, 460,
463 (1976) (sample included 60 nations containing two-thirds of world population; finding "[t]he nations
with the highest per capita income almost invariably top every test of psychological well-being and
satisfaction in major aspects of life."); Ruut Veenhoven, Is Happiness Relative?, 24 SOC. INDICATORS RES.
1, 12 (1991) (more recent and comprehensive data show "correlation between GNP per capita and average
happiness is +0.84! (p < 0.01)"); Ed Diener et al, The Relationship Between Income and Subjective Well-
Being: Relative or Absolute? 17-22 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (survey of 18,032
college students in 39 countries showed that "average life satisfaction" and "global happiness" both
"correlated significantly across countries with GNP per person"). See also Morris Silver, Money and
Happiness?: Towards 'Eudaimonology,' 33 KYKLos 157 (1980).
115. Veenhoven, supra note 114, at 10-12. Veenhoven argues that Easterlin's chart showing the absence
of a relationship between wealth and happiness among countries "is simply misleading. Easterlin played
the classic trick of scales: the scale of national wealth is 2.5 times longer than the happiness scale and
logarithmic. If both variables are plotted on equal scales.. . we.. . see a clear positive relationship." Id.
at 10.
116. Veenhoven argues that since income is used to satisfy basic needs, we should expect the effect
of income on happiness to diminish as those needs are satisfied. Id. at 26-27. Veenhoven uses the concept
of diminishing returns to explain Easterlin's time series study of the United States, and similar data described
supra note 111. The fact that growth between 1945 and 1970 did not significantly affect happiness does
not prove that absolute income is irrelevant, according to Veenhoven, only that absolute income has little
effect on happiness once affluence is achieved. Because "[tihe USA was already quite affluent at the end
of World War I ... it is... quite comprehensible that further increase did not add much to happiness."
Veenhoven, supra note 114, at 19. Time series data from several other countries over roughly the same
period-countries beginning at a level lower than the United States-shows a general rise in happiness. Id.
Of course, if the marginal effect of absolute income on happiness declines toward zero, any remaining
effect of income on happiness must be due to the pleasures of relative income. Veenhoven claims, however,
that within countries, the relationship between income and happiness is much weaker in affluent countries
than poor ones. Id. at 12. In some of the affluent countries, there is no remaining relationship between
income and happiness, but within the wealthiest he surveyed---the United States-there remains a significant
correlation between income and happiness. Id. Thus, despite the force of his general criticism of Easterlin,
there is still some evidence of the desire for relative income.
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1. The Process of Social Comparison and the Theory of Relative
Deprivation
The definition I have given to negative relative preferences11 7 bears sub-
stantial relation to social science research on the human drive toward social
comparison. From its beginnings, social psychology has emphasized the impor-
tance of social context to the development of an individual's self-concept,1 8
and, in particular, the fact that people compare themselves with other people.
Various theories compete for the best explanation of why people compare
themselves with one another, and for the best predictor of which "others" will
be chosen for comparison, what aspects will be compared, and the cognitive
and emotional effect such comparisons will have. Existing constructs-the
psychological theory of social comparison and the sociological theory of
relative deprivation-reveal that comparison with others is a prevalent phenom-
enon, and that people's emotional state, their short-term moods and long-term
happiness, often depend on their ranking in comparison with others."9
Within social psychology, the body of work most relevant to relative
preferences is "social comparison theory." Leon Festinger introduced social
comparison theory in 1954 to explain the particular relationship between social
groups and individual self-assessment." ° Festinger hypothesized that individu-
117. See supra text accompanying notes 14-24.
118. In the nineteenth century, William James noted the effect of comparisons to others on self-esteem.
WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (Dover, 1950) (1890). Early in this century, Charles
Horton Cooley introduced the concept of the "looking-glass self": people are "ashamed to be seen evasive
in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a
refined one, and so on. We always imagine, and in imagining share the judgments of the other mind."
CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1902) quoted in George Goethals,
Social Comparison Theory: Psychologyfrom the Lost and Found, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
261, 273 (1986).
119. Social comparison and relative deprivation theories have emerged from a group of theories that
share much in common for the purposes of this Article. For a survey and synthesis of other theories of social
psychology and sociology that are similar to social comparison and relative deprivation theories, see Thomas
F. Pettigrew, Social Evaluation Theory: Convergences and Applications, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON
MOTIVATION 241 (D. Levine ed., 1967). Pettigrew traces the origins of comparison theory to some of the
earliest social psychological thinking. Id. He finds within the work of various psychologists, including Leon
Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUMAN RELATIONS 117 (1954), and sociologists,
including SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE (1949), a
core of agreement he called "social evaluation theory." Pettigrew, supra, at 242 (these theories "are
variations on the same theoretical theme of social evaluation"). According to Pettigrew, the basic tenets of
social evaluation theory are (1) "that human beings learn about themselves by comparing themselves to
others"; and (2) that "the process of social evaluation leads to positive, neutral, or negative self-ratings which
are relative to the standards set by the individuals employed for comparison." Id. at 243 (emphasis omitted).
As the remainder of this Section reveals, modem work on social evaluation occurs primarily within the fields
of social comparison and relative deprivation theories.
120. See Festinger, supra note 119. See also Leon Festinger, Motivation Leading to Social Behavior,
in 2 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 191, 217 (Marshall R. Jones ed., 1954) (shorter summary).
Festinger is probably best known for his later work introducing the concept of cognitive dissonance. See
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). For a history of social comparison theory,
see Ladd Wheeler, A Brief History of Social Comparison Theory, in SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 55,
at 3 and Goethals, supra note 118. The major compilations of social comparison work are Studies in Social
Comparison, in J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. (Bibb Latan6 ed., supp. 1966); SOCIAL COMPARISON
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als seek to evaluate their own opinions and abilities, that sometimes there is
no absolute metric available for such self-evaluation, and that people will then
attempt to compare their opinions and abilities with others (called "comparison
others"). One of the key insights by Festinger, confirmed by much subsequent
research, is that people do not generally compare themselves with the rest of
the world but with some much more discrete group, typically with others they
see as being "similar" to themselves, either in general or for the characteristic
being compared. 21
As initially formulated, Festinger's social comparison theory easily fits
within a standard economic explanation of consumer behavior. To maximize
welfare, consumers require accurate information concerning their own opinions
and abilities. For example, to make intelligent decisions about what kind and
how much education or training one should purchase (investment in human
capital), or what job one should pursue, it is important to know one's aptitude
for various tasks. When there is no absolute scale for measuring one's abilities
or traits (and perhaps even when there is), it is rational to seek a relative
ranking by comparing oneself with others. If everyone you know is funnier than
you are, you may want to think about being a law professor (but not a comedy
writer).
One of the major changes in social comparison theory, however, has been
the recognition of a second function of comparisons. In addition to self-evalua-
tion, the motive for social comparison may be "self-enhancement," i.e., to
improve one's self-esteem.122 As Jerome Singer put it, people evaluate not
only an opinion or ability but "their opinions of themselves.... When a person
asks 'How much X do I have [compared to others]?' he is also asking 'What
sort of person am I for possessing that much XT ''t A favorable interperson-
PROCESSES: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (Jerry M. Suls & Richard L. Miller eds., 1977)
[hereinafter SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES], and SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 55.
121. See Jerry M. Suls, Notes on the Occasion of Social Comparison Theory's Thirtieth Birthday, 12
PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 289, 291 (1986) (concluding that subsequent studies support
Festinger's similarity hypothesis). For example, one study of 35,000 graduates of American colleges and
universities found that high grades are more strongly associated with selection of a "high-level" career than
is quality of school. In other words, even though quality of school varies significantly, a student's relative
standing among the other students at his or her particular school is the key predictor of choice of career.
James A. Davis, The Campus as a Frog Pond: An Application of the Theory of Relative Deprivation to
Career Decisions of College Men, 72 AM. J. SOC. 17 (1966).
122. See Jerry M. Suls, Social Comparison Theory and Research: An Overview from 1954, in SOCIAL
COMPARISON PROCESSES, supra note 120, at 1 ("It is now widely accepted that one's self-concept [defined
as including one's sense of self-worth] is vitally affected by social comparison. That is, one's self-concept
is based in part on how one compares to other individuals with regard to traits, opinions, and abilities.").
Goethals, supra note 118, at 268, credits William James and Erik Erikson with first making this general
point about self-esteem and comparison, although the first study within social comparison theory directly
to assess the effect of comparisons on self-esteem was Stan Morse and Kenneth J. Gergen, Social Compari-
son, Self-Consistency, and the Concept of Self, 16 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCItOL. 148 (1970).
123. Jerome E. Singer, Social Comparison-Progress and Issues, J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
103, 105 (Supp. 1 1966)
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al or intergroup comparison may enhance self-esteem;' 24 an unfavorable one
may reduce it.'ss People may seek others with whom favorable comparisons
may be made ("downward comparison"), so as to improve their self-esteem.126
Of course, the "similarity hypothesis" continues to place a limit on the people
with whom one makes comparisons; self-esteem depends upon comparisons
with similar others. 27
Because of the emotional risks of comparison-the possibility that one will
discover that one ranks lower along some scale than previously be-
lieved-people have mechanisms for coping with unfavorable comparisons. One
of these coping mechanisms illuminates the difference between self-evaluation
and self-enhancement: people tend to interpret information about themselves
in a "distorted, but reassuring" manner.12s They are more sensitive to informa-
tion that supports their positive self-image than to information that contradicts
it. 129 Unlike a rigid economic rationality, this bias undermines the "self-evalu-
ation" function; individuals tend to evaluate themselves charitably, not impar-
tially."'0 But this informational bias is rational in that it minimizes the loss
124. See Thomas A. Wills, Downward Comparison Principles in Social Psychology, 90 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 245 (1981) [hereinafter Wills, Downward Comparison Principles]; Thomas A. Wills, Similarity and
Self-Esteem in Downward Comparison, in SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 55, at 51-56 [hereinafter Wills,
Similarity and Self-Esteem] (citing supporting studies). Wills posits that downward comparison does not
produce a linear increase in subjective well-being because extreme differentials may produce countervailing
forces such as empathetic concern or concern for one's future similarity to the lower ranking person. Id.
at 58-60; see also Philip Brickman & Ronnie Janoff Buiman, Pleasure and Pain in Social Comparison, in
SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES, supra note 120, at 168-69 (citing studies regarding fear of success). Self-
enhancement may also be caused by intergroup comparisons, i.e., by making favorable comparisons about
the group to which one belongs (the "in-group") against groups to which one does not belong ("out-groups").
See Riia Luhtanen & Jennifer Crocker, Self-Esteem and Intergroup Comparisons: Toward a Theory of
Collective Self-Esteem, in SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 55, at 211 (citing supporting studies).
125. "[Clonceiving of a standard for evaluating abilities and opinions without reference to social norms
seems an impossible task. For this reason, a person's self-esteem is greatly affected by how he or she differs
from others on valued attributes .... The superior person, by serving to underscore an individual's outcome
dissatisfaction, lays bare this individual's low self-esteem as well and, by causing self-evaluative standards
to rise, compromises self-esteem even further." Richard Smith et al., The Roles of Outcome Satisfaction
And Comparison Alternatives in Envy, 29 BRrr. J. SOC. PSYCHOL 247, 254 (1990). See also Brickman &
Bulman, supra note 124, at 152-53, 158. Those in higher status positions often tend to disparage those in
lower status positions. Id. at 158, 166-67 (citing supporting studies).
126. Wills, Downward Comparison Principles, supra note 124. Similarly, people can sometimes
improve their self-esteem by comparing themselves with someone slightly higher in rank for an ability or
trait ("upward comparison"), if they can thereby assure themselves that they are very nearly as good as a
very high ranking individual.
127. Social comparison theory is therefore consistent with the common sense observation that a
modestly serious amateur bowler does notsuffer in self-esteem because she compares poorly to aprofession-
al; nor does a middle class worker gain self-esteem from favorable comparison to a homeless person. The
latter case, however, may produce guilt rather than esteem. See supra notes 121 & 124.
128. Goethals, supra note 118, at 274. See also George Goethals, Fabricating and Ignoring Social
Reality: Self-Serving Estimates of Consensus, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON: THE
ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM (James v. Oison et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM]; Gary Marks,
Thinking One's Abilities Are Unique and One's Opinions Are Common, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BuLL. 203 (1984).
129. This includes judging competitors or rivals more harshly than the objective facts warrant. See,
e.g., Marks, supra note 128.
130. John Arrowood refers to this fact as a "tension... between wanting to find out (self-evaluation)
and wanting to find out particular things (social reality and self-validation)." A.J. Arrowood, Comments on
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people suffer in their inevitable encounters with people who surpass them in
some manner important to self-esteem.1 31
In addition to social comparison theory, the process of "upward compari-
son" forms an integral part of what sociologists and social psychologists call
"relative deprivation." ' Relative deprivation theory further illuminates the
types of comparisons people seek and the behavior such comparisons motivate.
Although people are in a sense "deprived" whenever they lack something that
they desire, they do not always experience feelings of resentment, anger, or
unfairness as a result.1 33 Psychologists hypothesize that a central component
of people's angry feelings over deprivation is a comparison between themselves
and others who have the desired thing.' 34
Social theorists first introduced the concept of "relative" deprivation to
explain some paradoxical findings in an extensive and well-known study of
American soldiers during World War H. Notably, the study revealed that while
airmen had absolutely greater prospects for promotion than military policemen,
the former were substantially less satisfied than the latter with their chances
for promotion.135 Sociologists theorized that members of each military group
made comparisons primarily with members of their own group and, therefore,
that unpromoted airmen, who had more promoted peers, felt the most relative
deprivation. 136 Although comparison with others is not always necessary to
"Social Comparison Theory: Psychology from the Lost and Found," 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 279, 281 (1986). Brickman & Bulman, supra note 124, at 178-8 1, describe this conflict as a "contest
between adaptive and hedonic forces" and outline a model for predicting the net outcome of these forces.
131. Social comparison theorists have attempted to measure how much one's happiness, satisfaction,
or subjective well-being depends on how one fares in the process of social comparison. Such measurements
are extremely difficult because social comparison has both direct and indirect effects on well-being. Angus
Campbell, for example, claims to have found that individual well-being depends largely on the gap between
one's aspirations and one's achievements, and to some lesser degree on direct comparisons with "typical
Americans." See ANGUS CAMPBELL sr AL., THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LIFE: PERCEPTIONS, EVALUATIONS,
AND SATIsFACrnONs 171-72 (1976). Campbell states, however, that comparison with others is an important
determinant of one's aspiration level. Id. Similarly, adaptation-level theorists posit that subjective well-being
depends on how far one achieves above the level to which one has adapted as a result of past experiences,
but such experiences include the experiences of others one learns about through a process of social
comparison. See Philip Brickman & Donald T. Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good
Society, in ADAPrATION-LEVEL THEORY 287, 294 (M.H. Appley ed., 1971). Nonetheless, evidence suggests
that social comparison significantly affects subjective well-being. See Richard H. Smith et al., Intrapersonal
and Social Comparison Determinants of Happiness: A Range-Frequency Analysis, 56 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PsYCHOL. 317, 319 (1989) (citing studies). But see Diener, et al., supra note 114, at 16.
132. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 270-71 (1992).See generally ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 128; W. G. RUNCMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 196 (1966); SOCIAL
COMPARISON, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION: THEORETICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVES (John C. Masters & William P. Smith eds., 1987).
133. James M. Oison & Michael Ross, Perceived Qualifications, Resource Abundance, and Resentment
about Deprivation, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 425, 426 (1984).
134. See, e.g., Faye Crosby, A Model of Egoistical Relative Deprivation, 83 PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 90
(1976) (maintaining that first precondition of relative deprivation is that "the person who lacks X must see
that someone else ... possesses X").
135. STOUFFER, supra note 119, at 250-58.
136. Robert K. Merton & Alice S. Rossi, Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior,
in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 225 (Robert K. Merton ed., 1957); Robert K. Merton & Alice
S. Kitt, Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior, in CONTINUITIES IN SOCIAL RESEARCH:
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produce feelings of relative deprivation, 37 numerous studies since The Ameri-
can Soldier have demonstrated the importance of comparison with others to
feelings of relative deprivation and behaviors motivated by such feelings. 138
The theory of relative deprivation is useful in predicting and explaining social
protest, at least when people feel that their group is deprived as compared to
other groups.1 39 Other work has extended the concept to "relative gratifica-
tion," the notion that people feel especially gratified when they have more
relative to others."4
Furthermore, the concept of "poverty" may best be explained as an acute
form of relative deprivation.1 41 The feeling of income inadequacy known as
STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF "THE AMERICAN SOLDIER" 40 (Robert K. Merton & Paul F.
Lazarsfeld eds., 1950).
137. There are several possible bases for comparison: "persons may feel deprived of some desirable
thing relative to their own past, another person, persons, group, ideal, or some other social category." Ian
Walker & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Relative Deprivation Theory: An Overview and Conceptual Critique, 23
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 302 (1984). Several studies have shown how people may use their own past
as a basis for comparison. See Thomas S. Cook et al., The Construct Validity of Relative Deprivation, in
SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES, supra note 120, at 323 (presenting studies of self-comparison, Table 5).
Of course, some form of relative comparison is a necessary component of relative deprivation theory.
138. See Cook, supra note 137, at 320-23 (presenting studies involving comparison with others, Table
4). After reviewing this literature, Pettigrew concludes that "[flrom small group research and voting surveys
to international studies, relative deprivation (RD) ideas receive considerable empirical support." Pettigrew,
supra note 119, at 272. See also Morawetz, supra note 51, at 521-22 n.2.
One of the major theoretical disputes, begun by Runciman, supra note 132, is whether relative
deprivation (RD) is based primarily upon interpersonal or intergroup comparisons. "Egoistic RD refers to
a type of personal discontent that occurs when an individual compares his or her own situation to that of
others (ingroup or outgroup members), whereas fraternal RD is a more social discontent that occurs when
an individual compares the situation of his or her group as a whole to that of an outgroup." Lise Dub6 &
Serge Guimond, Relative Deprivation and Social Protest: The Personal-Group Issue, in ONTARIO SYMPO-
SIUM, supra note 128, at 201, 204. Compare Crosby, supra note 134 (the egoistic model emphasizing
interpersonal comparisons) with Walker & Pettigrew, supra note 137 (emphasizing fraternalistic model of
inter-group comparisons).
139.
The research reviewed... indicates that fraternalistic RD is useful for predicting white racism
and support of black political candidates in the United States, militancy among black Americans
and their approval of violence to gain their rights, attitudes of Qu6bec nationalism among
Francophone Canadians in Montreal, subjective satisfactions among members of Toronto's
Chinese community, and outgroup attitudes among Chinese in Toronto and Muslims in India,
respectively.
Kenneth L. Dion, Responses to Perceived Discrimination and Relative Deprivation, in ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 128, at 159, 174. Although rejecting a link between social protest and personal dissatisfaction
from "egoistic" relative deprivation, Dub6 and Guimond also report studies linking "fraternal" relative
deprivation and social protest. Dub6 & Guimond, supra note 138, at 201. For the distinction between egoistic
and fraternal relative deprivation, see supra note 138.
140. See, e.g., Morawetz, supra note 51, at 521-22, n.2 (finding that some people express happiness
at thought of others' incomes decreasing while their own remains constant). Although there are effects that
may offset "relative gratification," such as guilt or empathy, see supra note 124, Pettigrew perceptively
argues that "[glenerally in a competitive society such as that of the United States the intrinsic satisfaction
of the differentiating reward and the feeling of competitive success more than compensate for the interper-
sonal loss." Pettigrew, supra note 119, at 265. See Michael C. Kearl, An Inquiry Into the Positive Personal
and Social Effects of Old Age Stereotypes Among the Elderly, 14 INT'L J. AOINo & HuM. DEv. 277 (1981-
82) (finding evidence that elderly benefit from feelings of "relative advantage" by comparing themselves
to unduly pessimistic stereotypes of older Americans).
141. See Peter Townsend, The Development of Research on Poverty, SOCIAL SECURITY RESEARCH:
THE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY 15, 18 (1979) (A conception of poverty should be
"founded on 'relative deprivation' ... the absence or inadequacy of those diets, amenities, standards,
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poverty is difficult to define at an absolute level of income. Both official and
unofficial meanings of poverty have historically been relative, so that the
poverty level in various societies rises as the average income rises. 42 Att-
empts to define poverty without reference to contemporary social standards, i.e.,
definitions pegged to some absolute, nonhistorical amount of material wealth,
tend to condemn either too many or too few to poverty according to common
understanding. 43 Several theorists have convincingly argued that given this
sort of data, poverty cannot be understood except as inherently relative to social
standards of wealth. 144
Finally, there are psychological studies of what is called the "minimal
intergroup situation." Social psychologists seeking to understand the effect of
group membership on individual behavior have set out to create a "base-line
intergroup situation" in which individuals would have no reason to favor their
own group nor to discriminate against the other group.145 But to their surprise,
the psychologists were unable to construct intergroup situations without bias:
"[Iln one study after another, the 'minimal' [group] situations threw up findings
of intergroup discrimination which kept on producing very high levels of
services and activities which are common or customary in a society.").
142. For example, Lee Rainwater reviewed 18 Gallup Poll surveys taken in the United States between
1946 and 1969. This review revealed that the response to the question, "How much income a week do you
think the average family of four needs for health and comfort in this community?," rose 50% in constant(1971) dollars over the twenty-five year period. LEE RAINWATER, WHAT MONEY BUYS: INEQUALITY AND
THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF INCOME 52 (1974). Additionally, many countries have continually raised the
poverty line as the general wealth increases. See Easterlin, supra note 66, at 113 (citing studies).
143. See Easterlin, supra note 66, at 115-16 ("'[Tlhe great majority of American families live on a
scale that compares well with the way wealthy families lived 200 years ago."' (emphasis added) (quoting
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN ECONOMIST'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (Lance E. Davis et
al., eds., 1972)). If we adopt a subsistence level of poverty, the United States and other Western nations
will have virtually eliminated poverty, notwithstanding public understanding to the contrary. However, if
we seek an absolute standard higher than subsistence, the implication may be that many people in non-
Western countries (or in Western countries in the past) who are (or were) considered "middle class" are,
in fact, poor.
144. Scitovsky claims that some minimum amount of wealth is necessary for an individual to "gain
and assert his membership in the society around him." SCrrOVSKY, supra note 76, at 115-16. This level
of wealth is the minimum "status," the absence of which defines poverty in any given society. Amartya
Sen proposes a similar view in Poor, Relatively Speaking, 35 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 153 (1983). Sen rejects
a definition of poverty that is solely a question of inequality (having less than others), and instead defines
poverty as "absolute deprivation in terms of a person's capabilities." Id. at 153. But because such capabili-
ties should include the ability to avoid shame resulting, for example, from the failure to meet social
conventions, id. at 159-61, 168 (citing ADAM SMrrIH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 29), poverty
is "relative deprivation in terms of commodities, incomes and resources." Id. at 153.
145. HENRITAFEL, DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS 10(1978). Tajfel and Turner describe
the initial experimental paradigm:
[Tihe subjects . . . are randomly classified as members of two nonoverlapping
groups-ostensibly on the basis of some trivial performance criterion. They then make "deci-
sions," awarding amounts of money to pairs of other subjects (excluding self) in specially
designed booklets. The recipients are anonymous, except for their individual code numbers and
their group membership (for example, member number 51 of the X group and member number
33 of the Y group). The subjects, who know their own group membership, award the amounts
individually and anonymously.
Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 13-14 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986) (emphasis added).
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statistical significance."' ' In Part Ill(C), I argue that these findings suggest
an inherent tendency of groups to compete against one another for status, and
present a model of discrimination as a group-based status competition. For
present purposes, however, it is the nature of the group discrimination that is
relevant. When subjects in the minimal intergroup study were asked to award
other subjects points or money, they not only favored members of their group,
but appeared to follow a strategy of maximizing the relative difference between
the groups, even when that strategy failed to maximize profit within their own
group.14
7
In sum, research on social comparison processes and relative deprivation
suggests both the source and prevalence of relative preferences. Social compari-
son theory teaches that people commonly compare their abilities and traits with
those of others and that they feel measurably better off by favorable compari-
sons (to those of lower rank), and measurably worse off by unfavorable com-
parisons (to those of higher rank). In economic terms, we can reasonably say
that people have preferences-as ends in themselves-for favorable compari-
sons with others. Similarly, relative deprivation theory tells us that people are
made to feel worse off by having less of something than those with whom they
most frequently compare themselves. These feelings of deprivation are signifi-
cant enough to explain certain behavior, especially when people feel the group
to which they belong is deprived in comparison to other groups.' 48 Studies
of the minimal intergroup situation also demonstrate that individuals readily
compete on behalf of groups to which they belong by seeking to maximize
differences over other groups. Again translating into economic terms, we can
say that people have relative preferences for having as much or more than other
individuals, and for belonging to groups that have as much or more than other
groups. To understand fully the role that market goods play in satisfying these
preferences, we should consider what other social scientists have said about the
symbolic significance of such goods.
146. Id. at 10-11, 75-86. See also Louise Lemyre & Philip M. Smith, Intergroup Discrimination and
Self-Esteem in the Minimal Group Paradigm, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 660,660 (1985) ("More
than 20 experiments in which researchers used variants of the minimal group experimental procedure (MGP)
support the hy[plothesis that under certain conditions, merely being categorized into an experimental group
is sufficient to induce favoritism to the in-group and discrimination against an out-group."). For an additional
discussion of the minimal intergroup situation, including methodological detail, see infra notes 362-367 and
accompanying text.
147. TAJEL, supra note 145, at 80 ("[Wlhen relative differentiation in favour of the ingroup conflicted
with the absolute amounts of awards that could be distributed either to members of the ingroup (the
[maximum ingroup profit] strategy) or to all subjects (the [maximum joint profits] strategy), it was the
achievement of this relative differentiation which tended to guide the choices."); see also Lemyre & Smith,
supra note 146, at 660 ("Reliably, [individuals] discriminate competitively in favor of their own group,
striving not only for their own group's gain, but also for advantage relative to the other group even when
this entails the sacrifice of absolute gain for one's own group.").
148. Although envy is only one possible result of social comparison and relative deprivation, its
pervasiveness is additional evidence of the importance of these psychological processes. For the significance
of envy to human culture, see HELMUT SCHOECK, ENVY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR I (Michael
Glenny & Betty Ross eds., 1969) ("Envy is a drive which lies at the core of man's life as a social being.").
19921
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2. Goods as Symbols of Status
The pervasiveness of status symbols provides additional support for the
importance of positional desires: if people did not strongly desire status, they
would not invest in symbols of status. Additionally, an understanding of the
manner in which status symbols are utilized will illuminate more clearly the
distinction between observable and unobservable goods.
Status may be understood as the respect one commands from others as a
consequence of where others place one in a social hierarchy;149 those who
fare well in social comparisons deemed important by society are awarded this
respect. If the existence of an individual's favorable comparisons were always
conspicuous, then there would be no need for symbols of status. A person's
comparative qualities will not, however, be readily observable to all of society
all of the time. The history of status therefore must be understood in light of
the following problem: those who enjoy high status have an interest in symbol-
izing their status, while those who lack status seek to appropriate such symbols
and construct a "fraudulent" status for themselves.' 50 As significant social
science literature suggests, consumers commonly use goods in this manner, to
symbolize their status, whether truthfully or fraudulently.
Anthropologists study human culture in part by studying the material
objects of culture. Material objects reveal much more than the level of technolo-
gy a culture has obtained. Objects serve various symbolic functions, and their
study reveals the social norms, relationships, and patterns within a culture.' 5
149. "Status is ... a form of power ... consist[ing] of the respect, consideration, and envy of others.
A person with status sets the standards and norms by which others will act, and in this way embodies the
goals of a culture." MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE RCCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS:
DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 29 (1981). "Status symbols, therefore, express a very general aspect
of their owners-their power to control others. They are in some ways a summary of all the salient
characteristics of the self, a global measure of the owner's standing in the community." Id. at 31. Status
is the quintessential positional good: not everyone can have the power described above. See Sabini & Silver,
Envy, supra note 55, at 167, 172 ("It is not only, as social comparison theory holds ... that a person
evaluates his assessment of his own status by comparing his assessment with that of others, but also that
his status, as evaluated by himself or others, is inherently comparative.").
150. GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION: NEW APPROACES TO THE SYMBOLIC
CHARACTER OF CONSUMER GOODS AND ACTIVITIES 33 (1988) ('"[A] symbol of status is not always a very
good test of status' because it may be used in a 'fraudulent' manner. (quoting Erving Goffman, Symbols
of Class Status, 2 BRIT. J. Soc. 294 (1951))).
151. "Consumer goods have a significance that goes beyond their utilitarian character and commercial
value. This significance consists largely in their ability to carry and communicate cultural meaning.... In
the last decade a diverse body of scholars has made the cultural significance of consumer goods the focus
of renewed academic study." MCCRACKEN, supra note 150, at 71; see also id. at 75,83 n.8 (citing empirical
investigations for specific goods including housing, art, clothing, ornaments, technology, food, and
automobiles); MARY DOUGLAS & BARON ISHERWOOD, THE WORLD OF GOODS 59 (1979) ("It is standard
ethnographic practice to assume that all material possessions carry social meanings and to concentrate a
main part of cultural analysis upon their use as communicators."). See generally CSlKSZENTM-IALYI &
ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 149; MATERIAL CULTURE STUDIES IN AMERICA (Thomas J. Schlereth ed.,
1982); MARSHALL SAHLINS, CULTURE AND PRACTICAL REASON (1976); Russell W. Belk, Possessions and
the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988). Legal theory has generally ignored the symbolic
meaning of goods. For an exceptional work examining the relationship between product liability law and
the symbolic content of goods, see Anita Bernstein, Why Products Liability? (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
HeinOnline  -- 102 Yale L.J. 38 1992-1993
1992] Relative Preferences
A major function of material objects or "goods" is to symbolize individual
social rank or status. 152 Enthnographic studies find that goods are routinely
used to represent social rank. 53 An array of social science literature has re-
vealed "how individuals and communities use inanimate objects to claim, to
legitimate, and to compete for status meaning."'"M
Exactly what role do goods play in status competition? Veblen gave one
answer: the "conspicuous consumption" of goods demonstrates one's pecuniary
on file with author).
152. Material objects serve many symbolic functions other than representing status, and some
anthropologists have criticized theorists for ignoring the other subtle and varied ways in which goods are
imbued with cultural or personal meaning. See MCCRACKEN, supra note 150, at 89 ("It is only recently that
the field of person-object relations... has begun to recognize that the cultural meaning carried by consumer
goods is enormously more various and complex than the Veblenian attention to status was capable of
recognizing."); DOUGLAS & ISHERWOOD, supra note 151, at 207 n.6. But if some have focused on the
"status meaning" of goods to the exclusion of other meanings, it is only because symbolizing status is one
unmistakable function of goods. See McCRACKEN, supra note 150, at 10 ("status meaning" is "perhaps the
most obvious[] of the kinds of meaning contained in goods.").
153. See, e.g., E.R. LEACH, POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA: A STUDY OF KACHIN SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 142-43 (1964) ("Wealth objects [of the Kachin tribesmen] other than ordinary perishable
foodstuffs have value primarily as items of display. The best way [for a Kachin tribesman] to acquire
notoriety as the owner (ruler) of an object is publicly to give possession of it to someone else .... In sum,
the possessor of wealth objects gains merit and prestige mainly through the publicity he achieves in getting
rid of them."); H.K. Schneider, Economic Development and Economic Change: The Case of East African
Cattle," 15 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 259, 261 (1974) (concluding that "man is a maximizer not of goods
but of status," and that "[u]tility in its purest form is social, not material"); Joachim Voss, The Politics of
Pork and the Rituals of Rice: Redistributive Feasting and Commodity Circulation in Northern Luzon, the
Philippines, in BEYOND THE NEW ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 121, 128-29 (John Clammer ed., 1987) (the
pig "carries the heaviest symbolic load in Igorot society"; protocol of meat circulation at ritual feasts requires
that pig parts be distributed according to status). See also MASON, supra note 41, at 49-53 nn. 5 & 8
(potlach ceremony of various cultures involving hoarding of property for status rituals, sometimes including
intentional destruction of property); id. at 57 (Roman gladiator exhibitions originally introduced as part of
funeral games; over 90 year period, status competition led to escalation of number of gladiator pairs from
initial three to peak of 74 when checked by sumptuary legislation).
154. MCCRACKEN, supra note 150, at 31.
The field of material culture has established a detailed understanding of the symbolic properties
that adhere to objects of human manufacture.... [W]e are now in possession of a thorough
record of how material culture makes culture material. One of the special interests of this
literature is the ability of material culture to carry status messages.
Id. See also CSIKsZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 149, at 29 ("The most extensive studies
of objects as expressions of the self have been done in connection with the status-giving role of things.").
Goods may symbolize status by their rarity, expensiveness, age, or simple association with people who have
high status. Id. at 30-31. See also Floyd W. Rudmin, Ownership as Interpersonal Dominance: A History
and Three Studies of the Social Psychology of Property 49-56 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Queen's University (Ontario)) (reviewing studies of property as status symbol in social economics, popular
literature, science of symbols, and anthropological study of territorial markers). Furthermore, after studying
inferences that children, teenagers, and adults made from the house and automobile consumption decisions
of others, it was found that "[tihe ability to recognize the social implications of consumption choices is
. significant by second grade, and almost fully developed by sixth grade." Russell W. Belk et al.,
DevelopmentalRecognition of Consumption Symbolism, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 4, 13 (1982). See also MASON,
supra note 41; VANCE PACKARD, THE STATUS SEEKERS (1959); Marcus Feison, Invidious Distinctions
among Cars, Clothes and Suburbs, 42 PUB. OP. Q. 49 (1978) (finding public perceived local status
hierarchies for cars, clothing stores, and suburbs, although not as clearly as national hierarchies for
occupational prestige); William H. Form & Gregory P. Stone, Urbanism, Anonymity, and Status Symbolism,
62 AM. J. SOC. 504 (1957) (finding that many urban residents report using, among other things, displays
of possessions to determine the social status of strangers they observed); Erving Goffman, Symbols of Class
Status, 2 BRIT. J. Soc. 294 (1951).
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success and gains the consumer a "relative distinction.' 55 Conspicuous con-
sumption is the activity of displaying one's wealth by overtly consuming
expensive goods; the strategy is to make one's overt consumption particularly
expensive and one's expensive consumption particularly overt. Consistent with
the teachings of social comparison, conspicuous consumption is predominantly
"horizontal," in the sense of seeking status gains within one's group, rather than
"vertical," in seeking to move to a higher socioeconomic group.156
This short description of the symbolic function of goods and their role in
status competition is, however, inadequate. Conspicuous consumption would
be uncommon and perhaps rare if we only mean it to include those occasions
when people overtly compete for top status by purchasing more expensive
goods than others. Surely, one might argue, this crude form of materialism is
as likely to bring ridicule as the social respect we call status.15 7 But a more
sophisticated understanding of the use of goods as symbols of status will reveal
how commonplace this form of competition is. Two points are critical: (1)
people compete for symbols not only to convey or exaggerate their wealth, but
to display their sense of "fashion" and good taste, and (2) social norms against
overt status competition exist, but rather than eliminating the competition, they
drive it into less obvious forms.
First, competition in consumption is not merely about who has the most
expensive or greatest number of goods. Expensiveness does occupy an impor-
tant role: wealth is an important criterion of status,158 and goods symbolize
one's income or wealth. The more expensive and abundant the goods one
observes, the higher the income or wealth one supposes the owner to have. But
there is a second feature of goods that serves as a basis for competition:
fashion. The aristocratic class of England took up fashion as a means of
symbolizing their status, once the consumer/industrial revolution began to
undermine earlier status tests.'59 When present consumption replaced family
155. See supra note 35.
156. MASON, supra note 41, at 110; see also id. at 59, 136-37.
157. Various theorists have criticized Veblen as offering too crude a description of status competition.
See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 15. Others have noted that Veblen's analysis is to some extent tied to the
unusual time in which he wrote, when more obvious forms of status competition were accepted than are
accepted today. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 41, at ix. I have attempted to present a theory of the status
value of goods consistent with these critics' observations, without pausing to consider the extent to which
their reading of Veblen is fair.
158. See CsIKszuNTMIALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 149, at 160; DUESENBERRY, supra
note 33, at 30 ("income is one of the principal status criteria"). Duesenberry believed that income was a
particularly important determinant of status in the United States because of (1) the relative absence of statusbased on birth and (2) the relative absence of barriers to association between people of different status. Id.
159. According to McCracken, status in medieval and early modem England was based on family
honor, and entry of one's family to "gentle standing" required several generations of respectable living.MCCRAcKEN, supra note 150, at 37-38 ("five generation" rule). Consequently, status depended not so much
on having a certain quality or quantity of family goods, as on the age of such goods; and the physical proof
of age was the "patina" that age creates. Id. at 38-39. "Patina ... consists in the small signs of age that
accumulate on the surface of objects.... As these objects are minutely dented, chipped, oxidized, and worn
away, they begin to take on 'patina."' Id. at 32. Although the requirement of patina defined status in a
manner resistant to the perpetual attempts at "counterfeit status," the new consumer society of the eighteenth
[Vol. 102: 1
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respectability as the basis for status, the higher classes responded by a continu-
ous search for new styles of consumption, and fashion-based on nov-
elty--came to replace product age or "patina" as the test for status." To the
extent that "fashion" is based on sheer novelty--on the need constantly to
replace "outdated" goods-having fashionable goods again merely demonstrates
wealth, by demonstrating the ability to afford replacing still functional goods.
But, in addition, to be "in" fashion demonstrates that one possesses a special-
ized form of "insider" knowledge. Fashion may thus be a symbol of educational
or occupational status-other determinants of overall social status besides
wealth 161-or it may simply symbolize that one has acquired the right
"tastes."162 In either case, fashion goods 163 are necessarily observable goods;
the desire to symbolize anything with a good requires that one invest in goods
that are observed by others. Because some goods are particularly effective at
symbolizing success (by being more public or more expensive than average),
we should expect that people will invest in them more heavily than goods with
fewer symbolic capabilities.
Second, a person seeking status is limited by the fact that others may not
respect naked attempts to gain status. 64 The crude description of conspicuous
consumption fails to capture this limitation: although the consumption need be
conspicuous, the status-seeking motivation must not be. Jon Elster's concept
of "attitudes that are essentially by-products" explains this curious phenome-
century replaced patina with consumption as the test for status. "Wealthy subordinate social groups" then
had it within their power to emulate those of high status and create a counterfeit status. Id. at 40. McCracken
and others have attempted to illuminate the complex historical roots of the shift to consumerism that both
made possible and was made possible by the industrial revolution. See, e.g., NEIL McKENDRICK ET AL.,
THE BIRTH OF A CONSUMER SOCIETY: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
(1982); CHANDRA MUKERJI, FROM GRAVEN IMAGES: PATTERNS OF MODERN MATERIALISM (1983).
McCracken traces the rise in consumerism to Elizabeth I's use of "expenditure as an instrument of govern-
ment" in the sixteenth century and the attendant "social competition" among Elizabethan nobility. Mc-
CRACKEN, supra note 150, at 10-16.
160. Id. at 10-28. The role of patina is explained supra note 159. See also MCKENDRICK, supra note
159, at 11 ("in imitation of the rich the middle ranks spent more frenziedly than ever before, and in imitation
of them the rest of society joined in as best they might .... Spurred on by social emulation and class
competition, men and women surrendered eagerly to the pursuit of novelty, the hypnotic effects of fashion.");
CSIKSZENTMIIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 149, at 32 ("Whereas in the past one could achieve
status through strength, wisdom, honor, or holiness, and each of these required different forms of psychic
energy investment irreducible to the other, in modem times wealth has become the measure of a person's
standing on a uniform scale.").
161. Mason argues that this form of conspicuous consumption--to demonstrate occupation and
education-becomes more important in affluent societies in which raw wealth loses its previously dominant
influence over status. MASON, supra note 41, at 108.
162. Mason argues that in affluent societies, "price (or cost) can no longer be the sole criterion on
which decisions must be based and the consumer needs additional knowledge of the probable audience
reaction to his purchase in so far as it reveals his taste and the social quality of his preferences." Id. at 109
(emphasis added).
163. George Stigler and Gary Becker call "fashion goods" those goods that produce the "commodity"
of "social distinction"; goods such as certain jewelry, "large automobiles, expensive furs, fashionable
clothing, elaborate parties, a respected occupation, etc." See supra note 43, at 84.
164. Status has this fragile quality: it may become disjoined from any objective power base, and thus
subject to collapse. See CSIKSzENThMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 149, at 30-31.
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non.165 In his study on the limitations of rationality, Elster argues that there
are some mental states that "can only come about as the by-product of actions
undertaken for other ends. They can never, that is, be brought about intelligent-
ly or intentionally, because the very attempt to do so precludes the state one
is trying to bring about."'66 As one example, Elster argues that in most cases
"nothing is so unimpressive as behaviour designed to impress. ' '117 Likewise,
there are societal and group norms against wanting something merely to have
more than others, in order to symbolize a superior status.'68 To admit that one
is consciously manipulating the symbols of status in an effort to obtain status
is normally to condemn one's efforts to futility. 169 Nonetheless, the manipula-
tion of status symbols, when skillfully and covertly done, will enhance sta-
tus.1
70
Consequently, a consumer may value a good as a status symbol, even when
not conscious of engaging in status competition. As primary examples, consider
individuals whose relative preference takes the form of (i) wanting to acquire
or maintain social status (at least) equal to the average member of society, or
(ii) wanting to avoid the social status of the lowest ranking members of society.
Such individuals will want to acquire goods for the sake of their symbolic
value, but may not express their desire--even to themselves-in terms of status.
165. ELSTER, supra note 15, at 71-77.
166. Id. at 43.
167. Id. at 66. The attempts of the nouveaux riches "to impress are notoriously unsuccessful because
they try too hard." Id. at 68-69. Instead, as Paul Veyne describes, one impresses with an apparent attitude
of indifference to the impression one makes:
There is something paradoxical about expressive rationality and the way it is adapted to its end:
it will not produce its effect if it is too rational. A person who delights in himself and his own
greatness has little thought for the impression he makes on others and will not calculate it
precisely. And this the others know: they know that an authentic expression is one that disregards
the onlookers and does not measure its effects. The self-important who indulge in excessive
calculation do not see the spectators smiling behind their back. The spectator does not believe
in a calculated expression, since real greatness delights in itself only. Only the expression that
does not seek to produce an impression succeeds in making one.
Id. at 67 (quoting PAUL VEYNE, LE PAIN FT LE CRQuE 679 (1976)).
168. Seeking to have more or better goods than others as an end in itself leaves one open to the socialjudgment that one is shallow, vain, and petty (even while social status is accorded to those not overtly
seeking status, on the basis of relative, observable wealth). In addition to possible social disapproval, people
may belong or wish to belong to a particular group which may genuinely oppose or limit conspicuous
consumption as a means of gaining prestige. Cf. MASON, supra note 41, at 25, 69-70 (familial, occupational,
political, educational, economic, and religious groups may have differing views on propriety of expendi-
tures).
169. See MASON, supra note 41, at 42.
170. Notwithstanding the fact that social norms drive status-seeking behavior "underground," more
subtle wealth display remains an effective means of gaining status. See MASON, supra note 41, at 113.
Indeed, McCracken argues that the very advantage of goods as symbols is their ability to state indirectly
what social norms prevent stating directly:
The inconspicuousness of material culture ... makes [it] an unusually cunning and oblique
device for the representation of fundamental cultural truths .... IThe inconspicuousness of the
messages ... permit them to carry meaning that could not be put more explicitly without the
danger of controversy, protest, or refusal. Particularly when the message is a political one and
encodes status difference, material culture can speak sotto voce.
MCCRACKEN, supra note 150, at 68-69.
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Instead, people may consciously perceive themselves as merely desiring the
absolute commodities of "decent" clothes, a "good" car, or a "nice" house,
though their definition of "decent," "good," and "nice," upon analysis, turns
out to be (at least partly) relative to what others have. 171 These ostensibly
absolute desires provide a plausible way for people to explain their acquisition
of status symbols-to others and themselves-other than as a naked effort to
grab status. Veblen and Duesenberry emphasize how the consumption level
increases, not as a result of everyone trying to gain the highest rank, but merely
as people try to maintain a socially acceptable standard of living.1 72 From
social comparison theory, however, we should expect the "others" to which a
person compares his own consumption to be some group of peers, not the
whole society. Thus, even the affluent, who are well-placed within society at
large, may feel themselves needing better quality goods to keep up to the
minimum standard of living of their peers, rather than as a conspicuous device
for maximizing status.
The covert nature of status competition also explains more fully the distinc-
tion between observable and unobservable goods. Previously I asked why
people cannot make all consumption observable by "advertising" otherwise
unobservable consumption. One reason is the simple cost of such advertising,
especially given the need to distinguish one's genuine claim of consumption
from those who would "fraudulently" seek status by fabricating or exaggerating
their otherwise unobservable consumption. 173 But the broader answer is that
171. There is nothing in this description of rationalization and self-deception that is inconsistent with
the concept of economic rationality. In predicting that an individual will act to maximize satisfaction of his
preferences, consumer theory does not require that people consciously maximize, or that they even be able
to verbalize in rational terms reasons for their behavior. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 7 (1976). See also MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Econbmics, in
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953). Positive economics is thus content to say that people act as ifthey
were maximizing satisfaction of their preferences, and, as long as the empirical evidence supports such a
description, is indifferent to the contrary things people may think they are doing. In this regard, Becker says
that economics "is consistent with the emphasis on the subconscious in modem psychology." BECKER, supra,
at 7. My point is simply that people sometimes act "as if' they were concerned about the relative quality
and quantity of their goods even when not consciously concerned with relative consumption.
172.
The habit of looking for the marks of superfluous expensiveness in goods, and of requiring that
all goods should afford some utility of the indirect or invidious sort, leads to a change in the
standards by which the utility of goods is gauged. The honorific element and the element of brute
efficiency are not held apart in the consumer's appreciation of commodities, and the two together
go to make up the unanalyzed serviceability of the goods.
VEBLEN, supra note 35, at 156-7. See also supra note 63; DUESENBERRY, supra note 33.
173. For some goods, the mere act of consumption advertises that one owns such goods. For other
goods, one must bear a cost to publicize one's consumption. For example, without any additional costs, one
advertises the clothes one owns by wearing them. (And in case some people might fail to appreciate the
quality and expensiveness of one's clothes, fashionable attire will often bear a designer's logo.) On the other
hand, to publicize one's life or health insurance plan, or the quantity of one's savings, requires some
additional effort. This added effort constitutes the initial element of advertising costs, but there is a second.
Simply posting a notice of one's savings, or announcing that one enjoys more workplace safety than others,
will fail to persuade others because such claims are easily falsified. Making the claim credible requires
additional costs, as, for example, the cost of hiring independent auditors to "certify" the size of one's bank
account, or the safety level of one's workplace.
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the advertising tactic would, in most cases, be condemned as a naked effort to
acquire status. Breaching social norms is a real cost of explicitly advertising
one's consumption. Even though a credible declaration of one's income, for
example, would make it unnecessary to engage in the subtleties of symbolizing
that income with strategic consumption, it is quite uncommon for people
publicly to announce their income. Even relatively private announcements are
widely considered vulgar. By consuming goods naturally consumed in public,
an individual may communicate this same information indirectly and without
social disapproval. But goods not naturally consumed in public view are
unsuited for symbolizing status either because others are not routinely aware
of how much one is consuming or because social disapproval of efforts to make
others aware condemns such efforts to failure.' 74
3. Economic Evidence of Relative Preferences
Although neoclassical economists have generally sought to explain behavior
without resorting to relative preferences, there are a few areas in which the data
has essentially compelled recognition of such wants. Not surprisingly, Frank
offers relative income theories to explain employee wage data,175 and joins
other economists in reviving Duesenberry's relative income explanation of
consumer savings. 176 Milton Friedman also uses positional wants to reconcile
simultaneous consumer decisions to gamble and buy insurance,177 and George
Stigler and Gary Becker posit a desire for status to rationalize wildly fluctuating
markets for "fashion goods.' 178 Although relative wants are employed in the
latter two cases in an ad hoc manner, the ability of relative preferences to
explain such varied phenomena establishes just how pervasive these preferences
are. 17 9 Conversely, recognizing relative preferences will enhance positive
theories describing these phenomena.
174. Given the covert nature of status competition, we should also expect that people will not readily
admit their conspicuous consumption to others or to themselves, a fact that I argue below represents a special
transaction cost that impedes Coasean bargaining to reduce the waste of competitive consumption. See infra
text accompanying notes 245-252.
175. See FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 35-79; Frank, Marginal Products, supra note
77.
176. Duesenberry's savings theory is discussed supra note 37. See FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra
note 77, at 146-49; Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note 39, at 109-11; George Kosicki, Income
Redistribution and Aggregate Consumption: Implications of the Relative Income Model, 34 AM. ECONOMIsT
40 (1990); George Kosicki, A Note About Savings as a 'Nonpositional Good,' 14 E. ECON. J. 271 (1988);
George Kosicki, A Test of the Relative Income Hypothesis, 54 S. ECON. J. 422 (1987) [hereinafter Kosicki,
A Test of the Relative Income Hypothesis]; George Kosicki, The Relative Income Hypothesis: A Review of
the Cross-Section Evidence, 26 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 65 (1987).
177. Friedman & Savage, supra note 42.
178. Stigler & Becker, supra note 43.
179. In each of these cases, the data supports the existence of relative wants only to the extent that
a relative wants theory is intrinsically plausible. The prior sections demonstrated the intrinsic plausibility
of a pervasive and powerful desire for relative position.
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Frank and Kosicki have revived Duesenberry's relative income theory of
consumer savings to account for certain data that prevailing savings theories
cannot explain.'80 Savings data has always shown that those enjoying a high
income save a higher proportion of their income than those enjoying a lower
income.' 81 Paradoxically, however, as national wealth has increased, the pro-
portion of income saved has remained the same. The standard theories-the
permanent income"' and life cycle theories I83-explain this data by appeal-
ing to the same basic idea: that consumers seek to save the same proportion
of their lifetime income regardless of the size of that income. Thus, over time,
consumer savings is unrelated to income. But income fluctuates over a lifetime;
to smooth out the variations, people save proportionately more in what for them
will be a high income year, and less in what for them will be a low income
year.184 So while it appears that the level of savings is positively related to
income when examining any one year, the standard theories hold that absent
"life cycle differences and transitory earnings" (i.e., if everyone earned their
lifetime income in equal yearly portions), "high-income persons [would save]
the same fractions of their incomes as [do] low-income persons.' 8 5
But an empirical problem continues to challenge the standard theories:
although they explain some of the variation in savings rates, various studies
attempting to control for transitory fluctuations in income still find that savings
is positively associated with lifetime or "permanent" income.186 Frank and
Kosicki point out that Duesenberry's theory explains the discrepancy: the desire
for relative position pressures consumers to consume (at least) up to the
prevailing standard of living. Because the pressure to spend up to the average
is greater for those with below average incomes than for those with above-
average incomes, the former save less than the latter. The relative wage theory
also accounts for the apparent paradox that savings do not rise as social wealth
rises: because the explanatory variable is relative income, saving is not associat-
ed with aggregate wealth. 87
180. See FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 146-49; Frank, Nonpositional Goods, supra note
39, at 109-11; Kosicki, A Test of the Relative Income Hypothesis, supra note 176.
181. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 146.
182. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38.
183. See Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function, in
POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 1954).
184. In other words, if a consumer believes that he is enjoying what for him is an unusually high
income-one that will not be repeated often in future years-he will save more than in an average year.
Conversely, if he believes the year is below his average, he will save less. The theory predicts that if income
were guaranteed to be the same every year, a consumer would save the same amount each year, and that
the proportion would be the same regardless of the size of the total.
185. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 147.
186. Frank reviews this evidence and Kosicki adds his own. See FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note
77, at 146-59; Kosicki, A Test of the Relative Income Hypothesis, supra note 176.
187. Choosing a theory of savings is significant, among other reasons, for judging the consequences
or fairness of competing tax policies. The merits of taxing savings depend on why people save. See, e.g.,
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1175-79
(1992); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 967-81 (1992); Mark
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In addition, Frank offers a theory of relative wages that explains wage data
inconsistent with standard theory. The accepted neoclassical theory of wages
predicts that, in equilibrium, workers are paid an amount equal to their marginal
productivity, meaning the amount of revenue that their work adds to the total
revenue of the firm.188 The problem with this theory is that considerable
evidence shows that wage differentials are consistently smaller than marginal
productivity differentials, so that the most productive workers are often paid
less than their marginal productivity, while the least productive workers are paid
more. Frank contributes his own data to this discourse, also finding that wages
are too compressed to be explained merely by marginal productivity theory.189
Frank then explains this observed wage compression as a consequence of
workers' preferences for relative income-for earning more than, or at least
as much as, their coworkers. He theorizes that the preference for relatively high
income means that those at the high income end of a firm are willing to accept
less than their marginal product because they are also receiving implicit com-
pensation in the form of high status. 90 Conversely, he argues that those at
the low income end of a firm insist on more than their marginal product
because they are suffering from low status.' 9 '
Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649, 675-79 (1983). See also Mark L. Ascher,
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 108 (1990) (effect of taxing inheritance on savings
depends on choice between competing savings theories).
188. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 36-37.
189. Id. at 68-79; Frank, Marginal Products, supra note 77. Frank's data is directed at disproving a
particular defense of marginal productivity theory: the claim that any inconsistencies between marginal
productivity theory and wage data are explained by measurement difficulties. Some economists argue that
wages merely appear to be compressed because it is difficult for economists to measure accurately a
worker's marginal productivity. These economists still insist that but for measurement errors, marginal
productivity theory does a good job of explaining the data. Frank therefore studied groups of workers whose
marginal productivity is reasonably clear-automobile and real estate sales personnel whose marginal
productivity can be measured by sales revenue and scientific academics whose margininal productivity can
be measured by government grants. Making conservative estimates of marginal productivity, Frank found
that in each case the most productive workers were paid significantly less than their marginal productivity
and the least productive workers were paid significantly more. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77,
at 68-79. Frank's evidence refutes the claim that the data contradicting marginal productivity theory can
be dismissed as measurement error.
190. Frank also argues that the proliferation of job titles is better understood if we think of workers
competing for on-the-job status. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 91-94; cf. Jerald Greenberg
& Suzyn Omstein, High Status Job Title as Compensation for Underpayment: A Test of Equity Theory, 68
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 285 (1983).
191. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 41-57. If employers were not willing to pay relatively
less productive workers more than their marginal productivity, Frank predicts that such workers would eitherjoin firms where coworkers have marginal productivity equal to their own (and thus everyone earns the same
wage) or work alone (thus not having to worry about how their income compared to their coworkers). This
analysis plausibly assumes that workers are much more concerned about how their pay compares to that
of their coworkers than about how it compares to that of the rest of the world.
Choosing a theory of wages is significant, among other reasons, for judging the consequences or
fairness of competing employment policies. The desirability of comparable worth or collective bargaining,
for example, depends in part on the accuracy of the marginal productivity theory of wages. See, e.g., Michael
L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and
Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349,
1362-64 (1988) (deviation between in-firm marginal productivity and external market marginal productivity
creates opportunity for strategic behavior by employers and workers); Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The
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Friedman and Savage have used positional wants to reconcile two apparent-
ly inconsistent consumer decisions, the decision to buy insurance and to
gamble.1 92 If people were neutral to risk-if they assessed risk at its "expect-
ed value" of probability times outcome-they would neither buy insurance nor
gamble.1 93 Insurance is explained by the concept of "risk aversion"; risk-
averse consumers will pay others more than the expected value of a risk of loss
to induce them to bear the risk. Gambling is the reverse phenomenon: risk-
preferring consumers pay more than the expected value of a risk of gain to bear
the risk. Why does the same consumer sometimes do both? Friedman and
Savage sought to answer this question by hypothesizing that utility was posi-
tively related to income, but with sometimes rising and sometimes falling
marginal returns depending on whether the increased income allowed one to
move to a higher economic class. In their words: "[I]ncreases in income that
raise the relative position of the consumer unit in its own class but do not shift
the unit out of its class yield diminishing marginal utility, while increases that
shift it into a new class, that give it a new social and economic status, yield
increasing marginal utility."194 Their analysis is not completely correct; people
seem to receive substantial relative gains from doing better than their existing
peers or class, not merely from moving to the next class. But the basic ap-
proach seems sound. There are some absolute income gains that carry more
relative benefits than others: while some increases or decreases will hardly
change observable consumption, others of the same absolute magnitude will
have a larger outward effect 195 Therefore, people appear to prefer risk when
they can take unobservable losses for a chance at observable gains, but to avoid
risk when they can forgo unobservable gains to hedge against observable losses.
In the former case they would gamble; in the latter, insure. Today, the overlap
of these two behaviors-gambling and insuring-is even greater than in 1948
Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1758-63 (1986) (arguing that marginal
productivity constrains the wage level but leaves room for sex discrimination); Douglas L. Leslie, Labor
Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353,364-71 (1984) (advocating a "relational model" emphasizing relative
wages in place of "price theory" of wages based on marginal productivity).
192. Friedman & Savage, supra note 42.
193. This statement assumes that the only value in gambling is the possible reward from winning. In
circumstances in which gambling is pleasurable independent of the outcome, there is no need to use risk
preferences to explain gambling and no apparent inconsistency with buying insurance. Similarly, some forms
of gambling will persist because they symbolize wealth and confer status on participants. Lotteries exemplify
the type of gambling apparently motivated only by the desire to win.
194. Friedman & Savage, supra note 42, at 289-99 (emphasis added). Friedman and Savage claim that
because "[m]en will and do take great risks to distinguish themselves," they may be willing to risk falling
to the low end of their existing economic class for a chance of rising to the next class, but unwilling to risk
a slight fall within their class for a chance of simply rising to the top of their class. Id. at 299. Friedman
and Savage do not discuss the normative implications: since a "high" or "low" economic class is entirely
relative, if a significant number of people move up to a higher class, the class position of those whose
absolute wealth remains the same will tend to fall.
195. One might imagine, for example, that housing is a major component of observable spending. At
a given point on the income curve, a small positive increment income will not be sufficient to improve one's
housing level, even though at other points on the curve the same increment will be sufficient. The marginal
utility of money is declining in the former case, increasing in the latter.
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when Friedman and Savage wrote, which suggests that the desire for relative
position is not only strong, but has been gaining in importance over the past
several decades.'96
Finally, fashion constantly changes. Yet economists advocate a consumer
theory with stable preferences. Since they believe there is no acceptable theory
capable of explaining preference change, they wish to construct a model of
consumer behavior that minimizes the importance of such change. 197 Stigler
and Becker find it unsatisfactory to explain change in fashion, such as annual
changes in clothing styles, by asserting that consumer tastes are constantly
changing. Instead, they explain the fashion data by positing a single preference
for social status, which consumers satisfy by purchasing a combination of
"status" or "fashion" goods.198 Consumers purchase fashion goods to "pro-
duce" the commodity of "social distinction" or prestige.9 9 Given the amount
of resources devoted each year to "fashion" goods, or fashion components of
ordinary goods, this explanation of the data also suggests that the desire for
social distinction is powerful."0
In sum, the social science evidence suggests that people generally share a
strong desire for social distinction, and in particular that people desire relatively
high income and the goods associated with high income or status. While this
point is itself important for understanding and describing various behavior, it
also has important normative consequences.
B. A Socioeconomic Theory of Market Failure: Identifying When Satisfaction
of Relative Preferences Leads to Social Waste
Frequently, individuals acting to satisfy their relative preferences will fail
to reach a Pareto-optimal outcome. At other times, however, competition for
relative gain is not merely harmless, but a constructive social force. An appro-
priate theory should distinguish cases in which relative preferences will lead
to wasteful competitive consumption from those in which they will not. In
general, efforts to satisfy relative preferences will lead to an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources into a zero sum competition when the following conditions
196. A refined understanding of risk taking is obviously important for, among other things, tort and
insurance law.
197. Stigler & Becker, supra note 43. For an attempt to model the explosive oscillation of the demand
for status goods, see Philip Coelho & J. McClure, Toward An Economic Theory of Fashion (1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
198. Stigler & Becker, supra note 43, at 87-88.
199. Id. at 88. Stigler and Becker here rely on Becker's "new theory" of consumer behavior that makes
a distinction between "goods" and "commodities." See BECKER supra note 171 at 131-49; see also itfra
text accompanying notes 352-354.
200. Understanding the status function of goods should be relevant for determining the appropriate
definition and protection of property interests. For example, Gene Grossman and Carl Shapiro discuss the
effect of differing irademark law enforcement policies against foreign counterfeiting of goods desired in
large measure for symbolizing status. Gene Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Foreign Counterfeiting of Status
Goods, 103 QJ. EcON. 79 (1988).
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are present: (1) the relative preferences inherently conflict because satisfying
one person's preference necessarily means that another's will go unsatisfied;
(2) investments in satisfying inherently conflicting relative preferences divert
resources from satisfying absolute preferences (or at least other preferences not
in inherent conflict); and (3) positive transaction costs block private agreements
that might prevent this wasted investment in zero sum competition. Competition
to satisfy relative preferences is benign unless all of these elements coexist. In
a few limited cases, such competition is socially desirable.
Subsection One therefore describes the necessary and sufficient conditions
under which relative preferences inherently conflict. In particular, the Subsec-
tion introduces types of positional incompatibility other than simple competition
for the top position, and explains the conditions of preference conflict in light
of the previous discussion of social psychology. Subsection Two then describes
how competition for relative position, under the conditions of inherent prefer-
ence conflict, may inefficiently drain resources from the satisfaction of noncon-
flicting preferences. Subsection Three considers an exception to this analysis,
public goods, where relative preferences may actually help overcome market
failure. All of these predictions depend, in part, on the presence or absence of
transaction costs, a matter considered in Section C.
1. The Presence of Inherent Preference Conflict
First, we must identify the conditions of conflict in which satisfaction of
relative preferences is a zero sum process. At one level, all preferences "con-
flict." Economics begins with the idea that unlimited wants make resources
scarce; the discipline is reasonably defined as the study of the "allocation of
scarce means to satisfy competing ends."2 1 Nonetheless, there is a special
sense in which relative preferences may be in conflict. Even with infinite
resources, shared preferences for high-ranking positions may not all be satis-
fied. Although unlimited resources would eliminate the conflict between
absolute preferences, the conflict between two individuals' preferences "to have
the most X" (or "to avoid having the least X") would remain. This Article
refers to preference conflict as "inherent" if no amount of resources could
resolve the conflict. The satisfaction of relative preferences is a zero sum
activity where there is inherent preference conflict.
The process of comparison does not always create inherent preference
conflict. Comparing oneself with others involves several distinct variables: (i)
the individual or group of individuals with which one will make the comparison
("comparison others" or "referent group"); (ii) the characteristic which one is
201. BECKER, supra note 171, at3 (citing similar definitions in other works). The scarcity of resources
means that trade-offs exist between individuals as to whose preferences will be satisfied, and also that each
individual makes trade-offs as to which of his preferences he will expend resources to satisfy.
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interested in comparing (a "scale"); (iii) the type of position one seeks (ordinal
or cardinal; top, average, or avoidance of bottom); and (iv) a judgment about
how one ranks in that characteristic relative to the others (a relative "score").
People may have inherently conflicting preferences when (a) they make a
comparison among one another, and (b) the comparison involves the same
characteristic. But even when two parties have relative preferences that are in
this sense "reciprocal," those preferences will not inherently conflict unless (c)
they seek incompatible positions with regard to that characteristic and (d) they
will know whether they fail to gain the position they seek. An four elements
require some additional explanation.
The first factor in inherent preference conflict is the person or group an
individual uses as a basis for comparison. If people invariably compared
themselves to those who rank below them and avoided comparisons to those
who rank above them, then perhaps everyone could gain self-esteem from
ranking higher than certain others. 2°2 This strategy, however, has practical
limitations. One motive for comparison is to gain information. To gain informa-
tion, one must at least take the risk of unfavorable comparisons. It is not
informative to compare oneself only to those who one already knows rank
lower. In addition, given how pervasive social comparison is, it would be
difficult for one to choose only those people who rank lower in important ways
to be one's friends, neighbors, and coworkers, and impossible for everyone to
do so.2 3 Because individual status is, in part, derived from the status of the
groups to which one belongs, it may even be counterproductive to associate
only with lower ranking individuals. Finally, there are some circumstances in
which comparisons are involuntary, in which the media or unexpected contacts
with others provide highly salient information about the traits or abilities of
others.2
Second, relative preferences do not inherently conflict (and their satisfaction
is not zero sum) unless they are directed toward the same characteristic. 20 5
People differ about which characteristics are relevant for judging themselves
in comparison to others, and research suggests that people usually weigh most
202. If people care about a trait or ability but fear that comparison would be unfavorable, they may
preserve their self-esteem by avoiding comparison altogether. Festinger hypothesized that the segmentation
of society may serve to protect people from many unwanted unfavorable comparisons. See Festinger, supra
note 119.
203. See DUESENBERRY, supra note 33, at 30 ("[S]ince social status rankings in our society form a
continuous series rather than a set of clearly defined group rankings, every individual must associate with
some people of higher or lower status than his own.").
204. Festinger pondered the effects of television as a new source of involuntary comparisons. Festinger,
supra note 119. Interestingly, at least one study found that television in the United States was associated
with increased burglaries, but not with crimes of violence. Thomas Ashby Wills, Discussion Remarks on
Social Comparison Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL BULL 282, 285-86 (1986) (citing K.M.
Hennigan et al., Impact of the Introduction of Television on Crime in the United States: Empirical Findings
and Theoretical Implications," 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 461 (1982)).
205. This is what Scitovsky means when he says that people sometimes seek status by a "ranking on
a one-dimensional scale" such as income or wealth. See supra note 76, at 119.
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heavily those characteristics in which they excel. 26 When people compare
different characteristics, their relative desires need not conflict. Two people who
each rank higher than the other in one aspect and lower in another can each
compare themselves to the other on the scale of their strength, and each benefit
from the comparison. 2 7 For some reason, however, perhaps due to socializa-
tion of norms for self-worth, large parts of society do share certain scales as
important bases for comparison, such as standards of physical attractiveness 20S
and wealth. Indeed, the concept of social status or rank would have no real
meaning if this were not the case.
Third, even when relative preferences are reciprocal, they win not conflict
unless the preferences are for incompatible types of positions. There would not
be inherent conflict, for example, between the preferences of consumers A and
B (who compare themselves with each other for the same characteristic), if A
desired the first rank, B merely desired to obtain (at least) the average rank,
and at least one other consumer (C) existed, who had no positional desire at
all. A and B may each simultaneously obtain the position they desire; their
investments in gaining their desired ranks may produce gains to themselves
without imposing losses on C or on each other. On the other hand, since only
one person can occupy the highest rank, if two or more wish to be first, the
preferences are in inherent conflict' 9
The fourth, and final, requirement for inherent preference conflict is that
consumers know when they fail to gain the position they seek. Even when
people have incompatible, reciprocal relative preferences, there is often room
for differing views as to how one ranks relative to others. To rank oneself
relative to others, it is necessary to make a judgment both as to one's own rank
and that of those to whom one is compared.21° Many of the characteristics
206. People tend to care about only a small set of all possible bases for comparison, often including
those traits or abilities in which they already believe they excel. People can thus be emotionally indifferent
to many comparisons in which they rank poorly. See, e.g., Abraham Tesser, Emotion in Social Comparison
and Reflection Processes, in SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 55, at 115-45; Salovey, supra note 55, at
274-75. This process is part of a general effort to view oneself as unique. See George Goethals et al., The
Uniqueness Bias: Studies of Constructive Social Comparison, in SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 55, at
149-76. See also NOZICK supra note 52, at 245 (noting that if the set of all possible bases for comparisons
shrinks, it becomes increasingly difficult for an individual "to use as a basis for self-esteem a nonuniform
weighting strategy that gives greater weight to a dimension he scores highly in").
207. Not only would such adaptation avoid the "zero sum" nature of certain comparisons, but the
common ability to satisfy one's relative preferences would increase social welfare over what it would be
in the complete absence of such preferences.
208. Despite the truism that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder," there are many widely-held criteria
for attractiveness, or perhaps more accurately, for unattractiveness. Some examples of commonly applied
criteria for unattractiveness in America are being "fat" and having wrinkles (or "bags" under one's eyes).
For men, baldness and shortness are widely considered unattractive. while none of these standards is
universal, their pervasiveness is evidenced by the American obsession with dieting, the lengths to which
men go to avoid the appearance of being bald, and the rising use of cosmetic surgery.
209. To generalize: whenever more than n persons wish to occupy the top n ranks, the preferences are
for incompatible positions.
210. Nozick says that ranking one's ability involves two separate judgments: first, a "factual profile"
representing some absolute "score" one has for a particular characteristic; second, an "evaluative profile"
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people deem important are highly subjective (e.g., sense of humor, creativity,
resourcefulness), and evaluation of many others may require knowledge of
private facts about which one is often ignorant (e.g., income, sincerity, self-
enlightenment). n Individuals often differ in their judgments about the extent
to which characteristics are present in themselves or others. Therefore,
more than half of the people who care about a particular characteristic can
believe they rank in the top half regarding that characteristic.23 Relative
preferences thus will not inherently conflict unless the desired rankings are
reasonably "observable" (i.e. people have adequate information to make a
judgment of rank) and reasonably "objective" (i.e. that people reach similar
judgments about rank when given shared facts). Because there are some scales,
however, for which reasonably objective information exists, and because
people's ability to disregard unwelcome information is limited, there will be
some occasions where each person's placement on the scale is manifest to
everyone in the comparison group (e.g., hair loss, published class ranks, certain
occupational proficiencies, wealth).214
Of the four elements of inherent preference conflict, the third-that the
positions desired are incompatible-is sufficiently complex to warrant further
comment. Although the simplest case of incompatibility exists when two or
more consumers seek the highest ordinal rank on the same scale, there are
several other ways in which the desired positions may be incompatible. First
are other cases of ordinal incompatibility. Suppose initially that everyone in an
economy wishes to be (at least) of average ordinal rank. This preference might
be expressed as the desire to have at least an equal number of people below
one on the scale as are above one. The possibility of complete equality may
render these positional preferences compatible. In a three-person economy, for
example, a three-way tie might satisfy the desires to be average. Suppose,
however, that while B and C wish to have the average rank, A desires the top
rank. A will not be satisfied with equality, while B and C will not be satisfied
if A acquires a top rank.15 One person desiring the top rank can create an
representing one's belief as to where his factual profile places him in relation to the factual profile of others.
Nozick's example is the ability to shoot jump-shots; the factual profile might be one's ability '"to score
- jump shots out of 100 tries from 20 feet out."' NOZICK, supra note 52, at 242. It seems unlikely that
all characteristics can be measured in any objective way.
211. Id. at 244 n.*.
212. See Goethals, supra note 118, at 273-74. See also ELSTER, supra note 15 at 148-57 (advancing
concept of "wishful thinking" and "interest induced beliefs").
213. More precisely, more than N% of any group can honestly believe they rank in the top N% of that
group for a given characteristic. Thus, when Garrison Keillor says that, in Lake Wobegone, "all the children
are above average," he speaks to the ability of all the parents to believe that their children are in the top
50%.
214. Even where information directly relevant to some scale is difficult to acquire (such as income),
people may use more public information (such as house size, model of automobile, clothes, vacations) as
a proxy for measuring another person's rank.
215. If A achieves the top rank, there are two possibilities for B and C. If B and C are tied, neither
occupies the average rank (in the sense specified of having an equal number of slots above and below
oneself). If B and C are not tied, one occupies the third and lowest rank.
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inherent conflict in an economy where the others wish to be of average rank.
The same result occurs if we relax C's positional preference even more: even
if C only desires to avoid the lowest rank, there is an inherent conflict if B
wants the average rank and A desires the top rank. 16 Finally, suppose C is
completely indifferent to position, but that there are two A's seeking the top
positions. Although the A's desires are obviously incompatible with each other,
they are also incompatible with B's positional wants. For if the A's each rank
higher than B, B fails to achieve the average position he seeks. 7
A second interesting case of incompatibility exists when the position
desired is defined cardinally rather than ordinally. Under some circumstances,
adding the fact that the positional preferences are cardinal will create conflict
where ordinal preferences would not. In a three-person economy, imagine that
A desires not merely to occupy the highest rank but also to maximize the
difference between himself and the average ordinal rank (which, in a three-
person economy, is the second rank). In such case, if B desires to have (at
least) the average rank on a cardinal scale (not merely the second rank, but to
occupy the position halfway between the first and third ranks), there is an
inherent conflict even if C has no positional desire. Although A and B aim at
different points, their desires inherently conflict because they each define their
goal in relation to the point the other seeks. Similarly, if B and C merely desire
to avoid falling behind the cardinal average more than a certain amount-e.g.,
they each wish to stay within 50% of the cardinal mean-their desires will
inherently conflict with A's desire, assuming A still wishes to increase his
cardinal rank when either B or C has fallen to 50% of the cardinal mean. A
more realistic example of cardinal incompatibility may be illustrated by the
following: B and C wish to have (at least) the average on a cardinal scale,
while A wishes to occupy a position that exceeds all others by some minimum
amount (but not, as in the prior case, by an infinite amount). As A moves ahead
of the mean, the mean rises, causing B and C to invest in gaining ground; as
B and C approach A's position, A invests in creating the gap he seeks.21 1
These permutations demonstrate how minimal the conditions are for incompati-
bility.
This analysis also reveals an interesting example of compatibility-one
existing when certain ordinally-defined positional desires exist together with
216. The only difference from the prior example is that if B and C are tied, C would be positionally
satisfied by having avoided the lowest rank. However, with A in the top position, B would still not be
satisfied until he moves ahead of C, at which point C will occupy the lowest rank and be positionally
unsatisfied.
217. Assume that x% of the population wishes to obtain the top rank, y% wishes to obtain the average
rank, and z% is indifferent to rank. Whenever x > z, there cannot be as many positionally-indifferent z's
below the y's as there are x's above them. Consequently, whenever x > z, either some of the y's are of
below-average rank or some or the x's do not occupy the highest rank.
218. Even if B and C only seek to be within a range of the cardinal mean, the same upward spiral will
occur if the gap A seeks is large enough to lower B and C's positions too far below the mean.
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the cardinal desire not to fall too far behind some standard. Imagine, for
example, that A desires the first ordinal rank, B desires the average ordinal
rank, and C desires to avoid falling behind the average rank more than some
proportionate amount (e.g., to have at least 75% of what the average ranking
person has). Arguably, it is the failure to satisfy a preference of this latter
sort-the desire not to fall too far behind a norm-that constitutes "pover-
ty." 219 Under these circumstances, although each consumer in the economy
has a relative preference, there is no inherent conflict; satisfying all three
preferences simultaneously is possible. If this is the correct description of
poverty, then poverty could be eliminated not only by complete equality, but
by C's narrowing the gap between himself and the mean to the desired position.
Poverty might result, however, if A's and B's positional preferences were
incompatible and the competition between them raised the mean too far above
C's reach.
To summarize, people have inherently conflicting preferences when (a) they
make a comparison among one another, (b) the comparison involves the same
characteristic, (c) they desire incompatible positions with respect to one another
regarding that characteristic, and (d) their respective positions will be observ-
able and objective. These circumstances produce a zero sum situation: satisfac-
tion of one person's preference necessarily means the dissatisfaction of an-
other's.
Richard Posner poses a hypothetical that suggests a paradigmatic example
of inherent preference conflict. It concerns competition for physical height by
consumption of a human growth hormone.220 Because "tallness" is relative,
to prefer to be tall means to prefer to be taller than the average of some
reference group. The preference for being tall, or at least for not being short,
is widely shared in American society.221 We can say, therefore, that these
preferences for height are reciprocal. Because one's height is easily observed
and reasonably objective, the preference for height creates an inherent prefer-
ence conflict. Satisfying one person's desire to be taller means that those who
remain the same absolute height become relatively shorter and suffer a welfare
loss. The total welfare available from stature may thus be fixed; any "invest-
ments" in gaining height, e.g., shoe lifts or human growth hormones, will not
219. See supra note 144.
220. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 11-12 (discussing "pituitary extract"). See also
Easterlin, supra note 66. This hypothetical is not fanciful: technology is making growth hormone sufficiently
available to raise real distributional issues. See Barry Werth, How Short is Too Short?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
June 16, 1991 at 14; Melvin Grumbach, Growth Hormone Therapy and the Short End of the Stick, 319 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 238 (1988).
221. See Saul D. Feldman, The Presentation of Shortness in Everyday Life-Height and Heightism in
American Society: Toward a Sociology of Stature, in LIFE STYLES: DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Saul
D. Feldman ed., 1975), at 437-42; Wayne E. Hensley & Robin Cooper, Height and Occupational Success:
A Review and Critique, 60 PSYCHOL. REP. 843 (1987); A. Schumacher, On the Significance of Stature in
Human Society, 11 J. Hum. EVOLUIrION 697 (1982).
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increase total welfare created from "consumption" of height, but only redistrib-
ute who gains and who loses.222
As suggested above, there is one way in which preferences for height may
not conflict. Imagine that a certain group of people, the C's, wish only to avoid
falling too far behind the mean height, and are indifferent to relative height as
long as they are within, say, ten percent of the mean. Assume that the remain-
ing people wish only to achieve certain ordinal ranks: the A's wish only to be
within the tallest twenty-five percent of the population, and the B's wish only
to avoid being within the shortest forty percent of the population. Under these
circumstances, it would be possible for the C's who are more than ten percent
shorter than the mean to invest in gaining height without affecting the extent
to which the A's or B's satisfy their positional preferences. For many distribu-
tions, it is possible for everyone in the bottom forty percent to be within ten
percent of the mean; thus it is possible for the C's to satisfy fully their position-
al preferences without decreasing the satisfaction of such preferences by the
A's or B's. When higher ranking people care about rank but not distribution,
and when lower ranking people care more about distribution than rank, prefer-
ences do not necessarily conflict.
The existence of inherent preference conflict does not necessarily imply
a misallocation of resources. Misallocation occurs only when people use
resources to compete in a zero sum sector that might have been used in a
"positive sum" sector where welfare can rise with investment. I now turn to
an examination of this wasteful tradeoff.
2. The Social Waste of Satisfying Inherently Conflicting Preferences:
Diverting Resources to a Zero Sum Competition
People waste resources when they invest those resources in satisfying
relative preferences that inherently conflict instead of satisfying (a) absolute
preferences or (b) relative preferences that do not conflict because one of the
conditions of inherent conflict is absent. The minimum concept of Pareto-
222. This assertion ignores many complications. First, although many people would like to be tall, it
is likely that the pleasure one gains from height is usually not a simple, conscious realization that one is
taller than others. Second, in a utility analysis, we would weigh a large gain by the pituitary consumer
against a large number of small losses by everyone else. The person who adds to his height has very little
effect on average height; he almost certainly gains more satisfaction than the loss he imposes on any one
person made relatively "shorter." On the other hand, to add a few inches in height may be to become taller
than a very large pool of people, and all of those who come in contact with the now-tall child may suffer
some loss (plus those of equally tall or taller height lose some utility from tallness). Third, the comparisons
most important to utility are probably not, as suggested above, to average national height, but to average
height among much smaller groups (neighbors, coworkers, relatives, etc.). Fourth, instead of desiring to be
taller than the average of some group, people may (also) enjoy occasions in which they are the tallest within
a social group. In such cases, it is easier to see how increasing the frequency in which one is the tallest
in a group necessarily decreases the frequency of that enjoyment for others. Finally, people do not
indefinitely desire greater relative height; at some ages and at extreme levels height becomes socially
awkward. These complications, however, do not alter the point of the example made above.
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superiority condemns transactions undertaken to satisfy inherently conflicting
preferences, because making someone better off by satisfying such preferences
necessarily means that others are made worse off. Satisfying someone's abso-
lute preferences (or relative preferences that do not conflict), on the other hand,
does not require the nonsatisfaction of others' preferences. Thus, the Pareto
criterion recommends using resources to satisfy nonconflicting preferences. As
long as resources might contribute to satisfying such preferences, it is socially
wasteful for individuals to direct those resources toward satisfying their con-
flicting preferences.
The Pareto criterion, however, is always subject to the attack that it is too
restrictive. Perhaps we should employ the Kaldor-Hicks concept of social
wealth maximization instead. Under the Kaldor-Hicks test, investment in
satisfying conflicting preferences is efficient if those who gain from doing so
gain more than what others lose. In employing this test, we should consider
three possible cases of competitive consumption: (i) where one party alone
invests to obtain relative position, (ii) where both parties invest an identical
amount to obtain relative position, and (iii) where both parties invest to obtain
relative position but one party "wins" the competition by making a greater
investment than the other.
First, suppose one party alone invests to obtain relative position. If A
invests in position and B does not, perhaps it is because A cares about position
more than B. Certainly if there were no transaction costs we would expect B
to pay A to forgo such positional investment if the change harmed B more than
it benefited A. The power of this wealth maximization argument depends
entirely on whether transaction costs exist. For reasons stated in Part II(C),
transaction costs will frequently block private agreements to control positional
investment. Consequently, we cannot infer from B's failure to "bribe" A not
to make investments in position that the positional gain to A exceeds the
positional loss to B. If we do not know what would happen absent transaction
costs, we simply cannot say that A's positional investment is either efficient
or inefficient.
Second, consider the case in which A and B invest an identical amount to
obtain relative position. Whenever one party suffers from the external costs of
transactions to which she is not a party, that party may respond by investing
in "defensive measures," such as when a person purchases ear plugs to avoid
the externality of noise. The unique characteristic of inherently conflicting
preferences, however, is that any such "defensive measures" will not only
minimize the harm to B, but will deprive A of the benefit of his prior invest-
ment. To the extent B's investment is effective at all, it nullifies A's invest-
ment. A may respond by increasing his investment, but in each round of
positional competition, B may match A's investment, effectively wasting all
the resources invested. If, after any number of rounds, B exactly matches A's
investment, we have Frank's prisoner's dilemma model: A's and B's parallel
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investment in position is totally wasted. Neither achieves any lasting positional
change yet each has sacrificed the resources invested in striving for superiority.
Both parties would have been better off if neither had invested in position.
Third, if after the various rounds of competition, A "wins" the positional
competition, then A may be better off for having made the positional invest-
ments. Nonetheless, resources are wasted: the same relative outcome could be
achieved with fewer total resources. Had A and B been able to agree, they
could have achieved the same ultimate relative position (ordinal or cardinal)
by A's investing alone. In other words, if A invested a total of x and B a total
of y, A could have achieved the same relative rank by investing only the
difference (x - y). The difference between the amount actually invested (x +
y) and the "minimally necessary investment" given the outcome (x - y) repre-
sents the waste of competitive consumption.' 23
To illustrate this resource misallocation, it is helpful to return to Posner's
growth hormone hypothetical.2' Posner asks which family would have greater
"value" for a pituitary extract that would increase the height of their child: (1)
a wealthy family whose child will otherwise be of average height but who will
be "tall" with the growth hormone, or (2) a poor family whose child suffers
from a growth deficiency that will retard his growth far below average unless
he receives the hormone. The wealth-maximizing answer is that the family that
is "willing to pay" the greatest amount for the pituitary extract-quite possibly
the wealthy family--"values" it the most.2 5 Posner offers the example to
show the theoretical difference between social wealth and utility, the wealthy
family's consumption maximizing the former but not the latter. Posner's point,
however, is that such divergences are "rare," and that wealth maximization is
good as a general rule for maximizing utility.22
Posner's discussion misses the most interesting aspect of the example: the
wealthy family's use of growth hormone to make its average height child "tall"
not only fails to maximize utility, but may even reduce utility. The wealthy
family's consumption of the extract may not only produce less utility than
would the poor family's consumption, it may be worse than having no con-
sumption of the hormone at all. Because the preferences for height inherently
conflict, the use of human growth hormone falls the Pareto criterion: making
one person better off by being taller necessarily makes others worse off. Even
under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, if there are transaction costs, we cannot be
sure whether it is efficient for only one consumer to use the growth hormone.
223. The total waste, (x + y) minus (x - y), is equal to 2y. In other words, all of what B invested (y)
and an equivalent amount of A's investment is wasted. Only the amount that ultimately placed A ahead
of B is not wasted.
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We can say, however, that if the poor family responds to the rich family's
investment by also investing in the hormone, there is genuine social waste.
One possibility is that the freedom to consume growth hormone will
produce a prisoner's dilemma. Suppose that we have a two-family economy
in which each set of parents, hoping to make its child "tall," or to prevent him
or her from being "short," ranks its preferences as follows: (1) that its child
consume the extract, while the other child does not; (2) that neither child
consume the extract; (3) that both children consume the extract; and (4) that
the other child consumes the extract while its child does not. Under these
circumstances, each family may choose to purchase the extract to avoid out-
come (4) and to have a chance at outcome (1).227 Their joint decisions would
produce outcome (3), in which the added height for both children is equal and
produces no advantage for either.22s The result of such a dilemma is an "arms
race" of competitive consumption of growth hormone in which parallel spend-
ing decisions eliminate the utility of the object purchased. This wealth creates
no welfare, but reduces welfare if, in the absence of human growth hormone,
the parents would have spent some of the money saved in satisying their
nonconflicting preferences. 229 The nonproductive investment in growth hor-
mone represents a loss of the welfare these alternative items would have
generated. Even if there is a "winner" in this competition, such that one family
gains greater height (within the limits desired) than the other, there is still waste
if both families consume the hormone. If the "losing" family had not consumed
the hormone, the winning family could have consumed only the minimally
necessary amount to achieve its positional edge. The resources represented by
the winning family's additional consumption, and all of the losing family's
consumption, are wasted.
We can also use Posner's hypothetical to explain under what circumstances
it would be affirmatively desirable for one of the families to purchase the
growth hormone. Recall the height preferences postulated at the end of the last
section: A's desire to be in the top twenty-five percent rank, B's desire to be
in the top sixty percent rank, and C's desire to be within ten percent of the
227. More technically, the decision to consume the hormone "dominates" the other decisions. If family
B abstains from hormone consumption, then family A prefers consumption because it secures its highest
ranked outcome (I). If family B consumes the hormone, then family A prefers consumption because it
avoids its lowest ranked outcome (4). Family B's choices are the same.
228. There may be some activities where absolute height is an advantage. For example, assuming that
there are lower marginal costs to picking those apples in the part of the tree that can be reached without
a ladder (less risk of injury, less capital maintenance), then there may be some gain from having taller apple
pickers. But such examples are exceptional.
229. For example, suppose the family's next highest use for the money invested in growth hormone
would have been for encyclopedias or for greater leisure for the breadwinners. One can imagine leisure and
encyclopedias as having elements of a positional good if one family is striving to have more leisure or to
give its child more education than others. I assume for purposes of this example, however, that this is not
the case, that the families value the goods for their absolute value only, regardless of the amount consumed
by others. All that is necessary for the point above, however, is that these alternative goods create more
absolute utility than the growth hormone (which creates virtually none).
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mean height. Suppose that the wealthy family in Posner's hypothetical, whose
child would otherwise be of average height, has the preference represented by
the A's, and the poorer family, whose child has a growth deficiency such as
dwarfism, is one of the C's. In this case, consumption by the poor family could
satisfy its positional preference without causing any harm to anyone else. The
wealthy family's consumption, however, could satisfy its positional preference
only by displacing another A who would otherwise be in the top twenty-five
percent, and by raising the mean so that a larger number of C's may be more
than ten percent below the mean.
3. Relative Preferences and Optimal Effort: The Exceptional Case When
Inherently Conflicting Preferences Are Socially Beneficial
Some might object to the above analysis of competitive consumption by
raising the connection between consumption and production. In a market
economy, people must produce in order to consume. Even if people in a group
would be better off limiting their competitive consumption, perhaps their efforts
to satisfy their relative preferences cause them to produce more goods or
services to satisfy other people's absolute preferences. Perhaps it is desirable
to have relative preferences that elicit greater productive effort.
Although relative preferences will undoubtedly elicit greater effort, one
should not conclude that greater effort is always desirable. Under standard
microeconomic accounts, absent market failure, absolute preferences are
sufficient to elicit the optimal tradeoff between leisure and work. In economic
terms, the cost of an hour of work is the value the worker places on using that
hour for leisure. The benefit of an hour of work is equal to what others are
willing to pay for that hour of labor. It is efficient for individuals to work those
hours, but only those hours, where the marginal benefits of work exceed the
marginal costs.230 A competitive market-where customers or employers bid
for labor-will generally produce that result.
Assume, for example, that A is a self-employed plumber working for ten
hours a day who values his marginal (fourteenth) hour of leisure at twenty-five
dollars. That sum reflects the strength of his preference for the activities he
engages in during leisure. It would be an inefficient use of resources for him
to work the eleventh hour for a wage less than twenty-five dollars per hour.
At that point, if the highest wage offered is only twenty dollars per hour, then
his working would contribute less toward satisfying the preferences of others
(as measured by their willingness to pay) than his leisure would contribute
230. Typically, the marginal costs of labor increase over the range of hours in a day (e.g., the worker
values the first hour of leisure per day more than the twenty-fourth) while the marginal benefits of labor
decline (e.g., a firm values the first hour of labor per day more than the twenty-fourth). Thus, typically,
there will be one optimal amount of time each worker should work, a point graphically illustrated by the
point at which the rising marginal cost curve for labor intersects the falling marginal benefit curve.
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toward satisfying his own preferences (similarly measured)." In a competi-
tive market, absent a market failure, customers or employers will offer to pay
A up to the value they place on his labor, and A will work the optimal level
without concern for relative position. Any additional effort caused by A's
having a relative preference (e.g., for having more income than a neighbor, B)
would be excessive, unless the additional effort actually satisfies A's relative
preference. But, under the circumstances specified above, if B has an inherently
conflicting relative preference, A's and/or B's additional effort will be wasted.
This analysis, however, points to one important circumstance where relative
preferences may be not only harmless but desirable: when an existing market
failure holds effort below the optimal level. For example, a competitive market
(in which consumers act to satisfy only absolute preferences) is commonly
thought to elicit less than optimal production of "public goods" or quasi-public
goods. 32 Public goods have two defining characteristics: (1) inexhaustability,
meaning that consumption by one individual does not preclude consumption
by other individuals; and (2) nonexcludability, meaning that once produced, it
is not feasible to exclude nonpaying individuals from consuming the good.z 3
Journalists and scholars, for example, "produce" information and ideas that may
be jointly consumed by many under circumstances where it is not be feasible
to exclude use by nonpayorsY 4 For commodities with these public good
characteristics, consumers will hope to "free ride" on the paid consumption of
others, gaining the benefit of the public good at no cost. Because all consumers
have the same incentive, a competitive market will usually underproduce such
goods.a 5 The general problem of free riding may also cause the market to
underproduce goods with disproportionately large external benefits. For exam-
231. The same analysis would work if we measured "effort" not by the number of hours worked but
by A's "intensity" of work during a given hour or by his investment in training as a plumber.
232. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 46-48 (1988); FERGUSON &
MAURICE, supra note 9, at 494-95; Wendy L Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COL. L. REV. 1600, 1610-11 (1982).
233. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 232, at46; Gordon, supra note 232, at 1611 & n.65. Under more
relaxed conditions-when inexhausability or nonexcludability is imperfect-a commodity may be a quasi-
public good.
234. Cf. Gordon, supra note 232, at 16 11 (explaining why "[b]ooks and inventions exhibit certain public
goods characteristics"). Copyright law gives scholars and journalists some powers of exclusion regarding
their "expression," but these powers are limited and do not include protection of "ideas, processes, systems,
discoveries, or similar products of mental effort." Wendy . Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:
The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1370-73
(1989) (explaining limitations on exclusion right under copyright law). Consequently, this kind of work may
retain some important public good characteristics. Suppose, for example, that a legal scholar constructs a
new "test" that dramatically clarifies the law and improves the ability of judges to decide cases. Such a test
is certainly not "exhausted" if one judge uses it to decide a case; nor can the scholar feasibly advocate the
merits of the test and yet exclude people from using it. Similarly, suppose a journalist who uncovers new,
highly probative facts about a candidate for political office. Transaction costs may prevent the journalist
from selling that information to voters on a case-by-case basis, but once published, there may be no practical
way to exclude nonpaying consumers from using the information in deciding how to vote.
235. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 232, at 46; FERGUSON & MAURICE, supra note 9, at 494;
Gordon, supra note 232, at 1611. The underproduction of public goods represents a market failure which
may justify governmental regulation either subsidizing or directly supplying such goods.
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ple, if altruists desire that the poor receive a certain level of financial support,
each would benefit from another's charitable contributions.n 6 Consequently,
each may seek to free ride on the contributions of others, resulting in less than
optimal levels of charityY237
Relative preferences offer some hope of correcting these market failures.
First, efforts to satisfy relative preferences will elicit greater consumption of
certain goods. If there were a relative preference for commodities otherwise
underproduced, competitive efforts to satisfy the preference would raise demand
for, and encourage production of, such goods. For example, for the reasons
given above, free riding may cause less than the optimal level of contributions
to charitable organizations. But a relative preference to give more to any
particular charity than others give-to receive the status of being a "major do-
nor"--would tend to correct this market failure.23s Up to some point, it is
socially desirable for consumers to have relative preferences for otherwise
underproduced goods.
Relative preferences might correct market failure in a second way. To
satisfy their relative preferences, workers must produce more so that they can
afford to consume more. Although this increase generally means that workers
are producing private goods beyond the optimal level, competitive consumption
also induces workers employed in the production of quasi-public goods to
produce more. In theory, competitive consumption might drive such workers
to produce an optimal amount of such goods. The costs, however, would
certainly exceed the benefits. Making the conventional assumption that public
or quasi-public goods are a small fraction of all goods, inducing greater effort
by all workers to correct for underproduction would create a larger market
failure of overproduction of private goods.
Nonetheless, there are two particular cases where relative preferences might
encourage the increased production of quasi-public goods at an acceptable cost.
First, suppose that only those people in the business of producing quasi-public
goods have relative preferences. Competitive consumption would drive these
people to increase their effort toward a socially optimal level of production,
236. For example, a soup kitchen that feeds the homeless may create benefits such as decreased crime
and decreased pandering, as well as the altruistic pleasure of knowing others have enough to eat. These
benefits are not limited to those who contribute to the soup kitchen.
237. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 440. To illustrate the market failure, suppose
that ten people place a value of one dollar per day on having one more person fed at a soup kitchen and
that it costs five dollars per day to feed one more person. Although the total benefits--ten dollars-exceed
the cost, it is quite possible that the ten people will fail to contribute the needed five dollars because each
will consider the possibility that others will contribute enough and that he will accrue the benefits without
contributing anything.
238. To elaborate on the example supra note 237, if one person seeks to "consume" (i.e., give) more
charity than others, he might be willing to contribute the entire five dollars per day. Amihai Glazer and Kai
Konrad argue that conspicuous charity has certain advantages over conspicuous consumption in signaling
one's income, and find evidence that people use charitable giving for that purpose. Amiha Glazer & Kal
A. Konrad, A Signalling Explanation for Private Charity (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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while private good production (carried out by workers without relative prefer-
ences) remained unaffected. But this approach would fail if it depended on
people satisfying their relative preferences by the money wages they receive
in quasi-public good production. Since it is the nature of such goods that
producers cannot generate as much return on their effort as they could by
producing private goods, there is a tendency for such people to exit the market
for producing quasi-public goods239 This tendency would be countered in
part, however, if merely being a producer in a quasi-public good market earned
one relatively high status within the larger community. Thus, awarding social
respect to those in such occupations, and depriving private good occupations
of similar status, may encourage the production of quasi-public goods without
raising the likelihood of wasteful competitive consumption.
Second, suppose that people producing quasi-public goods have a relative
preference for their production. This possibility requires that we relax the
neoclassical assumption that work is entirely a cost (a sacrifice of leisure), and
imagine that sometimes people also gain utility directly from working (as
opposed to the wages they earn from work). 4 If people have preferences for
work, such as the desire to accomplish tasks or to develop proficiencies, then
it is plausible that they also have relative preferences for work, such as the
desire, as an end in itself, to be more productive than others. Again, according
to neoclassical theory, relative preferences for work generally would not be
necessary to elicit optimal effort. But for public goods, such a desire would
correct the natural tendency to underproduce such goods. Therefore, it would
be socially desirable if people in quasi-public good occupations had the desire,
as an end in itself, to be more productive than others.
To illustrate these two points, consider again the fields of journalism and
academia. If these fields produce information that has the characteristics of a
public good, then it may be socially desirable (a) that the occupations of
journalist and scholar be accorded high social status and (b) that journalists and
scholars strive for status within their occupations. In American society, these
occupations are not particularly high in status, but it is interesting that some
of the most prestigious "prizes" are the Pulitzer Prizes for journalism and the
Nobel Prizes for certain academic disciplines. Perhaps the status these prizes
bestow is a cultural means of partially solving the public good market failure.
239. Those with relative preferences would not remain concentrated in public good production for
another reason. People tend to compare themselves with similar others, such as the group of people sharing
one's occupation. If the remaining industries lacked positionally-motivated producers, it would be easier
to "get ahead" in those industries than in those in which everyone seeks to satisfy relative preferences.
240. The standard assumption that work does not itself produce pleasure has been questioned and
criticized. See, e.g., ROBERT E. LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE (1991); Margaret Jane Radin, Justice And
The Market Domain, in NOMOS XXXI: MARKETs AND JUSTICE 165, 176-77 (John W. Chapman & J.
Roland Pennock eds., 1989).
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C. When Transaction Costs Prevent Bargaining Solutions
When the conditions of inherent preference conflict exist, the above analy-
sis suggests that individuals will wastefully divert resources from satisfying
nonconflicting preferences into the zero sum activity of competitive consump-
tion. All three cases of wasteful competitive consumption depend, however, on
the failure of the parties to agree privately to controls on their competitive
investments. In Coasean terms,"' satisfaction of relative preferences under
circumstances of inherent conflict creates negative externalities-the
nonsatisfaction of another individual's relative preferences. The Coase Theorem
suggests that, in the absence of transaction costs, the parties will bargain to the
efficient control of such externalities. In other words, individuals will voluntari-
ly seek agreements restricting competitive consumption if such agreements will
save resources that are more efficiently employed in satisfying nonconflicting
preferences.
In this context, "efficient allocation" is a function of two factors: maximiz-
ing welfare by satisfying the strongest relative preferences (some persons
having stronger relative preferences than others) and minimizing resources
expended to satisfy relative preferences. In the growth hormone example, the
efficient outcome might be that neither individual, A or B, consumes the growth
hormone;2 2 but because each wishes to avoid being made relatively shorter
by the other's consumption of growth hormone, each will consume the growth
hormone if acting independently. In the absence of transaction costs, the Coase
Theorem says that A and B will reach an agreement whereby each promises
to forgo consumption of the hormone. Similarly, under certain circumstances,
the most efficient outcome might be for A to consume the growth hormone but
for B to refrain. Acting independently, however, B also may consume the
hormone, canceling the effects of A's consumption, and wasting the investment
of both. If A benefits more from gaining in relative height than the cost to B
from losing relative height, though, the Theorem predicts that A will pay B to
refrain from hormone consumption while A partakes of it himself, if the net
gain is larger than that produced by any other consumption pattern.
241. See Coase, supra note 101. Briefly stated, the Coase Theorem says that "in a world without
transaction costs, parties will bargain to the optimal allocation of rights, no matter where the rights were
initially assigned." James Lindgren, "Ol' Man River... He Keeps on Rollin' Along": A Reply to Donohue's
Diverting the Coasean River, 78 GEo. L.J. 577, 579 (1990). In even simpler terms, "when it is to the benefit
of people to reach an agreement, they will seek to reach it." George J. Stigler, Two Notes on the Coase
Theorem, 99 YALE LJ. 631, 631 (1989).
242. The mutual consumption of growth hormone will cause A and B to forgo consumption of an
absolute good (e.g., safety or insurance), without making either any taller in a relative sense.
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1. Conventional Transaction Costs
In most cases, however, high transaction costs will prevent individuals from
reaching agreements about limiting expenditures to satisfy their relative prefer-
ences. Such agreements will generally require that an individual bargain with
every individual who is affected by his consumption of a positional good. These
transaction costs will be prohibitively high when there are more than just a few
consumers. The groups to which individuals generally compare them-
selves-friends, neighbors, coworkers-are usually large enough to make
bargaining impractical.
In addition to the high costs of negotiating with all relevant parties, the
normal problems of strategic behavior are likely to prevent an efficient out-
come. Noncontracting parties can "free ride" on the agreement of others to
forgo consumption of a positional good (such as growth hormone) or to con-
sume a minimum amount of a nonpositional good (such as safety). Such parties,
as a result, receive greater benefit from consuming positional goods. This is
the effect that creates the prisoner's dilemma of the sort discussed above.243
Also, as more parties express their willingness to participate in an agreement
(restricting positional consumption or requiring nonpositional consumption), the
few remaining parties will perceive that their cooperation is growing in impor-
tance, and they will threaten to "hold out" in an effort to extract more than a
proportionate share of contractual benefit. The possibility of both strategies
often will block any agreement.'
2. Special Transaction Costs
Besides these standard transaction costs, the context of competitive con-
sumption presents some special impediments to Coasean bargaining. First,
paying a Coasean "bribe" may undermine rather than preserve or enhance one's
social status. Offering to pay others to forgo consumption is just the kind of
overt manipulation of status symbols that is more likely to produce derision
than status.245 Explicitly offering to pay people to assume a lower status is
especially self-defeating because it concedes that the "briber" is otherwise
status-deficient. Even if such payments do produce status, acknowledging that
one seeks such an end will violate social norms against feelings of jealousy and
envy. Although it is appropriate to want "nice" clothes, a "good" car, and a
243. The unrestricted families now will gain even more from hormone consumption, since the contract
will tend to depress the average community height. Any party who contractually restricts his or her own
consumption of goods serving purely relative ends risks relative losses if other consumers are not so
restricted. Consequently, a consumer will tend to refuse to enter such agreements unless all consumers are
included.
244. See generally Loyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991).
245. See supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text.
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"decent" income, many consider it inappropriate to want more or better clothes,
cars, and income than others, or to feel badly for possessing less. Thus, the
shame people feel in admitting they care about these things will also impede
Coasean bargaining in this context.'
For example, if Jones seeks to own one of the "nicest" cars on his block,
he can theoretically pay his neighbors not to buy a better car. But such bargain-
ing requires Jones to reveal the shameful fact that he feels worse when others
are doing relatively better, or better when others are doing worse. And vis-h-vis
the neighbors with whom he makes the bargain, the Coasean contract will
hardly protect his status given that the reason that his car compares favorably
to others is that he is paying the other owners not to improve their own. Rather
than enhance status, the existence of the contract is a form of subordination to
his neighbors: Jones' self-esteem is so fragile that he will pay others to pretend
they are less financially successful than they really are. Thus the shme and
"self-defeating" subordination of openly seeking and paying for status constitute
the first set of special transaction costs to bargaining in this context.
Of course, in some cases, there may be ways of bargaining to the efficient
outcome without either side actually admitting to having a relative preference.
To return to Frank's coal workers example, 47 the workers may be unwilling
to admit that each would refuse to work in the "dirty" mine except for the
prospect of losing position relative to the other. This "shame" cost might
prevent a straightforward agreement to work in the clean mine. But there are
alternatives: for example, the workers might agree to form a union and jointly
demand the right to work in clean mines. They might give as the reason for
their demand, not the avoidance of resource misallocation caused by their
competitive consumption, but the right of working people to humane conditions
or the need to stop management from exploiting workers.248 This alternative,
or others, may avoid shame costs, but require other transaction costs. If the
costs of alternative arrangements are also sufficiently high, they will prevent
the parties from bargaining to the efficient outcome.
Another special impediment to Coasean bargaining in this context is that
people may not possess sufficient information about the relative nature of their
own preferences to carry out the necessary bargaining. The social norms against
relative desires may suppress the necessary self-knowledge. Normally, con-
scious awareness is irrelevant to the economic theory of consumer behavior.
In predicting that individuals will act to maximize satisfaction of their prefer-
246. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 675 (1988)
(discussing "anxiety" as transaction cost). Although neglected for a time, psychology has again begun to
emphasize the importance of shame. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME, THE EXPOSED SELF (1992); THE
MANY FACES OF SHAME (Donald L. Nathanson ed., 1987); LEON WURMSER, THE MASK OF SHAME (198 I).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
248. Cf. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 150-58. I am not suggesting that this is the
primary explanation for unionization.
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ences,249 consumer theory does not require that people consciously maximize,
or that they be able to verbalize what they are doing in maximizing terms. 2'
People need not even be conscious of what their preferences are; their observ-
able behavior may be explained best as an attempt to satisfy a desire whether
or not they are aware of such a desire. Positive economics is thus content to
say that people act as if they were maximizing satisfaction of their preferences,
and is indifferent to what people may think they are doing.
Nonetheless, the Coase Theorem presents a special case. Here, economic
analysis predicts that people engaged in conflicting activities will bargain to
reach the optimal level of each activity. Can such bargaining occur without at
least one party being conscious of the fact? More significantly, can such
bargaining occur without at least one party being conscious of conflict between
the two activities? There may be circumstances in which "subconscious bargain-
ing" does exist, where two parties consciously engage in some activity other
than bargaining that produces the effect of a Coasean bargain. 15 But there
are other circumstances in which it is exceedingly unlikely that parties will
bargain unless they are conscious of what they are doing and why.
For example, suppose that A lives in a neighborhood where everyone parks
on the street and that she has a preference for having the "best" automobile on
her blocky 2 Assume also that B shares this relative preference, that B "com-
petes" with A by investing in progressively more expensive cars, and that such
investment is inefficiently diverting resources from satisfying nonconflicting
preferences. The Coase Theorem predicts that A and B will solve this problem
by agreeing to restrict their car consumption. But if A and B are not conscious
of the relative nature of their preferences-if they each consciously perceive
themselves wanting only a "nice" car, not one better than the other-can we
expect them to bargain with each other to restrict the quality of automobile they
consume? A might "compete" with B for best car on the block even though
she has never met B. It seems highly unlikely that A could contact B for the
first time and arrange a limit on automobile consumption, without being
conscious of the facts that she had a relative preference for automobiles, that
an agreement restricting competitive automobile consumption was desirable,
249. This also applies to any decision unit seeking to maximize any object (such as firm maximizing
profits or politician maximizing votes).
250. See BECKER, supra note 171, at7; FRIEDMAN, supra note 171, at 15. Of course, people sometimes
do consciously maximize; it is simply not necessary to economic theory that they do.
251. When people have a pre-existing relationship of some sort, it is possible that they will act "as
if' they were bargaining over conflicting activities, while not being conscious of the conflict or the bargain.
Imagine two people sharing an apartment: A, who likes to go to sleep early, and B, who likes to play music
loudly late at night. Consciously or subconsciously, it is possible that A might "punish" B for each incident
of late night music by refusing to do chores or by acting coldly toward B for a period of time. Again,
consciously or subconsciously, B might respond in kind, or B might play the music at a lower volume, turn
it off earlier in the evening, or purchase and use headphones. Even with both parties behaving subconscious-
ly, the ultimate result might be a Coasean bargain in which the parties reach the efficient outcome.
252. Neoclassical economics would infer such a preference if its existence best explained certain of
A's observable behavior, whether she was conscious of this preference is irrelevant.
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and that she was in fact bargaining with B over that issue. We may generalize
this point by saying that where there is no previous contractual relationship
between the parties (and especially where there is no previous relationship of
any kind between the parties), it is unlikely that they will contact each other
and negotiate a contract without conscious awareness that their activities
conflict and that they are bargaining over the best way to resolve that conflict.
Yet in the context of relative preferences, the necessary self-awareness will
sometimes be lacking. Avoiding conscious awareness of one's relative prefer-
ences may be a common means of avoiding the feelings of shame such prefer-
ences tend to create (even if others do not know about them). Wanting more
expensive goods, or a higher income, than one's neighbors, coworkers, and
friends may make one feel petty, vain, and shallow. Thus, a final special
impediment to Coasean bargaining in this context is that people may be insuffi-
ciently conscious of their relative preferences to permit them to bargain.
3. Examples of Successful and Unsuccessful Coasean Bargaining
There will be cases in which parties overcome these impediments to
Coasean bargaining. An excellent example is suggested by Frank's theory of
wages. As noted above, 3 Frank explains the deviation of wages from mar-
ginal productivity by reference to workers' desire for having higher wages than
their coworkers in the firm. According to Frank, this desire leads firms to pay
their more productive workers less than their marginal productivity, and their
less productive workers more than their marginal productivity, thus compressing
the pay scale from the scale that marginal productivity theory suggestsY.
If Frank's theory is correct, individuals have somehow bargained to a
solution of the problem of competitive consumption and (consciously or
unconsciously) avoided the resource misallocation their relative preferences
might otherwise create. Absent Coasean bargaining, if firms set wages at
marginal productivity, some workers would make wasteful investments in
preserving their position vis-a)-vis their coworkers. Rather than work in a firm
with people making relatively higher wages (because of their higher marginal
productivity), workers would seek to preserve their status in one of two ways:
(1) by each working for himself or herself and avoiding all coworkers or (2)
253. See supra text accompanying notes 188-191.
254. Workers accept wages that are relatively high within the firm, but are below their marginal
productivities, because they are better off trading that wage increment for increased status. Other workers
accept wages that are relatively low within the firm, but above their marginal productivity, because they
are better off trading that status for the wage increment. In a dynamic sense, individuals who care little about
status will seek firms with more productive workers because getting paid more than their marginal
productivity is well worth the sacrifice of being relatively poorly paid within the firm. Conversely, people
who care enormously about status will seek firms with less productive workers because getting paid less
than their marginal productivity is worth the benefit of being relatively well paid within the firm. The fact
that a worker voluntarily joins a firm with workers of varying marginal productivities and differing wages
means that the workers must be making wage-for-status trades that are beneficial to him or her.
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by working for a firm that has a uniform wage scale because it employs
workers with the same marginal productivity. 5 These options are "invest-
ments" in status because of the opportunity cost each entails: by forgoing work
with other workers or with other workers of higher productivity, an individual
may sacrifice an absolute wage in order to avoid a "relatively" low wage. To
avoid this waste, it is necessary that the more productive workers "bribe" the
less productive workers to remain in the firm at a relatively lower wage by the
affording them the prospect of receiving-through the bribe-more than their
marginal productivity. But if each employee had to reach an enforceable
agreement with every other employee whose status was affected by his contrac-
tual'wage, then we should expect the high transaction costs to prevent workers
from bargaining to the efficient outcome. How is it that the workers avoid this
wasteful investment and reach the efficient outcome?
The answer is that firms facilitate the necessary bargaining. Firms attempt
to gain the most productive combination of workers; where this includes
workers of differing marginal productivities, firms can create a pay scale
equivalent to marginal productivity or one that deviates from it. If workers
desire relative wages (compared to coworkers), then firms offering compressed
pay scales will dominate the market and drive out firms paying strictly accord-
ing to marginal productivity. Employees, therefore, need not negotiate directly
with each other; they can shop for an employer who offers them the most
desirable combination of absolute and relative wages. Where workers face firms
offering a rich selection of possible tradeoffs between absolute wages and
status, and where they already bear the transaction costs of finding an employer,
the transaction costs for reaching the best tradeoff among employees will be
low.256 Most importantly, a single employer has the ability to "enforce" the
current arrangement among employees much more cheaply than enforcing
numerous employee/employee agreements by keeping the relative wages equal
for workers of a given marginal product2 57 This mechanism also eliminates
some of the special transaction costs discussed above: workers need not admit
to caring about relative wages, nor be conscious of bargaining over relative
255. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77. There are other ways workers might invest in preserving
workplace status: (I) by sabotaging the efforts of coworkers, and (2) by working a job in which their
marginal productivity equals or surpasses coworkers when they could earn more in absolute terms in a
different occupation in which their productivity was below that of their coworkers.
256. Assuming a competitive market in which workers have the option of avoiding a wage-for-status
trade altogether (by working alone or in a firm where equally productive workers are paid equally), the
decision to take a job in a firm with coworkers of unequal productivity and unequal wages is to accept the
implicit tradeoff made between wages and status.
257. Firms will experiment with different scales, attracting those workers who prefer their particular
status-for-pay tradeoff. Firms that manage to attract workers of a certain preference for status will have an
incentive to maintain the existing tradeoff in order to retain those employees. For example, a firm attracting
people with little concern for status will tend to have larger disparities in wages, disparities more in line
with disparities in marginal product. For this firm suddenly to compress wages would cause its most
productive workers to leave. Conversely, a firm with workers who value status highly will have smaller
wage disparities, and will lose its least productive workers if it makes them larger.
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wages. In bargaining with the firm over wages, workers can consciously focus
only on absolute wages, but still act "as if' they were attempting to maximize
satisfaction of a relative preference for relative wages.
Stated this way, we can understand the difference between the market for
labor and the market for growth hormone and other sectors in which serious
resource misallocation may occur. In the growth hormone case, it is much more
difficult to control the group of people with whom comparisons are to be made.
Parties deciding whether to purchase growth hormones may be concerned about
a very broad category of people whose decisions to purchase hormones may
affect them. Because height is such an easily observable characteristic, one
compares oneself to a very large group, and often to a group with whom one
does not voluntarily choose to associate. Similarly, there are limits by which
one can avoid unfavorable economic comparisons, and usually there is no
collective decisionmaking process, other than government, to set minimum
expenditure levels on nonpositional goods (like safety). Finally, even a firm's
ability to facilitate wage-for-status bargains is unhelpful to the extent workers
wish to be well paid relative to groups other than coworkers s8 In Frank's
mine workers example,5 9 competition among neighbors for relative income
drives workers to forgo health and safety investments that would make all
parties better off.
Competitive consumption is a market failure. Individuals seeking to maxi-
mize satisfaction of their relative preferences will, under the conditions speci-
fied, fail to use social resources efficiently. Specifically, when individuals invest
in satisfying their inherently conflicting preferences, they divert resources into
a zero sum competition; the investment is wasteful because consumers are
worse off using resources in this manner than they would be using those
resources to satisfy nonconflicting preferences. Preferences inherently conflict
when individuals (a) compare themselves with one another, (b) the comparison
involves the same characteristic, (c) they desire incompatible positions with
respect to one another regarding that characteristic, and (d) their respective
positions will be observable and objective. These conditions will not cause
economic waste where individuals voluntarily agree to refrain from such
competition. But the nature of relative preferences-and more conventional
problems-will often impede the necessary bargaining.
lII. LEGAL REGULATION To CORRECT FOR COMPETITIVE CONSUMPTION
As with any market failure, the practical issue is whether collective regula-
tion can correct the failure without imposing more costs than are gained from
258. See, e.g., Philip E. Graves, Dwight R. Lee & Robert L. Sexton, A Note on Interfirm Implications
of Wages and Status, 8 L LAB. REs. 209 (1987) (arguing that in some fields, such as academia, workers
may care more about reputation beyond firm than within it).
259. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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the correction. To improve the market result, we must be reasonably confident
that we have isolated a particular instance of competitive consumption and that
the benefits of regulating the market to correct the resource misallocation will
exceed the costs of the regulation. This Part examines these issues. Part III(A)
discusses three strategies that could be used to correct for competitive consump-
tion: prohibiting or taxing consumption of goods that primarily serve relative
ends, mandating consumption of goods that are commonly sacrificed in compet-
itive consumption, and creating social norms against engaging in competitive
consumption. The following sections examine in greater detail the normative
implications of the most prevalent type of competitive consumption, that which
is caused by the relative desire for social status. Part III(B) considers how
individual competition for status might lead to inefficient investment of resourc-
es for which income taxation may be viewed as a corrective. Part III(C)
considers how groups may compete for status and, in particular, suggests an
understanding of antidiscrimination laws as seeking to prohibit a certain form
of group-based status competition.
These latter two sections illustrate how the theory of relative preferences
and competitive consumption can illuminate problems of legal theory. I empha-
size, however, that this entire Part is a tentative exploration of possible regula-
tory responses to competitive consumption, rather than a definitive set of
recommendations for solving the market failure.
A. Strategies For Correcting Competitive Consumption
Any strategy for correcting a market failure must begin by specifying how
to identify the failure in practice, rather than in theory. Although I have speci-
fied the conditions above, I now enrich the model in two ways to account for
certain real world complexities.
The social science evidence reviewed in Part 11 suggests the primacy of one
form of competitive consumption: the consumption of status goods. Occasional-
ly people may have independent preferences for particular status goods (e.g.,
one preference for the "best" car on the block, another for a socially acceptable
home, another still for the most fashionable clothes in the office), or for
achieving particular types of "distinction" (e.g., athletic and artistic distinction).
On the whole, however, the superior interpretation of the evidence is not that
consumers have a large collection of separate relative preferences, but that they
purchase a combination of status goods in order to "produce" a single commod-
ity of overall social distinction or prestige.260 The goods produce status by
260. See Stigler & Becker, supra note 43. Becker is even willing to entertain the possibility that "all
households have precisely the same utility function and that all observed behavioral differences result from
differences in relative prices and access to real resources." Becker, supra note 171, at 145. Although
Becker's approach is generally useful to explain much of the evidence, I do not believe that, in fact, there
is only one relative preference for status, and that every effort to achieve a better position regarding some
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demonstrating certain constituent elements of status: relative income or the
quality of one's tastes. Because one of the most prevalent types of competitive
consumption is the investment in goods symbolizing income and status, many
of the regulatory issues discussed below address this form of competitive
consumption.
Second, in the real world, most consumer investments cannot be simply
categorized as satisfying "relative" or "absolute" preferences. Most goods
satisfy both; we might describe goods as having an "absolute value" based on
their ability to satisfy absolute preferences, a "relative value" based on their
ability to satisfy relative preferences, and a total value based on both. Goods
fall along a continuum between satisfying solely relative preferences and solely
absolute preferences. Some goods have almost exclusively an absolute value
and very little relative value; other goods have almost exclusively a relative
value and very little absolute value. Examples of the former might include
health insurance, savings, and basic foodstuffs; examples of the latter might
include steroids, animal furs, and diamonds. Moreover, some goods may tend
to have a primarily absolute value at certain levels of consumption, but a
primarily relative value at higher levels of consumption. Examples of this group
might include housing space, "quality" of automobile and clothing, and educa-
tional degrees in business administration.
The market failure of competitive consumption is not merely that consum-
ers buy goods satisfying relative preferences to the detriment of goods satisfy-
ing absolute preferences. In the real world, competitive consumption exists
where the drive to satisfy relative wants inefficiently diverts resources from the
production of the goods with a high ratio of absolute to relative value to goods
with a low ratio of absolute to relative value. In addition, for goods which
supply a primary value that changes from absolute to relative as the quantity
consumed increases, we can expect individuals to consume to the level at which
the ratio of absolute to relative value is lower than that of other goods the
individuals choose not to consume. One may purchase a diamond ring, for
example, not only to satisfy the relative preference for relative, visible wealth,
but also for the absolute satisfaction of its intrinsic beauty. Under conditions
of inherent preference conflict, however, such goods retain the characteristic
that resources invested will not increase total consumer satisfaction by as much
particular good is but an attempt to satisfy that one relative desire. It is at least possible that people have
desires for particular goods as ends in themselves. For example, certain people may desire to have more
or better automobiles than others, solely as an end in itself and not as a means to obtaining general social
status or distinction. Also, while a person may desire some general commodity like "social distinction," he
or she may separately desire a narrower commodity like "athletic distinction," "artistic distinction," or "chess
playing distinction." If no amount of general social distinction-no amount of wealth, fame, power or any
other "good" that helps produce such a general commodity-satiates one's desire for distinction among chess
players for playing chess, then it does not make sense to say that investing time in developing chess skills
is merely a means of producing social distinction. Instead, we should say that while the person has a general
desire for social distinction and chess playing may help achieve social distinction, he or she has an
independent desire for chess playing distinction.
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as an equal investment in a good valued to a greater degree for its satisfaction
of absolute preferences. To the extent the diamond investment diverts resources
from a good with a greater absolute value (although less total value to the
consumer), the individual drive to satisfy relative preferences causes resource
misallocation.
Having enriched the model, we must now concede that we will never have
the information necessary to identify and correct every instance of competitive
consumption. We lack the ability to separate precisely the absolute and symbol-
ic value of particular goods.261 We cannot identify small differences in the
"absolute value" of different goods with sufficient confidence to justify market
regulation for all instances of resource misallocation that likely exist. We can,
however, identify goods that fall very near either end of the continuum. As a
practical strategy, therefore, we can concentrate on (1) preventing over-
consumption of goods with primarily a relative value (or with primarily a
relative value at the levels being consumed), and (2) preventing under-
consumption of goods with primarily an absolute value (or with primarily an
absolute value at the levels being consumed). The former regulatory strategy
might suggest prohibiting the consumption of certain goods or consumption
above a certain level. The latter regulatory strategy suggests mandating con-
sumption of particular goods or consumption up to a certain level. Alternatively,
the government could deter excessive investment in primarily relative goods
by taxing such consumption, and could encourage additional investment in
primarily absolute goods by subsidizing such consumption. Finally, with or
without governmental action, social norms may operate to restrain the waste
of competitive consumption. The remainder of this Section will consider these
strategies in turn.
1. Prohibiting and Taxing Investment in Status Competition
The first possible approach is to prohibit the consumption of goods with
primarily a relative value, or with primarily a relative value at the levels being
consumed. The difficulties inherent in this approach limit its usefulness. The
effectiveness of prohibition depends critically on the ability to identify and
prohibit close substitutes for a prohibited good. If consumers can choose among
various goods to produce a status gain, then prohibiting one good will likely
cause substitution of another. To block the substitution effect of prohibition,
government must prohibit the whole class of substitute goods (or at least the
class of substitute goods sharing an equally high ratio of relative to absolute
261. We might try answering questions like: "How much value would an individual place on a diamond
if he or she lived alone on a desert island with no possibility of future human contact?" Subtracting that
value from the current value within society would disclose what percentage of that individual's current value
for diamonds is an absolute value. But merely stating this line of inquiry is to point out our inability to reach
definite answers to these questions.
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value). This approach might work, for example, in preventing overconsumptionof artificial growth hormones or performance enhancing drugs, there being noclose substitutes for these recent technologies.262But the prohibition approach will generally fail to curb consumption ofstatus goods. Indeed, "sumptuary" laws'63 have historically failed for predict-able reasons. First, when an item serves solely to enhance status, lacking anynecessary function, substitutes are nearly infinite. And many goods are onlymomentarily status symbols; by the time they are generally known as "trendy"they have begun to lose their relative function. There is reason to doubt thegovernment's ability to keep pace with the constant change in what constitutesa "fashionable" good. The inventiveness of people in creating alternative objectsfor status consumption would seem to doom any but the most extreme levels
of prohibition.'
Of course, there are many stable status goods, goods such as automobilesand clothing. But the status function of automobiles and clothing is stableprecisely because people need certain levels of these goods regardless of status;they only serve as status goods at higher levels of consumption. To prohibitstatus consumption of goods that have primarily an absolute value at lowerlevels of consumption, government must define the level of consumption atwhich the value of such goods becomes primarily relative. Because the levelvaries among individuals, this decision will prove difficult.265 The likely erroris to define either too high a level, which means that some will continue toconsume large quantities of such items to symbolize status, or too low a level,which means that some consumption satisfying primarily absolute preferenceswill be curtailed. Thus, the problems of prohibition are: (1) for goods that serveonly as symbols of status, keeping one step ahead of what constitutes "fashion-able" consumption, and (2) for goods that at low levels serve primarily tosatisfy absolute preferences, selecting the appropriate level beyond which
consumption is to be prohibited.
The latter problem is not necessarily insurmountable. One strategy forprohibiting stable status goods might be to err intentionally on the side of too
262. Similarly, if certain forms of cosmetic surgery constitute competitive consumption, an outrightprohibition would probably succeed.263. Societies have historically attempted to control the consumption of goods directly, throughsumptuary laws, although the motivation was generally not to correct for market failure. See, e.g., Mc-KENDRICK, T At, supra note 159, at 37 (describing sumptuary laws that preserved elite status of Chineseand Roman Emperors by prohibiting public from wearing royal colors).264. The prohibition will make the symbol more scarce and possibly exacerbate the problem ofenforcement See id. at 40.265. We would expect the quantity and quality of these goods an individual consumes to rise as hisor her income rises, even in the absence of any relative desires. Consequently, there is no one level at whichconsumption of a good becomes, for all or even most people, primarily of relative value. Theoretically,government could try to define acceptable levels of consumption based on income level, but we should alsoexpect people to vary considerably in the intensity of their absolute preferences for items like food andclothing. In any event, the complexity of such regulation, and the intrusion on personal autonomy, wouldlikely be prohibitive.
'P.1.f; D--
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little regulation, prohibiting only the most lavish expenditures 
on such goods.
But an even better strategy would be taxation, another means 
of deterring
investment in goods providing primarily a relative value. In 
a variety of ways,
taxation is a more flexible tool than prohibition. Although the 
harm of excessive
taxation is that people must pay more to satisfy their absolute 
preferences, the
harm of excessive prohibition is the total frustration of absolute 
preferences that
the goods would satisfy. Because the error costs are lower, 
taxation can more
safely target a larger span of consumption than can prohibition. 
In addition,
taxation may be applied gradually to reflect a gradual rise 
in the proportion of
the expenditure that serves to satisfy relative preferences. 
Suppose that the
percentage of the price of a new automobile that buys the 
status component of
the automobile rises as price rises. Where it might be impossible 
to prohibit
all status elements of automobiles (without making everyone drive the 
same
kind of car), it would be possible to deter the amount invested in the 
status
component of automobiles with a "progressive" excise tax 
that increased as the
amount spent on an automobile increased. Finally, it is easier 
to adjust taxation
....os266
to account for changing economic variables than it is to adjust prohibitions.
Even when taxation of goods serving primarily relative ends 
fails to deter
the consumer's purchase of such goods, taxes on status goods 
may be preferable
to certain other types of taxes. Taxes generally impose a 
social cost due to the
manner in which they distort individual choices regarding the 
goods or activity
taxed. Excise taxes, by raising the overall price of a good, reduce 
the value that
the consumer can obtain from his budget. The consumer 
must either increase
expenditures on the taxed good, in which case he or she 
loses value by spend-
ing less on some other good, or obtain a lower quantity of 
a now more expen-
sive, taxed good and thus less value. This analysis is 
incomplete, however,
when the value of the good taxed depends, even in part, on the fact of its 
price.
When consumers value a good for its expensiveness-for 
the wealth it repre-
sents-then the taxation of that good, like any other factor 
that raises its price,
will raise the value the consumer receives from a given 
unit.
Noting this effect, a number of economists, beginning with 
John Rae and
John Stuart Mill,267 have advocated taxation of such goods. 
Yew-Kwang Ng
266. For example, it might make sense to consider how expensive 
a status car is in comparison to the
average new automobile. Suppose expenditures on automobiles 
more than four times the price of an average
automobile are primarily motivated by the desire for status. 
A decision to prohibit such expenditures would
mean that, for some years but not others, entire brands of automobiles would 
be illegal. To say the least,
it would be far less disruptive on the sale of such brands 
if the amount of tax, rather than the legality of
the entire business, fluctuated periodically.
267. John Rae first advocated taxation of relative goods-what 
he called "luxuries"--as a costless
means of raising revenue. See RAE, supra note 30, at 286-96 
(taxes on goods valued merely as "marks of
opulence" does not proportionately decrease consumer welfare). John Stuart 
Mill made a similar argument:
TIThe consequence of cheapening articles of vanity, is not 
that less is expended on such things,
but that the buyers substitute for the cheapened article some 
other which is more costly .. . and
as the inferior quality answered the purpose of vanity equally 
well when it was equally expen-
sive, a tax on the article is really paid by nobody: it is 
a creation of public revenue by which
nobody loses.
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offers a formal analysis of optimal taxation for what he terms "diamond"
goods. 268 Ng offers diamonds as a prototypical example of goods that are
valued "not for their intrinsic consumption effects but because they are cost-
ly. '269 Supposing this to be the case, Ng notes that after imposition of a tax
doubling the price of diamonds, "a $1000 gift of diamond is still valued at
$1000, though the size of the stone is smaller."270 In other words, consumers
value diamonds only relatively, so that the value they receive from diamond
consumption is solely a function of where their consumption places them in
relation to others. As long as everyone is subject to the tax, spending $1000
on diamonds will place one in the same relative position regarding diamond
consumption regardless of the fraction of that amount the tax represents. Thus,
taxes on purely relative goods do not decrease consumer value.27' The only
costs are the administrative costs of collecting the tax.
Taxes on "diamond goods" can thus increase social welfare as long as the
government collecting the tax spends the revenue on satisfying nonconflicting
preferences. Ng and others note that few, if any, goods will be pure "diamond
goods."'2 ' The above analysis still means, however, that the greater the extent
to which the good is valued for its price, the less the extent to which a rise in
price caused by taxation decreases consumer value. For example, assume that
the government places a hundred percent tax on diamonds and that ninety
percent of the value consumers place on diamonds is for their ability to repre-
sent relative wealth. For each dollar of tax, the diamond rises by a value of
ninety cents, lowering the effective tax rate to ten percent. Furthermore, taxation
MILL, supra note 30, at 869. As David D. Friedman points out in Diamonds Are a Government's Best
Friend: Burden-Free Taxes on Goods Valued for Their Values: Comment, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1988),
David Ricardo first had the basic insight, employed above, regarding the commodity of gold used exclusively
for money. Ricardo observed that a tax on gold used as money would diminish the amount of gold in the
economy but would proportionately increase the value of each unit of gold; the society would have the same
amount of goods and services-the same wealth-but would trade it with fewer units of gold. DAVID
RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1817) in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
DAVID RICARDO 194-96 (Piero Sraffa, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1951). See also Edward Miller, Status
Goods and Luxury Taxes, 34 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 141 (1975).
268. Yew-Kwang Ng, Diamonds are a Government's Best Friend: Burden-Free Taxes on Goods Valued
for their Values, 77 AM. EcON. REV. 186 (1987). Ng credits Pigou with observing the significance of the
"desire to possess what other people do not possess" for tax policy, id. at 187, (quoting A.C. PIGOU, supra
note 30, at 226), but fails to note the prior contributions of Rae and Mill. See supra note 267. See also
Konrad, supra note 76, at 259-62; Frank, Frames of Reference, supra note 77, at 82-84.
269. Ng, supra note 268, at 186.
270. Id.
271. This statement ignores the likely complication that some consumers already own diamonds when
a tax is imposed (or increased). For those who did not own diamonds before the diamond tax, the tax
decreases their ability to afford a diamond of a given size compared to those consumers who already own
such a diamond. But those consumers who already own a diamond gain from the fact that a diamond of
the size they own is now more expensive for others to obtain. Unless a luxury tax is imposed on ownership,
rather than mere purchase, of diamonds, the tax will have the effect of preserving the effectiveness of the
given distribution of status goods.
272. Ng, supra note 268, at 187 (stating that "most goods are valued partly for their intrinsic consump-
tion effects (approaching 100 percent for ordinary items like bread) and their values (approaching 100
percent for precious jewels)"); Konrad, supra note 76, at 261 (arguing that most goods will have varying
proportions of status and consumption aspects).
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will increase welfare if the government taxes goods with primarily a relative
value and spends the revenue on goods with primarily an absolute value. 3
Assume, for example, that the government transfers the revenue raised by a
hundred percent diamond tax to people who spend thirty percent of the transfer
satisfying their (inherently conflicting) relative preferences, and the remainder
on satisfying nonconflicting preferences. For each dollar raised by the tax, the
government is actually taking only ten cents from the diamond consumer and
potentially procuring seventy cents in satisfaction of absolute preferences. As
long as the administrative costs are less than sixty cents of each dollar, the tax
increases welfare.274
Of course, to achieve any of the above taxation advantages requires consid-
erable information and more analytical work. But this section provides a general
framework for efforts to deter consumption of goods which primarily satisfy
relative preferences.
2. Mandating Consumption of Nonstatus Goods
The strategy of preventing underconsumption of nonstatus goods does not
suffer as much from the substitution problems that plague sumptuary laws.
First, not being valued for the sake of novelty, nonstatus goods are more stable
and therefore easier to specify and regulate. Second, at least compared to
prohibiting status goods, there is less reason to be concerned about substitution.
When compelling consumption, the substitution concern is that requiring con-
sumption of a good of primarily absolute value might cause the consumer to
forgo some other good, previously consumed, that was of equal (rather than
less) absolute value. Because the propensity to substitute goods for one another
is measurable and stable, it should be possible to mandate consumption of
goods that will avoid the substitution problem.275 In other words, if govern-
ment mandates consumption of only those goods with the highest ratios of
absolute to relative value, there is little chance a consumer will respond to the
regulation by giving up a good with an even higher ratio of absolute to relative
value.
273. In theory, a tax enhances welfare if the benefit the government provides with the tax revenue has
a greater absolute value than the good the government taxed. The statement in the text qualifies this claim
to reflect (a) the difficulty of determining exactly how much absolute or relative value a particular good
has and (b) the fact that transaction costs will prevent the government from transferring the full amount
it taxes.
274. As is standard in neoclassical economics, this analysis makes no use of interpersonal utility
comparisons. The argument is not that people receiving money from the government will gain more utility
from a dollar than diamond owners will gain from a dollar, but that more of the utility they gain will be
from satisfying nonconflicting preferences. Because social welfare increases more when resources are used
to satisfy absolute preferences rather than relative ones, recipients thus make better use of the resources.
275. For example, lawn mower safety devices are probably not substitutes for auto safety devices, nor
is either of the latter a substitute for retirement savings.
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There is, however, a problem with mandating consumption: the income
effect. Requiring a new expenditure decreases the consumer's total discretionary
budget, causing the consumer to cut back at the margin on goods she values
least.276 To the extent those items are other goods of primarily absolute value,
the regulation may create no net gain or a loss. However, as long as the income
effect is small, and the compelled expenditure is directed toward a good with
a high ratio of absolute to relative value, it is unlikely the income effect will
cause a cutback in a similarly valued good.277 This feature suggests either that
the total expenditures mandated by government must be limited, or that the
government must know a great deal about the consequences of the income
effect. With these effects in mind, we can turn to specific examples.
Frank's key insight is that government regulations mandating consumption
of certain goods may be efficient if those goods are the sort that people other-
wise tend to sacrifice wastefully in their competition for relative income. His
primary example is workplace health and safety. His prisoner's dilemma
analysis was reviewed above.278 Health and safety are often279 unobservable,
and cannot therefore contribute to one's status as well as equal expenditures
on more observable items. If Frank is correct, rules requiring some minimum
levels of health and safety might efficiently prevent status competition from
causing workers to underinvest in these goods. Similar arguments exist for
setting minimum consumption levels of other, largely unobservable "goods"
such as health insurance, pensions, vacation time, and workplace democra-
cy.s28 In addition, this analysis may demonstrate the efficiency of rules pro-
hibiting people from selling certain goods they are nonetheless free to give
away. For example, prohibiting the sale of human kidneys from living donors
276. The opposite effect occurs when prohibiting consumption-the consumer has more income,
allowing greater purchases which might be directed toward goods that are not substitutes. Depending on
the intensity of this effect, prohibition, while causing substitution, could also cause the consumer to purchase
new items with primarily an absolute value.
277. I argue it is "unlikely" on the additional assumption that proportionately few of the goods the
consumer is presently consuming have a "very high" ratio of absolute to relative value. If all goods presently
consumed have an equal chance of providing the least marginal return to the consumer, it is statistically
unlikely that the cutback caused by the income effect will fall on one of the few goods that has as high
a ratio of absolute to relative value as the good whose consumption is compelled.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
279. The argument is not that consumers will underinvest in all health and safety measures, but only
in those that are unobservable (or fall near the unobservable end of a continuum). See discussion of
observable/unobservable distinction supra notes 90-96 & 173-174 and accompanying text. There is no reason
to expect that people will underconsume highly observable safety measures, which may themselves becomes
symbols of status. Certain types of high status automobiles-Mercedes Benz, for example-are known for
their high degree of safety. Manufacturers, by advertising how much safer their cars are than others, render
that safety consumption highly observable. Unlike Frank's example of the worker in the dirty mine, the rest
of the world knows how much safety the Mercedes Benz driver is enjoying. (Note also how certain
automobiles advertise "antilock brakes" by a publicly observable symbol ("ABS") on the rear of the car).
280. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 146-68.
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in effect encourages kidney "consumption" by removing the financial incentive
to give up one's organs. 281
Granting the general analysis, the difficult practical question is what level
of health and safety regulation is actually efficient. How can we determine the
precise floor of safety that will correct the problems of competitive consump-
tion, without requiring more safety than workers would want in the absence of
relative preferences? The answer, of course, is that we cannot exactly identify
the welfare-maximizing level of safety. We cannot precisely separate the
relative from the absolute reasons for consumption, nor precisely identify when
relative preferences inherently conflict. But even if we adopt the principle that
it is best to err on the side of too little regulation, we may be able to do better
than assuming that the efficient level of regulation is zero. 2 We can seek
to determine the minimum level of consumption in several ways. First, individ-
uals may simply state a preference for a collective rule. 3 If workers are
aware that they sacrifice safety or health in a futile but unending effort to gain
relative income, then they may favor collective regulation mandating minimum
levels of safety.2 ' Second, there is a significant difference between the value
placed on safety (and other unobservable compensation) by workers who
bargain individually with employers and those who collectively bargain.28
To the extent other factors can be excluded, this difference may quantify the
degree to which competitive consumption causes workers to excessively
sacrifice such goods.
281. See id. at 178-97. Frank notes that prohibitions on the sale of human organs or parental rights
are difficult to justify in economic terms, but notes that these too may be cases in which individuals will
make wasteful sacrifices with the hope of gaining in relative income, or from the fear of losing relative
income. A human kidney, for example, is a quintessentially nonstatus good. See generally, Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987)
282. Imprecision is inherent in any "hypothetical bargain" analysis that asks what parties would do
if the world were different and transaction costs were absent. Whenever transaction costs prevent voluntary
bargaining, legal economists simply argue about what people would do if those costs were not present. Given
the strong evidence reviewed above that people desire status (and relative income and certain goods as a
means of gaining status), it seems far more likely than not that workers would agree to some minimum
safety and health standards in the absence of transaction costs.
283. Schelling quotes hockey players who chose not to wear helmets, but who argue in favor of a rule
mandating such protection. See SCHELLING, supra note 81, at 213.
284. One implication of the theory of inherent preference conflict is that, for some issues, consumers
may be better able to express their wishes in the voting booth than in the marketplace. The existence of
public support for certain forms of economic regulation need not lead inevitably to the conclusion of public
choice theorists that supporters seek to extract economic rents. But given the shame of admitting to relative
preferences (even to oneself), see supra notes 246-252 and accompanying text, workers are unlikely to favor
such regulations for the avowed purpose of limiting competitive consumption.
285. Frank, Unobservable Commodities, supra note 77, at 152 ("ITrhe union worker must receive a
risk premium that is $8.08 per week higher than the premium required by an identically situated nonunion
worker for accepting a 1/1,000 increase in the annual probability of death."); FRANK, THE RIGHT POND,
supra note 77, at 150-58 (unionized workers devote higher budget share to unobservable commodities of
insurance and pensions than nonunionized workers); id. at 158-59 (budget shares devoted to unobservables
of savings and insurance higher in military than civilian sector).
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Ultimately, we must use judgment. Consider the judgment that athletic
competition leads to inefficient underconsumption of health and safety.286 The
case for a rule requiring a hockey helmet or prohibiting steroids seems reason-
ably powerful (as are other mandatory safety rules in sports), but there could
be nonrelative reasons for not wearing a helmet or using steroids.287 We may,
nonetheless, have confidence in the mandatory rules because we imagine that
we would not give up the safety of a helmet for any reason other than improv-
ing our chances of winning. Although this basis for regulation may immediately
seem paternalistic, it is not. The judgment is not that hockey players do not
desire the level of safety that they "should," and that their decision against
safety is therefore irrational. Instead, the judgment concedes the individual
rationality of the decision not to wear the helmet, but asks whether the individu-
als are making the decision primarily to satisfy inherently conflicting relative
preferences. If so, there is a nonpatemalistic basis for supposing the individual
would prefer a collective rule foreclosing individual choice to the existing rule
allowing it.
3. Social Norms Against Relative Preferences
Competitive consumption presents a problem of coordinating collective
action. Aside from governmental responses, human cultures sometimes develop
norms to solve such collective action problems.88 Existing social norms con-
demn both envy-negative feelings at the relative fortune of others-and
"relative gratification"--positive feelings at the relative misfortune of others.
Expressions of such feelings subject an individual to the sanction of negative
public opinion. The holder is judged vain, shallow, and petty; the individual
himself experiences shame. To the extent these norms actually dampen relative
feelings, they succeed in diminishing the problem of competitive consumption,
but the failure of these norms actually to extinguish these feelings in some ways
contributes to the problem. These norms restrain Coasean bargaining that might
limit the harm of competitive consumption.8 9 In the absence of social sanc-
tion, individuals would be more likely to admit their relative preferences to
286. See supra note 81, regarding hockey helmets and steroids.
287. Hockey players may play not only to "win," but to satisfy their absolute desire for invigorating
and exciting activity. They may find the game to be more "exciting or invigorating" without a helmet.
Second, for those who are paid to play, the hockey salary also allows them the means to satisfy their
absolute desires; if fans will pay more to watch helmetless players, the players can earn more playing
without a helmet. Notwithstanding these possibilities, it is possible to feel some confidence in the judgment
that the hockey player's primary motivation for not wearing the helmet when given the choice is the relative
desire to win, not these other concerns, and therefore that the players would be better off if they gave up
the right to compete by exposing their skulls to the risks of the game. In addition, an athlete might like the
"feel" of having the muscles that steroids make possible, although more typically steroids represent merely
a means of gaining or preserving a competitive edge.
288. See, e.g., AXELROD, supra note 78; Ellickson, supra note 4.
289. See supra text accompanying note 246.
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others and themselves, and thus more prepared to bargain in regard to such
preferences. In addition, the existence of these norms contributes to the distinc-
tion between observable and unobservable goods.290 If overt manipulation of
status symbols could produce status gains, people could advertise their other-
wise unobservable consumption rather than sacrifice such consumption in a
competition for observable consumption.
Society is probably still better off with the norms against envy and relative
gratification than it would be without them.291 Strengthening those norms
would further curtail the harm of competitive consumption. The enumeration
of conditions under which competitive consumption will occur isolates the
particular categories of relative preferences that a social norm should condemn.
For example, relative preferences do not conflict unless they are directed toward
a common characteristic.2 92 Similarly, desires for position are less likely to
be incompatible and cause inherent conflict if they are directed toward "avoid-
ing the bottom rank" or maintaining an average rank, than if they are directed
towards obtaining the top rank.293 Thus, social norms need not, and largely
do not, indiscriminately condemn relative preferences. Instead, they more
strongly censure preferences the more they are commonly shared within society,
and the more they are directed toward the top rank.29
An interesting question is whether society can, through law, seek to create
or strengthen social norms. Should law be used not merely to create incentives
and disincentives to behavior, but to shape consumer preferences? Neoclassical
economic analysis treats consumer tastes or preferences as an exogenous
variable; the nature of existing preferences is not explained but simply accepted
as a fact.295 Despite this fact, some economists and legal theorists have of-
290. See supra text accompanying notes 164-174.
291. If the norms against envy and relative gratification did not exist, the market failure would not
disappear. Considerable transaction costs would still impede private limits on competitive consumption. See
supra text accompanying notes 243-244. In addition, advertising costs would still create a distinction
between observable and unobservable goods. See supra text accompanying note 90. The market failure
would worsen in several ways. First, to the extent that the norms actually dampen the intensity of relative
preferences, people would become even more concerned with relative standing. Second, if there were no
norm against "advertising" one's relative accomplishments, this would generate more inherent preference
conflict. There would be fewer cases where people failed to discover that others had higher ranks on a given
scale.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 205-207.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 209, 215-219.
294. People seeking to collect more stamps than others do not present the same potential for inherent
conflict as those seeking to gain a higher income than others, and while there is no social sanction against
the former behavior, there is some against the latter. Similarly, it is less shameful to admit that one seeks
to "keep up with the Joneses" than to admit that one hopes to keep ahead of the Joneses and everyone else.
295. Positive economics thus describes and predicts how consumers with fixed preferences will respond
to changes in endogenous variables such as price. Welfare economics evaluates the efficiency of different
states based on how well the given preferences of individuals are satisfied. See BECKER, supra note 171,
at 5 ("[Plreferences are assumed not to change substantially over time, nor to be very different between
wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in different societies and cultures."). Economics leaves
to sociology and psychology the burden of explaining why people have the preferences they do, and what
causes preferences to change. Id. at 14.
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fered models making tastes an endogenous variable, seeking to predict changes
in tastes and to evaluate the possibility and desirability of policies that seek to
shape consumer tastes. 296 The suggestion that law may directly shape consum-
er preferences has profound implications for legal theory. To evaluate fully the
efficacy and wisdom of using law in such a manner would require an extended
discussion beyond the scope of the present Article.297 Nonetheless, there are
two points worth making about using the law to diminish relative preferences
(or to enforce social norms against such preferences), points that should prove
useful for any serious discussion of the general issue.
First, the existence of inherent preference conflict caused by certain relative
preferences presents a "special case" for reshaping preferences. One utilitarian
argument that can always be advanced for shaping preferences-what I call the
"general case" for reshaping preferences-is to alleviate conventional scarcity.
If people simply can be made to "want less," existing resources will go further
in satisfying the remaining preferences. For compelling reasons, however,
liberalism's traditional solution to scarcity-economic growth-represents a
politically safer solution than preference shaping.298 Inherent preference con-
flict, however, represents an occasion when increased productivity is not
available to solve the problem of resource scarcity. When we cannot resolve
preference conflict by economic growth, we have a special case for reshaping
preferences to resolve the conflict.299 The question remains whether the case
is "special" enough-whether the government should be permitted to shape
preferences even in the case of inherent preference conflict.
The second point worth noting is that the cases in which theorists have
advocated preference shaping fit the conditions of inherent preference conflict.
296. Although law and economics scholars almost uniformly treat law solely as a way of adjusting
incentives for behavior given existing preferences, there are important exceptions. Guido Calabresi believes
that preference shaping is a primary goal of law. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrrruDEs, AND
THE LAW 84 (1985) ("Law, unlike economics, is not concerned only, or even primarily, with reduction of
costs, 'given tastes.' It is fundamentally concerned with shaping tastes."). Kenneth Dau-Schmidt is the first
economist to use a theory of preference shaping to explain a body of legal doctrine (criminal law). See
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990
DUKE UJ. 1 (1990). Cass Sunstein has made a slightly different point about the effect of law on preferences.
He argues that because preferences may "adapt" to existing legal institutions, those institutions cannot be
justified solely by their ability to satisfy existing preferences. See SuNSTEiN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION, supra note 45. Sunstein relies on Elster's concept of "adaptive preferences." See ELsTER,
supra note 15.
297. The suggestion raises at least two fundamental questions, one for social science and another for
political philosophy: (1) Can law change preferences in a sufficiently significant and predictable manner
to form the basis of policy? (2) When, if ever, is it morally permissible or politically prudent to use law
to shape preferences-literally to determine what people want?
298. There is considerable political danger in sanctioning a broad governmental power to manipulate
preferences to reduce scarcity. Totalitarian regimes have committed enormous atrocities in the name of
eliminating certain bourgeois consumer wants. At a minimum, when increasing productivity may accomplish
the same end, we should not condone preference shaping as a means of reducing resource scarcity.
299. Cf. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 112-13; MARSHALL, supra note 32, at 136-37
("lIlt would be a gain if the moral sentiment of the community could induce people to avoid all sorts of
display of individual wealth.") (emphasis added).
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Several scholars have suggested that one function of civil rights laws was to
state a moral principle delegitimizing racial discrimination, that is, to reduce
the desire to discriminate.3 ° In economic terms, the claim is that the law has
reshaped preferences. The preference of whites to avoid association with blacks
(racial animus) is inherently inconsistent with the preference of blacks to be
economically integrated in society (the desire for equal treatment). The prefer-
ences are for mutually exclusive outcomes; regardless of the level of wealth,
one set of preferences had to remain unsatisfied. Thus, to the extent
antidiscrimination laws actually diminish white animus toward blacks, the law
alleviates an inherent preference conflict.30 1
The same may be said, in part, about the criminal law.302 Many preferenc-
es, the satisfaction of which criminal law prohibits, are for direct harm to
others. Not all actions to harm others represent an inherent preference conflict;
sometimes the act of harming another is merely a means to the end of obtaining
material reward. In such cases, given sufficient resources, the criminal's desire
to obtain wealth could be satisfied sufficiently to obviate his seeking to take
wealth from others. On the other hand, sometimes harming others is not a
means to a material end, it is the end itself. 303 In those cases, one person's
desire to cause another some physical pain or death, as an end, with rare
exception, inherently conflicts with the desires of the victim. Economic
300. See, e.g., John J. Donohue, InI, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic
Perspective, 56 U. CHl. L. REV. 1337, 1338-39 & n.6 (1989); Richard Posner, The Eficiency and the
Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 520 (1987) [hereinafter Posner, Title VII].
301. As a utilitarian principle, inherent preference conflict could only justify using law to reshape either
set of incompatible preferences, in this case whites' preference for nonassociation or blacks' preference for
equal treatment. There are powerful reasons for choosing, on utilitarian as well as other grounds, the former
over the latter. The utilitarian argument must follow from a detailed theory of how the law shapes preferenc-
es, something largely absent from the existing literature. For the most complete account to date, see Dau-
Schmidt, supra note 296, at 17-22. In my view, such a theory must recognize that law has only a finite
ability to shape preferences, substantially limited to reinforcing pre-existing cultural norms. For the law to
succeed in diminishing the desire for equality upon the part of blacks and other minorities would essentially
require the establishment of a full-blown caste system, with lower ranked individuals conditioned not merely
to tolerate but to desire their lot. I believe, although I will not here try to prove, that the law and norms
of American society, partially committed to the principle that "all persons are created equal," was and is
better equipped to move individual preferences toward fuller realization of that principle than toward a caste
system.
302. Dau-Schmidt notes the difficulty of using existing normative principles to judge the desirability
of preferences. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 296, at 16. Consequently, he argues that in choosing what
preferences to reshape, society need not"count" in a social welfare calculation the satisfaction of preferences
it has deemed criminal. Id. at 12 ("Even among economists, there is a growing consensus that criminal
benefits should carry no weight in the social welfare function."). As a utilitarian justification, this argument
fails; any set of criminal laws might seem to maximize social welfare if we need not count the
nonsatisfaction of preferences the laws criminalize. In deciding whether to crininalize gambling, for
example, the pleasure some would receive from legalized gambling should count in a utilitarian decision.
Cf. Donohue, Sex Discrimination, supra note 300, at 1343-44. As explained in the text, however, we can
count the preferences of the criminal, however, and still decide to use the law to reshape those preferences.
303. Not every preference to harm others that creates inherent preference conflict is "relative." One
might say that some persons have an "absolute" preference that others be physically harmed or placed in
pain. Such a malicious or sadistic preference would give rise to an inherent conflict even if it has no relative
aspect. Thus, negative relative preferences are only one special case for preference shaping. The more
general category is any inherently conflicting preferences.
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growth-increasing the size of the "economic pie"---cannot resolve this prefer-
ence conflict. The inherent nature of this conflict again provides a special
(though not necessarily sufficient) case for using the criminal law to re-
shape-to diminish-preferences to harm others.3 4 Although this theory does
not explain or justify all or even most of the criminal law, it provides a reason
for using the criminal law to reshape and diminish the malicious preferences
often responsible for the most serious criminal offenses-murder, rape, and bat-
tery.305 This particular characteristic of crimes motivated by malice may also
explain attempts to punish more severely crimes motivated by group hatred.30 6
B. Regulating Individual Status Competition: The Case of Income Taxation
The above section explored possible solutions to correct for the market
failure of competitive consumption. This Section and the next will illustrate the
usefulness of a theory of relative preferences to legal theory by addressing two
policy issues: income taxation and antidiscrimination laws. Each may be viewed
as attempting to correct for a particular form of competitive consumption:
income taxation is directed at individual status competition, and
antidiscrimination laws are directed at group-based status competition.
Of the various arguments for and against income taxation, and particularly
progressive taxation, I will focus on the following economic claim that such
taxation is inefficient. First, welfare economics refuses to make interpersonal
utility comparisons; the concept of efficiency is designed to avoid such compar-
isons. If there is no way of knowing whether the beneficiary of government
spending gains more or less than the individual taxpayer loses, redistributing
wealth is, at best, neutral. Second, even assuming that transaction costs are zero,
304. As stated supra note 301, inherent preference conflict provides a utilitarian justification only for
using law to reshape either set of incompatible preferences. An additional utilitarian argument will generally
be necessary to determine which set of preferences the law should seek to diminish. In the case of criminal
law, however, it should be self-evident that however difficult it may be to diminish the desire to harm others,
it is not possible for law to diminish the desire not to be harmed.
305. The claim that separate treatment may reshape malicious preferences is merely illustrative and
necessarily incomplete. To fully evaluate the claim, we require a psychological or sociological theory of
how the law shapes preferences. I am currently engaged in such an undertaking, but it is beyond the scope
of this Article.
306. The unique need to reshape preferences when crime is maliciously motivated may justify efforts
to provide separate treatment of"hate crimes." Separate treatment of hate crimes may facilitate the reshaping
of the underlying malicious preferences, either by direct symbolism of the additional gravity of such offenses
or the indirect symbolism achieved by more severe punishment. Although hate crimes generally are not
defined to include any crime motivated by hate, but only those motivated by hatred of certain groups, this
is not inconsistent with the theory of inherent preference conflict Violence against minority groups, who
historically faced discrimination, may symbolically reinforce the legitimacy of such violence in a way that
violence against an individual one personally hates does not.
Some theorists claim that rape is a "hate" crime-a crime of violence that is not primarily a means
of satisfying the desire for male sexual gratification, but for satisfying the desire for demeaning a woman
by nonconsensual sex. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
(1975). Such a description may justify using the law not merely as a vehicle for deterring rape, but as a
means of diminishing the desire to rape.
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taxation diminishes wealth. Because income taxes (proportional or progressive)
decrease the rewards of work to an individual, they decrease the amount of time
the individual will spend working as well as the amount of time and money
the individual will invest in human capital. Thus, taxing income decreases the
amount of income each worker generates. This cost represents the true "dead
weight loss" of income taxation; although those who benefit from government
expenditures may theoretically gain an amount equal to what those who are
taxed lose, they cannot gain from the income the worker forgoes by working
less. Nor does the worker gain by working fewer hours; prior to the income
tax, the worker valued the income from working those hours more than he
valued the use of those hours for leisure. 7 Taxing income thus contracts the
total wealth created. Finally, a progressive tax may undermine work incentives
more significantly than a proportional tax because it taxes most intensely the
high-income workers whose marginal hours are likely to be the most produc-
tive.30
8
The existence of relative preferences, however, undermines this efficiency
analysis. Income taxation may correct the tendency of people competing for
relative income to sacrifice leisure excessively."0 9 Although Veblen talked of
"conspicuous leisure" as a means of demonstrating pecuniary success, 310 there
is reason to believe that, today, most leisure is less observable-and contributes
less to one's status-than the goods one can obtain and consume by working
longer hours.311 There is also evidence that in recent years economic growth
307. For example, assume that without taxes, A would consume fourteen hours of leisure per day,
working for ten hours at $10/hour, and that the fifteenth hour of leisure provides only $9 of benefit to A.
A 20% income tax would mean that A would earn only $8/hour, so that he would consume the fifteenth
hour of leisure and work one fewer hour per day. Ignoring the tax on the nine hours that the worker still
works (as theoretically creating an equal benefit to others), the worker is still worse off by $1 as a result
of adding a marginal hour of leisure ($10 wage minus $9 leisure value). The government receives no tax
and therefore no benefit from the marginal hour that the worker now takes as leisure, so there is a
deadweight loss of $1. In addition to decreasing the incentive to engage in productive work (work where
total benefits exceed total costs), income taxes may create losses by reducing the incentive to invest in
human capital, such as education and training. Because the government captures some of the benefit of such
investments, the worker may forgo education and training where the total benefits exceed the total costs.
308. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 473. Although a progressive tax may undermine
work incentives less at the lower levels of income where the tax is less than proportional, it undermines
work incentive more at higher incomes. Assuming that the highest paid workers are the most productive,
the work hours sacrificed are more valuable than the work hours increased. Id.
309. See generally Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1961-62 (1987); Michael Boskin & Eytan Sheshinski,
Optimal Redistributive Taxation When Individual Welfare Depends Upon Relative Income, 92 Q.J. EcON.
589 (1978); Konrad, supra note 76, at 264-68; Layard, supra note 66; Yew-Kwang Ng, Relative-Income
Effects and the Appropriate Level of Public Expenditure, 39 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 293,299 (1987). Frank
notes that the desire for relative income may cause an inefficient sacrifice of leisure, which he uses to
explain laws requiring overtime pay. FRANK, THE RIGHT POND, supra note 77, at 133-35.
310. See supra note 35.
311. Certainly some forms of leisure-expensive and fashionable hobbies and vacations for exam-
ple-may still demonstrate one's wealth, but spending a few more hours at home each day-reading,
sleeping, talking to one's family, and engaging in the other unobservable parts of everyday life-contribute
far less to demonstrating wealth than the consumer goods one might purchase by working more. Conspicu-
ous consumption has long surpassed conspicuous leisure in symbolic significance. As wealth becomes greater
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has not allowed people more leisure time, but less.312 These facts support the
theoretical prediction that people seeking relative wealth will work excessively.
If so, the disincentive effects of taxation will be desirable.
To illustrate these points, suppose that neighbors313 A and B earn
$10/hour, and each value their leisure time according to Table 1:314
TABLE 1
Marginal Marginal Marginal Cost Net
Hour Benefit (marginal value Marginal
Worked (wage) leisure) Value
12th $10 $14.50 -$4.50
llth $10 $13.00 -$3.00
10th $10 $11.75 -$1.75
9th $10 $10.50 -$0.50
8th $10 $9.50 $0.50
7th $10 $ 8.75 $1.25
In the absence of a desire for relative income, we would expect each
worker to choose sixteen hours of leisure and eight hours of work per day
because they each value the first sixteen hours of leisure more than the
$10/hour wage, and the remaining hours of leisure at less than $10/hour.
Assume, however that A and B each seek relative income, and that they
each value relative income in the following simple manner: (i) an equal income
and more equally distributed, only a very few can afford the truly conspicuous leisure of not working at
all, while more can afford conspicuous consumption. See MASON, supra note 41, at 30, 41, 107 (arguing
that when lower income groups achieve ability to consume conspicuously, the rich find that conspicuous
consumption is less effective as means of status reinforcement). In addition, leisure is more ambiguous than
consumption. As society becomes more fragmented and transient, it becomes more important to display
wealth to strangers who may mistake conspicuous leisure for unemployment. Id. at 9-10.
312. See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE
1-2 (1991) ("In the last twenty years the amount of time Americans have spent at their jobs has risen
steadily.... Since 1948 ... [t]he level of productivity of the U.S. worker has more than doubled.... [but]
we did not use any of the productivity dividend to reduce [work] hours."). See also STAFFAN B. LINDER,
THE HARRIED LEISURE CLASS 77-93 (1970).
313. The assumption that A and B are neighbors (or members of some comparison group other than
coworkers) is significant because, in such case, the analysis above, supra text accompanying notes 243-252,
shows that transaction costs will likely impede private bargaining to limit competitive consumption. But
as also noted previously, where A and B are coworkers, there is a greater likelihood that, through their
selection of a firm or through collective bargaining, they can bargain toward a solution.
314. The cost of an hour of work is the value the worker attaches to using that hour for leisure. This
analysis is static rather than dynamic, because it ignores the effect that changes in hours worked (caused
by taxation) will have on the prevailing wage. This simplification, while making the example more
accessible, does not alter the conclusion.
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provides $0 worth of relative satisfaction; (ii) an income superior to the other
provides $2 worth of relative satisfaction for every $1 0/day increment; and (iii)
an income inferior to the other provides a $2 cost of relative dissatisfaction for
every $10/day increment.315 How many hours will A work under these cir-
cumstances?
Taking the initial eight-hour day as the baseline, A is now better off
working two extra hours (for a total of ten per day) regardless of the choice
B makes. If B works eight hours, A's decision to work two additional hours
produces a net gain of $1.75 ($20 in wages + $4 of relative value - $22.25 of
leisure). This net gain is larger than that created by working any other number
of hours.316 If B works nine hours, A's decision to work ten produces a net
loss 317 of $0.25 ($20 in wages + $2 of relative value - $22.25 of leisure), but
larger losses are incurred by working less than ten hours.318 If B works ten
315. The following chart shows the relative gains and losses for one from working between three hours









Undoubtedly, no utility function for relative income would be this simple. It is especially unlikely that the
relationship between relative income and value would be linear. For example, if the first incremental
differences in income created no definitive difference in observable consumption, this increment would have
a proportionately lesser effect than subsequent ones. Conversely, the first increment that firmly establishes
the fact of income superiority or inferiority would have a proportionately greater effect than subsequent
increments. Nonetheless, the simpler function above is useful for illustrating the possible consequences of
a desire for relative income.
316. If A chooses to work nine hours, A's net gain is only $1.50 ($10 in wages + $2 of relative value -
$10.50 of leisure). Obviously, if B works eight hours, A's decision to continue working eight hours
produces no net gain or loss. To work seven hours would produce a net loss of $2.50 (- $10 in wages -
$2 of relative loss + $9.50 in leisure). To work fewer hours only increases the relative losses and sacrifices
$10 of wages for leisure valued at less than that amount.
If A chooses to work eleven hours, A's net gain is only $0.75 ($30 in wages + $6 of relative value -
$35.25 in leisure). In general, workers will stop increasing the hours they work to obtain relative income
when the difference between the wage and the value of leisure (the net absolute loss from working an
additional hour) rises above the marginal relative gain of an additional hour's wage. Here that occurs at
the eleventh hour, where the leisure sacrificed is worth $3.00 more than the wage, and the relative gain of
working that hour is only $2.00.
317. Let me emphasize that throughout this example I am comparing A's situation to that which
prevailed when A and B were indifferent to relative income and both worked eight hours. Thus, a net loss
of $0.25 means only that A is $0.25 worse off when working ten hours while B works nine than he was
in the earlier circumstance.
318. If A chooses to work nine hours, A's net loss is $0.50 ($10 in wages + $0 of relative value -
$10.50 of leisure). If A chooses to continue working eight hours, A's net loss is $2 ($0 in wages - $2 in
relative loss - $0 in leisure). Working fewer hours only incurs greater absolute and relative costs. For the
reasons stated supra note 316, A will not work more than ten hours. For example, A's working eleven hours
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hours, A's decision to work ten hours produces a net loss of $2.25 ($20 in
wages + $0 of relative value - $22.25 of leisure), but that is also superior to
the alternatives. 319 A will therefore choose to work ten hours. Because B faces
exactly the same circumstances, B will also work ten hours. Consequently,
neither will experience any relative gain and each will sacrifice $22.25 of
leisure for only $20 in wages. This outcome conforms to the prisoner's dilemma
in which each party sacrifices absolute resources but fails to achieve any
relative gain.
With a change in the value A or B places on leisure or relative income,
the problem may shift to either of the other two cases of competitive consump-
tion,31 or the problem may disappear entirely.321 Suppose, for example, that
A has the desire for relative income expressed above, but that B values relative
income only half as much (receiving $1 gain or loss for every $10 difference
in wages).322 Using reasoning identical to that of the above paragraph, B is
now better off working one extra hour for a total of nine per day, regardless
produces a net loss of $1.25 ($30 in wages +$4 of relative value - $35.25 in leisure).
319. If A chooses to work nine hours, A's net loss is $2.50 ($10 in wages - $2 of relative loss - $10.50
of leisure). If A chooses to continue working eight hours, A's net loss is $4 ($0 in wages - $4 in relative
loss - $0 in leisure). To work fewer hours only increases the relative losses and sacrifices $10 of wages
for leisure valued at less than that amount. For the reasons stated supra note 316, A will not work more
than ten hours. For example, A's working eleven hours produces a net loss of $3.25 ($30 in wages +$2
of relative value - $35.25 in leisure).
320. For example, even with A working ten hours per day, B would not work more than eight hours
if either (a) working the ninth hour (and subsequent hours) would require sacrificing an hour of leisure B
valued at more than $2, or (b) B lacked any concern for relative position at all. In case (b), there is no
market failure: A is made better off by satisfying a preference for relative income and B is made no worse
off. In case (a), A's gain is exactly matched by B's loss. But if B values relative position more than A (e.g.,
at $3 per increment), B would continue working only eight hours if B valued the marginal hour of leisure
net of wages even more (e.g., at $4). This constitutes the first case of competitive consumption, in which
one party's investment in position creates a net loss in welfare.
321. For example, if A and B each valued their last hour of leisure more than they valued the relative
and absolute (wage) gain working that hour would produce, neither would work more than eight hours.
322. In other words, A values relative income as stated above, and B values relative income as follows:
(i) an equal income provides $0 worth of relative satisfaction; (ii) a superior income provides $1 worth of
relative satisfaction for every $10/day increment more than the income of the other, and (iii) an inferior
income provides $1 cost of relative dissatisfaction for every $ 10/day increment less than the income of the
other. The following chart shows the relative gains and losses for B from working between three hours more
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of the choice A makes. 3 A will face the same options as before and choose
to work ten hours. With A working ten hours and B nine, A's net loss is $0.25
($20 in wages + $2 of relative value - $22.25 of leisure) and B's net loss is
$1.50 ($10 in wages - $1 of relative value - $10.50 of leisure). A has "won"
the positional competition; he has achieved a superior income. But here we
have the third case of competitive consumption: B's extra hour of work and
one of A's hours of extra work are wasted. A could achieve the same relative
outcome by working nine hours while B works eight, in which case B's net loss
is reduced to $1 and A's net gain is $1.50." The difference in these two out-
comes, representing the total waste of this competition, is $2.25.'15
How does this analysis affect consideration of income taxes?326 If A's
and B's incomes were taxed at twenty percent, their after tax wage would fall
to $8/hour. In the absence of a desire for relative income, each would have
originally worked eight hours. But neither would be willing to work an eighth
hour with the tax, sacrificing leisure worth $9.50 for only $8. Instead, from
Table 2, we observe that the tax will cause A and B to cut back to five hours
of work per day, all remaining hours of leisure being worth more than $8:
323. If A works eight hours, B's net gain from working nine is $0.50 ($10 in wages + $1 of relative
value - $10.50 of leisure). Other choices produce worse outcomes for B: at ten hours, B's net loss is $0.25
($20 in wages + $2 of relative value - $22.25 in leisure); above ten hours would increase his absolute losses
(difference in marginal wage and value of leisure) more than increasing relative gains ($1 per increment).
At eight hours, B's net gain/loss is $0; below eight hours, B would increase his relative losses and sacrifice
$10 of wages for leisure valued at less than that amount.
If A works nine hours, B's net loss from working nine is $0.50 ($10 in wages + $0 of relative value -
$10.50 of leisure). But B's net loss from working ten hours is $1.25 ($20 in wages + $1 of relative value -
$22.25 in leisure) and from working eight hours is $1 ($0 in wages - $1 of relative value - $0 of leisure).
For the reasons stated above, working more than ten or less than eight hours only increases B's losses.
If A works ten hours, B's net loss from working nine is $1.50 ($10 in wages - $1 of relative value -
$10.50 of leisure). But B's net loss from working ten hours is $2.25 ($20 in wages - $0 in relative loss -
$22.25 in leisure) and from working eight hours is $2 ($0 in wages - $2 of relative income - $0 in leisure).
As before, working more than ten or less than eight hours only increases B's losses.
Again, all "gains" and "losses" are in comparison to B's situation when A and B were indifferent to
relative income and each worked eight hours.
324. In this example, despite A's "victory," he is worse off than he would have been in the absence
of a competition. Both parties would be better off working only eight hours. But the joint welfare maximiz-
ing outcome is having A work nine hours while B works eight.
325. Here, A "invested" $2.25 by trading two hours worth of leisure worth $22.25 for only $20 of
wages. B "invested" $0.50 in relative income by trading an hour of leisure worth $10.50 for only $10 in
wages. The total investment is $2.75. The "minimally necessary investment' is only $0.50 (A trading one
hour of leisure worth $10.50 for only $10 in wages and B making no trade). The difference, $2.75 - $0.50,
represents the total waste, $2.25.
326. Aside from taxation, this analysis suggests a justification for laws regulating work hours or
permitting or requiring collective bargaining of work hours. Given the existence of a moderately strong
desire for relative income, some restraints on work hours may enhance welfare. See FRANK, THE RIGHT
POND, supra note 77, at 133-35.
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TABLE 2
Marginal Marginal Marginal Cost Net
Hour Benefit (marginal value Marginal
Worked (wage-tax) leisure) Value
10th $ 11.75 -$3.75
9th $8 $10.50 -$2.50
8th $8 $ 9.50 -$1.50
7th $8 $ 8.75 -$0.75
6th $8 $ 8.25 -$0.25
5th $8 $ 7.75 $0.25
However, with the initially stated desire for relative income,327 A and B
would each work ten hours per day. Given this relative desire, how long will
A and B work after imposition of the income tax? Because the tax decreases
the absolute wage for any hour worked from $10 to $8, it likely also reduces
the relative gain created by one party working an hour more than the other.
Assuming proportionality to the previous relationship, each party receives a
$1.60 relative gain or loss for every $8 difference in wages.32 If so, each
party will now choose to work eight hours. The absolute net cost of working
the ninth and tenth hour ($3.75 and $2.50) is in each case higher than the $1.60
increment of marginal relative loss one will suffer if the other continues
working ten hours, so it is cheaper not to work those hours. But the absolute
net cost of the eighth and lower hours of work is less than the $1.60 relative
value, so it pays to work eight hours.329 Because each will work eight hours,
327. A and B have the same desire for relative income as stated supra note 315.
328. As explained supra note 315, a linear relationship between absolute income and relative value
is unlikely, but useful for illustration. The following chart shows the post tax relative gains and losses from










329. The same tedious analysis of the previous examples would demonstrate more rigorously that A
and B are each better off working eight hours regardless of how many the other works.
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each gains back $22.25 in leisure for a sacrifice of $20 (in pretax) wages.
Rather than distort the tradeoff in work and leisure, the income tax operates
here to correct excessive work caused by competitive consumption, and enhanc-
es welfare.33°
Now consider the issue of tax progressivity. There are two reasons why
it may be efficient to make income taxes progressive. First, if the proportion
of one's income devoted to satisfying relative preferences rises with income-if
status goods are "superior" goods in this economic sense33-then prog-
ressivity combined with redistribution may enhance welfare.332 If government
taxes the income of those who are spending a high proportion of their income
seeking to satisfy inherently conflicting preferences (e.g., on "fashion goods")
and distributes the revenue to those who spend a low proportion of their income
seeking to satisfy inherently conflicting preferences, then the tax may increase
welfare. It is a plausible, though still empirically untested, assumption that the
proportion of one's income devoted to such goods rises as income rises. If so,
some level of progressivity is efficient.
333
Even if the above analysis fails, a progressive tax may be the optimal
structure for achieving the goals of raising revenue and correcting for excessive
levels of work. In the above illustration, for example, the desire that neighbors
A and B have for relative income causes them to work beyond an optimal level.
A twenty percent proportional income tax exactly offsets the relative gain from
working more hours than the other, and causes the workers to work at the
optimal level. But it is not necessary that the government take a flat twenty
percent of each worker's income. To correct the tendency to work excessively,
the government need only tax the income earned from working above the
optimal level. In other words, a zero percent tax up to $80/day (from eight
hours work/day) and then a twenty percent tax on all income over $80/day
induces the workers to work the optimal eight hours/day. Thus, an income tax
330. This same analysis applies to the decreased investment in human capital an income tax produces.
Education has been noted as being a positional good because people often seek simply to be more educated
or at least more credentialed, than others. See Hirsch, supra note 67, at 48-51. Because much of the value
of a certain level of education is determined by how many others lack that level, the value of high school
and college degrees to employment opportunities has fallen over the past several decades. We should expect,
therefore, that the competition to be "more educated than others" leads to excessive investment in certain
types of education and that some levels of income taxation may correct this distortion.
331. Goods are "superior" if the amount consumers buy increases more than proportionately as income
increases.
332. Pigou believed that those who earn more than the "mass of the population" spent a greater portion
of their income on positional goods, and that this fact justified progressive income taxes. PIGOU, supra note
30, at 89-90; see also DUESENBERRY, supra note 33, at 44, 101-03, 113; PIGOU, supra note 36, at 91.
333. This claim is not the conventional argument for making the interpersonal utility comparison that
the poor would gain more from a marginal dollar gained than the rich would lose from the marginal dollar
taxed. In the claim here, the rich person may lose the same (or more) utility than the poor gains. But the
rich person's expenditure of that dollar on relative satisfaction imposes a greater external cost (by lowering
the relative position of others) than does the poor person's expenditure of that dollar satisfying absolute
preferences.
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structure that functions only to correct the tendency to overwork will inevitably
be progressive, here with rising rates of zero percent and twenty percent.
Such a tax would deter excessive work (because neither A nor B would
work over eight hours) but raise no revenue, a function usually considered
indispensable. The government can, however, raise revenue by taxing income
earned on the optimal hours of work-in this example, by setting the tax on
the first eight hours of work per day to some positive amount less than twenty
percent.334 The choice of a tax rate greater than zero percent and less than
twenty percent will depend entirely on the level of revenue the government
requires. Thus, the tax will be proportional only if, by coincidence, therevenue
requirement necessitates a twenty percent tax on the first $80/day. At any lesser
revenue requirement, the optimal tax structure will be progressive.
Of course, there is no perfect information. In the real world, taxpayers earn
differing wages, value relative income differently, and do not precisely disclose
the value they place on their leisure time. In practice, it will be quite difficult
to determine the level of tax that will prevent wasteful competition for relative
income while not discouraging an optimal amount of work. Nonetheless, the
above analysis suggests that the conventional economic view of income taxation
and progressivity-based only on absolute preferences-is seriously incomplete.
C. Regulating Group Status Competition: The Case of Antidiscrimination Laws
Thus far, our discussion, like the existing work on relative desires, has
focused on how individuals compete against each other for position. But status
competition is not limited to the level of individual against individual. An
individual's status depends in part on the status of the social groups of which
he or she is a member. Thus, some competition takes the form of competition
between groups. Group competition takes many forms, but for illustrative
purposes, this Section will address one particularly salient manner in which
individuals are stratified: by race. A relative preferences theory of group
competition may help illuminate the causes and consequences of racially
discriminatory behavior.
Although arguments for and against prohibiting race discrimination usually
involve claims of justice or rights, there has also been considerable discussion
concerning the efficiency of such prohibitions.335 Gary Becker's path-breaking
334. At less than 20%, A and B will still work the full eight hours because the relative wage premium
for a marginal hour is greater than the tax. At substantially more than 20%, A and B will work less than
the optimal amount
335. For example, Richard Posner and John Donohue recently engaged in an exchange concerning the
efficiency of such laws. See John J. Donohue II, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986);
Posner, Title VII, supra note 300; John J. Donohue M, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination
Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (1987); Richard Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CIi. L. REV. 1311 (1989), Donohue, supra note 300. See also
RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992).
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economic model of discrimination336 has served as the foundation for this
analysis.337 A theory of group status competition may provide an economic
description of discriminatory behavior superior to Becker's, 3 8 one revealing
antidiscrimination laws as a possible corrective for wasteful inter-group status
competition.
Becker posits that people discriminate on the basis of race because they
have a "taste" for avoiding association with members of another race; "contact"
with other races imposes a "non-monetary cost" on the discriminators. 339 That
discrimination predominantly takes the form of whites refusing to associate with
blacks (in employment, public accommodations, neighborhoods, etc.) means
that whites have, on the whole, discriminatory tastes and blacks do not. Becker
draws an analogy between these tastes and transportation costs;34° both im-
pose costs on trades between certain individuals and consequently tend to
decrease the amount of trade that occurs. Whites give up otherwise favorable
trades with blacks when the psychological "costs" of association exceed the
benefits of the trade. The harm of discrimination, in Becker's model, is the loss
of the benefit these forgone trades would have created. These lost trades harm
both whites and blacks,341 although blacks are hurt more because, as an eco-
nomic minority, trade with whites represents a larger proportion of all possible
beneficial trades for them than trade with blacks does for whites.32 Becker
criticizes black nationalists for suggesting that blacks cease all contact with
whites because, he asserts, this conduct would only increase the economic harm
blacks suffer from forgone trades 3
Becker also claims that market competition will decrease discrimination
against blacks. Regarding employment discrimination, for example, Becker
336. Originally the subject of Becker's 1955 Ph.D. dissertation, his theory was published as THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1st ed. 1957). See also BECKER, supra note 171, at 15-30 (1976).
337. In their exchanges, see supra note 335, Posner and Donohue disagree as to the ultimate efficiency
of laws prohibiting race and sex discrimination (Donohue claiming and Posner denying that such laws may
efficiently encourage nondiscriminatory firms to dominate the market), but both premise their analysis on
Becker's model of discrimination. In calling for the repeal of all antidiscrimination laws, EPSTEIN, supra
note 335, also relies on Becker's model.
338. Like Becker, I am interested in explaining discriminatory behavior that is caused by racial animus.
Although significant discriminatory behavior results from ignorance and unconscious stereotypes, this Section
focuses on the kind of discriminatory behavior that is immune to new "information." See BECKER, supra
note 336, at 8 ("Ignorance may be quickly eliminated by the spread of knowledge, while a prejudice (i.e.,
preference) is relatively independent of knowledge.") (footnote omitted). A theory of racial animus based
on relative preferences is therefore not a complete theory of discrimination, but I think it provides an account
of this facet of the problem that is superior to Becker's.
339. BECKER, supra note 171, at 6-9. See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 615
("Some people do not like to associate with the members of' other groups).
340. BECKER, supra note 171, at 11-13 & n.3, 24-30.
341. Id. at 11-13.
342. Id. at 21-22 & n.16. See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 616
(Nonassociation hurts blacks more than whites just as a trade embargo between the United States and
Switzerland, while injuring both nations, would hurt Switzerland more. For Switzerland, the United States
represents a much larger market, and a much greater opportunity for beneficial trade, than Switzerland
represents for the United States.).
343. BECKER, supra note 171, at 21 & n.7.
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concludes that the market will favor employers who have little or no taste for
nonassociation with blacks over employers with a moderate or strong taste. The
stronger the taste, the higher the "costs" of employing black workers, and the
more the employer will forgo black workers with skills superior to those of
their white employees."
From Becker's model, Posner draws the conclusion that antidiscrimination
laws are inefficient. 5 If discriminatory preferences are like any other prefer-
ences, then a law that prevents their satisfaction is not likely to maximize
wealth. An antidiscrimination law will at times require white employers to
employ black workers even if the employers prefer not to do so. Posner argues
that the loss from this trade to the white is not likely to be compensated by the
gain to the black, for if the trade created a net surplus of wealth, we would
have seen the black worker "bribe" the white employer by offering his labor
at a lower cost in the absence of any statutory compulsion.346 For example,
suppose the white owner of a firm employing whites at $100/day values the
cost of associating with black workers at $10/day. Black workers (equally as
productive as existing white workers) whose best alternative pays less than
$90/day should be willing and able to "bribe" the white employer to hire them
at $90/day. When black workers have failed to be hired at this lower wage,
Posner would infer that their existing alternatives are superior (for example,
they are elsewhere earning $95/day). If so, the only blacks a new antidiscrimi-
nation law compels the white employer to hire are those who will gain less than
the white employer loses by the hiring.' 47 Thus, Posner thinks antidiscrimina-
tion laws are inefficient for the same reason that laws forbidding consideration
of transportation costs would be inefficient: in both cases, the law compels
trades that would not take place voluntarily because they do not increase net
wealth.
The theory of relative preferences suggests a different explanation of racial
discrimination with different normative implications. To appreciate fully the
superiority of this theory, it is necessary to examine the "household production
function" Becker more recently set forth in his "new theory" of consumer
behavior.348 Becker describes traditional consumer theory as the view that
344. White-owned firms that do not discriminate will employ their ability to hire better workers to drive
more prejudiced white owners out of the market. Id. at 35-37. See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra
note 50, at 616.
345. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 622-23; Posner, Title VII, supra note 300.
See also EPSTEIN, supra note 335. I focus here on the argument that such laws are necessarily inefficient
because they frustrate preferences. A complete evaluation would require consideration of the efficacy and
costs of enforcing such laws.
346. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 50, at 622-23.
347. The black worker who was elsewhere earning $95/day gains only $5 from the result compelled
by the law, while the white employer loses the $10 association cost. The black workers currently employed
at $90/day do gain an amount-$10--equal to what the white employer loses, but this wealth transfer
represents no actual efficiency gain.
348. See BECKER, supra note 171, at 131.
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"the consumer unit ... attempts to maximize utility ... which it obtains
directly from the services of goods ... purchased in the marketplace" subject
to a budgetary constraint.349 He criticizes this theory because it attributes the
considerable amount of behavior it cannot explain by income and prices, to
inexplicable "variations in tastes." 350 Relying on "differences in tastes" as an
explanatory variable is unsatisfactory, according to Becker, because economists
(and other social scientists) have no adequate theory to explain "how tastes are
formed. 35
1
To solve this problem, Becker draws a distinction between "goods" and
"commodities." Rather than view the consumer as obtaining utility directly from
"goods" purchased in the market, Becker suggests that we view the consumer
as obtaining utility from "commodities" that the consumer or household "pro-
duces" by "combining purchased market goods and services with some of the
[consumer's] own time."352 For example, a consumer does not derive utility
directly from an automobile, but uses an automobile-a specific "good"--to
produce the more general "commodity" of transportation (and also, perhaps,
status). By imagining consumers as using goods and time to "produce" their
own utility, the economist need not explain behavior simply with prices and
income, but can also use production variables such as the household's availabil-
ity of time, investment in human capital, and decisions regarding marriage and
fertility.353 The corresponding advantage to the new theory is "its reduced
emphasis on the role of 'tastes' in interpreting behavior."354
Becker has never revised his theory of racial discrimination to take account
of his household production theory. Yet the former theory suffers from the
defects the latter is meant to address. Under Becker's model of race discrimina-
tion, "taste" (for nonassociation with those of another race) plays a central role.
If changes in the discriminatory behavior of whites over time, or differences
in discriminatory behavior by different whites, cannot be attributed to price or
income, then Becker would have to rely on changes or differences in assoc-
iational tastes, changes and differences he has no theory for explaining. Instead,
the household production theory demands that we ask, what "commodity"
349. Id. at 131-32.
350. Id. at 132-33.
351. Id. at 147 (tastes "have defied effective theoretical analysis").
352. Id. at 134.
353. Id. at 141-44. For example, Becker notes, a household purchases more heating oil in the winter,
when prices are highest, than at other times. The better explanation is not that the household's tastes
seasonally change, but that it purchases the "good" of heating oil in order to produce the "commodity" of
a comfortable living temperature, and that as production conditions (i.e., climate) change, so does the
behavior of the household. Becker is not actually suggesting that any economist would explain the cyclical
change in demand for heating oil by reference to a change in tastes; his point is that in such cases, however,
the economist either relies on a change in tastes or some ad hoc rationalization outside of the theory of
behavior. "[Bly incorporating an intuitively appealing explanation in each case, economists usually interpret
these observations in reasonable ways. The important point, however, is that the received theory of choice
itself is of modest use in that undertaking." Id. at 133.
354. Id. at 144.
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whites are "producing" when they purchase the "good" of nonassociation. The
concept of relative preferences suggests an answer: consumers have a prefer-
ence for a "commodity" that might be thought of as social distinction or status,
and consumers may purchase the "good" of nonassociation in order to produce
greater social distinction.355
As noted previously, Becker and Stigler have written, outside the context
of race discrimination, that "social distinction" is a "commodity," and that
consumers purchase what they call "fashion goods" in order to obtain it.356
Becker and Stigler list as examples of "fashion goods" "elaborate parties [and]
a respected occupation." 35 7 These two are particularly interesting examples
because they suggest the role of social group membership in determining one's
individual social rank. One's social status depends in large measure on the
social status of those with whom one associates. The more exclusive the "party"
or the "occupation"--the more people who wanted but were denied admis-
sion-the greater the social distinction created by one's being accepted into the
group. People will therefore seek to join exclusive groups, and also to preserve
the exclusivity and generally enhance the distinction of the groups to which
they already belong. 8
Race discrimination by whites may be seen not as an attempt to satisfy an
irrational "taste" for nonassociation with blacks, but as an attempt to produce
the "commodity" of individual distinction by raising the relative status of a
particularly salient social group-one's race. As Becker and Stigler note, the
scarcity of social distinction means that "an increase in one person's distinction
generally requires a reduction in that of other persons."359 One option for
increasing one's distinction is therefore to directly lower the status of another.
Although "subordinating" any individual may raise one's status to some extent,
subordinating a member of another group will often be more productive of
status because it allows one to lower the status of the other individual's entire
group, as well as that of the individual.3 60 Whites who discriminate against
blacks may therefore be said to act "as if' they were producing social distinc-
tion for their group, and derivatively for themselves, by subordinating members
of a nonwhite race. This theory views discrimination not as the result of a
355. Although I present this theory of group-based status competition to explain race discrimination,
the same concept can be usefully applied to other forms of discrimination in a fairly straightforward way.
356. Stigler & Becker, supra note 43, at 84.
357. Id.
358. In the latter case, it is not necessary that one's membership be in any sense voluntary; individuals
competing for status will compete to obtain more status for the groups to which they belong, whether or
not they "choose" to join the group.
359. Stigler & Becker, supra note 43, at 88.
360. Of course, not every effort at discrimination will be effective. Also, discriminatory eff-
orts-especially when overt-may violate norms of other groups to which discriminators belong.
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random taste for nonassociation, but as one alternative for producing the "basic
pleasure" of social distinction.361
There are several reasons for favoring this descriptive model of discrimina-
tion over Becker's. First, in addition to employing Becker's new theory of
consumer behavior, the model also finds considerable support in sociological
and psychological accounts of intergroup behavior. For example, in what is
known as the "minimal intergroup situation," people immediately identify with
and favor others they perceive as belonging to their same group.362 In repeat-
ed experiments, psychologists created "groups" under circumstances they
expected would cause no intergroup bias: (i) the groups were created artificially
by the researcher for the purpose of the experiment; (ii) individuals were placed
in groups on a trivial or random basis; (iii) there was no prior hostility between
the individuals; (iv) no social interaction took place between the individuals;
and (v) the experiment gave no external incentive for favoring members of
one's group.363 Nonetheless, people consistently evaluated members of their
own group more favorably than the members of other groups. In essence, "the
mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke inter-
group competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group. '364
Individuals view their welfare as so dependent on the welfare of groups
to which they may belong that they seem predisposed to compete for their
group and against others. This evidence supports the claim that people perceive
themselves as deriving individual status from the status of the groups to which
they belong, and therefore compete to enhance the status of those groups, and
to diminish the status of other groups.361 One would expect that an individu-
361. Others have attacked Becker's model for failing to address discrimination motivated by the desire
to subordinate minorities or women. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual
and Structural Remediesfor Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEo. L.J. 1659, 1667-70
(1991). In this particular criticism, however, Mary Becker does not reject the existence of the category of
discrimination that Gary Becker explains as the product of whites' taste for nonassociation. Rather, she adds
another category of discrimination, one resulting from a desire to subordinate racial minorities or women.
My point is different. I am seeking to deny any explanatory significance to Gary Becker's model and to
recharacterize the behavior his model addresses as group-based status competition. The suggestion is not
that all discrimination results from a conscious desire to injure or humiliate others, but that people engaging
in discriminatory behavior act as if they were maximizing group status. Unlike Mary Becker's claim that
"[m]uch discrimination is not... rational," id. at 1664, the theory I am proposing also suggests that most
discrimination is a rational means of attaining status for one's group.
362. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text
363. For the initial experimental methodology, see Taffel & Turner, supra note 145, at 13-14. The
results were subsequently replicated "even when the assignment to groups was made explicitly random."
Id. at 14. See also Leigh L. Thompson & Jennifer Crocker, Downward Social Comparison in the Minimal
Intergroup Situation: A Test of a Self-Enhancement Interpretation," 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1166,
1167 (1990) ("The tendency to favor [one's] in-group over outgroups is so powerful that it has been
demonstrated when group membership is determined arbitrarily by a coin flip ... or through a lottery
procedure.") (citations omitted).
364. Tajfel & Turner, supra note 145, at 13. "The basic and highly reliable finding is that the trivial,
ad hoc intergroup categorization leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group." Id.
at 14.
365. The studies show that individuals sacrifice absolute gains to maximize the relative advantage of
their group over others. See supra notes 145-147.
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al's membership in genuine social groups (e.g., stratification by family, gender,
ethnicity, race, religion, school, neighborhood, car ownership, etc.) would matter
to them more than the artificial groups the experimenter creates briefly and
randomly in the laboratory.366 Social identity theorists and other social scien-
tists interpret the laboratory and field data as supporting the idea that some
intergroup bias and hostility, like race discrimination, is the product of group-
based status competition.367
The second reason for preferring the status competition theory to Becker's
theory of the taste for "nonassociation" is its ability to explain more precisely
the discriminatory behavior observed in society. It is apparent that prejudiced
whites rarely seek to avoid all association with blacks; they seek to avoid
certain types of association but are indifferent to (or actually desire) others. 368
Certainly in the segregated South at the time of Becker's dissertation, some of
the whites who refused to work with blacks, patronize establishments that
served blacks, and use bathrooms open to blacks, employed blacks as domestic
servants. If such whites sought nonassociation, why did they allow a black
person to enter their home, clean their belongings, cook their food, and rear
their children? On the other hand, why would whites oppose marriage of inter-
racial couples with whom they did not and would never associate? And why
would whites oppose the election of black politicians with whom they would
never share personal contact?369 A better explanation than a taste for
366. Recall the earlier evidence that "fraternalistic" relative deprivation (based on comparison of one's
group to other groups as distinct from comparing oneself to other individuals) is highly predictive of social
protest and other significant behavior. See supra note 139.
367. See GORDON NV. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 349 (1953) ("Out-groups, as status
builders, have the special advantage of being near at hand, visible (or at least nameable), and occupying
a lower position by common agreement, thus providing social support for one's own sense of status
enhancement."); Jennifer Crocker & Riia Luhtanen, Collective Self-Esteem and Ingroup Bias, 58 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 60, 66 (1990) ("[W]e suggest, with social identity theorists, that prejudice
may represent an attempt to enhance social identiiy or collective self-esteem."). See also Dion, supra note
139, at 168-69; Dub6 & Guimond, supra note 139, at 210-11; Luhtanen & Crocker, supra note 124. See
generally TaJfel & Turner, supra note 145; DIFFEREIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS (Henri Tajfel ed.,
1978).
368. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EcONOMIc
LIFE 83, 89 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972) ("Physical proximity is probably significant only because of its
implications for status and for feelings of superiority and of fear. The slave owner and his overseer felt no
reluctance to work with an all-black labor force.").
369. One does not "associate" with a politician by privately casting a vote in his favor. Of course, there
are nonstatus explanations for whites voting against black political candidates. whites may believe that a
black candidate will enact policies against the interests of whites. Psychologists and political scientists
attempting to determine the reasons for white opposition to black candidates and black political causes have
found, however, that a theory of "symbolic racism" better explains the data than simple models of self-
interest:
[A]bstract, moralistic resentments of blacks-what we have called symbolic racism-proved to
be the overriding determinant of voting, for whites shielded from possible tangible threats posed
by blacks as well as for those in more imminentjeopardy.... Our findings imply that the white
public's political response to racial issues is based on moral and symbolic challenges to the racial
status quo in society generally rather than on any direct, tangible challenge to their own personal
lives.
Donald Kinder & David Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threat to the Good
Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYcHOL 414, 427, 429 (1981). See also David Sears et al., Whites'
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nonassociation is that such whites, seeking to preserve a superior group status,
will not tolerate associations that imply equal or superior rank, but do tolerate
(and even desire) associations that imply a lower rank for blacks. 7
Third, the relative preference theory points to an obvious harm of discrimi-
nation that is entirely missed by Becker's account: the psychological harm to
the victims of discrimination. Even though Becker realizes that "an increase
in one person's [social] distinction generally requires a reduction in that of
other persons, '37' the only harm his theory recognizes from discrimination
is the forgone benefit of trades that discrimination precludes. Becker's model
may accurately describe all the harm created if, for example, Rotarians refused
to trade with members of the Kiwanis Club. To be excluded from a group when
one has chosen to join a roughly equal competing group is likely to have
minimal status effects. Even to be excluded involuntarily from a particular
group within society is not likely to affect one's social status dramatically if
one has the choice of being a member of other groups with similar size, power,
and wealth. But what should be clear to us now is that the majority of a
society, possessing disproportionately greater wealth, power, education, and
symbols of leadership, is fully capable of depriving the members of a minority
group of social status by ostracizing them in daily life. When members of the
minority group desire the status of full and equal citizens, intentional discrimi-
nation by a majority group is likely to deprive them of such status and substan-
tially harm their self-esteem.372
As evidence of the significance of the stigmatizing harms of discrimina-
tion, Becker might have considered more carefully the possible rationality of
black nationalists' calls for complete segregation. One way to eliminate inherent
preference conflict is to eliminate the reciprocity of the relative preferences,
directing one's concern away from the existing scale toward some other rank-
ing. In this case, if blacks could "give up" their desire to be equal citizens of
a predominantly white America, they would cease to suffer from the failure to
achieve such status. 373 Although this alternative would mean giving up an
Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?, 73 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 369 (1979). The finding
of symbolic racism supports the theory that whites act as if they were seeking to maximize the status of
their race by minimizing the status of blacks. Note that groups seeking to use the political process to lower
the status of other groups as an end in itself (rather than merely as a means to greater share of scarce
resources), exacerbate the public choice problems of political action.
370. For the same reason, Becker's model does not explain sex discrimination. Sexist males do not
typically have the desire to avoid association with females. An advantage of the status competition theory
is that it is broad enough to include sex discrimination: males act as if they were maximizing the status of
their gender group by lowering the status of females. Sexual harassment in the workplace, for example,
operates to preserve this status relationship where women would otherwise gain status by obtaining
traditionally male occupations.
371. Stigler & Becker, supra note 43, at 88.
372. See, e.g., ALLPORT, supra note 367; ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA (1963). See also Charles L. Black,
Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE U. 421 (1960).
373. It creates no loss in self-esteem to be separated from a group in which one has no desire to be
a member. One imagines that the Amish, who have chosen to remain largely separate from American
society, feel little stigma in being segregated from it.
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even larger number of beneficial trades, some black nationalists apparently
perceive the psychological harms of racism to be greater than the harms of
forgoing all trade with whites. Absent a theory recognizing any stigmatizing
harms of ostracism, Becker has no basis for challenging this judgment.
One may, however, raise an important objection to this status competition
theory of discrimination: although individuals will compete for individual status,
the problem of "free riding" will prevent them from competing for group status
by seeking to lower the status of other groups. Efforts to lower the status of
others, such as forgoing beneficial trades with blacks, entail costs. It might
serve all whites for each member to bear some cost in lowering the status of
nonwhites, but for any individual white, the dominant strategy will be to gain
all the benefit from the discriminatory behavior of other whites, while making
no such efforts oneself. When each white attempts to free ride on the group
efforts of others, there will be no group status competition.
This objection fails, however, if groups have an effective way of inducing
individuals to contribute to group status.37 4 One likely mechanism is the aw-
arding of status within the group. For most groups, a fundamental norm is that
those who contribute to the group are esteemed above those who do not.
Elevated intragroup status is an implicit payment group members make to
members who contribute the most to raising their group's intergroup status;
lowered intragroup status (culminating in ostracism or expulsion) is the implicit
punishment of those who fail to contribute to enhancing the group's status, or
worse, who lower it. Of course, discrimination is not the only means of enhanc-
ing group status; one may achieve greater glory for a group (and oneself) by
positive achievements (e.g., earning fame in sports, entering a respected profes-
sion, succeeding in business). Positive achievements may be the more efficient
way of gaining individual status because such achievements may gain one status
across group lines, while discriminatory conduct will not. If so, we should
expect that while people pursue the achievement strategy when available, those
who fail in this regard-and who otherwise suffer from low status within their
group-will more commonly turn to discrimination as their only means of
seeking intragroup distinction. This prediction is supported by the social science
literature, which consistently finds an inverse relationship between social status
and racial prejudice among whites." 5
374. The objection also fails in cases where there is no "cost" to discrimination because the white is
choosing among transactions of equal monetary value. Suppose, for example, that a white employer receives
two equally productive applicants for a single job, one being black and the other white. There is no monetary
"cost" to hiring the white; the employer necessarily must reject one applicant. But the prejudiced white does
not chose randomly; rejecting the black applicant offers a greater opportunity for producing status. If many
choices are otherwise in equipoise, there will be significant discrimination even among whites unwilling
to bear a cost to enhance the status of their group.
375. ALLPORT, supra note 367, at 80 ("lIlt seems fairly well established that white people in the lower
socio-economic levels are, on the average, more bitterly anti-Negro than white people at the higher levels.");
Donald Noel & Alphonso Pinkney, Correlates of Prejudice: Some Racial Differences and Similarities 69
Ad. J. Soc. 609, 611-12 (1964) (finding "among whites that the higher the occupational status, the lower
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The status competition theory also leads to different conclusions about the
fate of discriminatory behavior in the face of market competition. Other theo-
rists have noted that when the act of discrimination is a form of consumption,
rather than a means of lowering the costs of production, there is no reason to
expect the market to drive out more discriminatory whites.3 76 The status com-
petition theory views discriminatory behavior as an act of consumption, or more
precisely, as a good that permits the white consumer to "produce" the commod-
ity of greater status. That some whites engage in greater discrimination than
others does not mean that the former suffer greater "costs" from association
with blacks than the latter, but, for a variety of reasons, that the former receive
more utility from enagaging in such behavior than the latter. If discrimination
is generally a matter of consumption, we should expect the market to cater to
rather than eliminate it 3 77
We have thus far considered only the failings of Becker's positive model
of race discrimination. What are the normative implications of the group status
competition theory of race discrimination? Here, we should return to the
Coasean bargain argument Posner raises in condemning antidiscrimination laws
as inefficient. As explained above,378 Posner argues that if blacks could gain
more than whites lose from a mutual transaction, then blacks would bribe
whites to engage in that transaction. Status effects, however, make Posner's
inferences problematic. Assume again that the white employer offers white
workers $100/day and black workers of equal productivity $90/day. Taking
status into account, we can now imagine that a black worker who refuses to
take the $90/day wage could gain more than $10/day when an antidiscrimina-
tion law compels the white employer to hire him at $100/day.
We can imagine, in other words, why a black worker earning only, say,
$75/day at an all black firm might still refuse to accept the $90/day job with
white coworkers earning $100/day. Frank has produced significant evidence that
the desire for status among one's coworkers is sufficient to cause individuals
to forgo significant absolute income to secure superior relative income within
a firm.379 But Frank's model concerns the status loss from being paid less
than more productive workers; here the black worker suffers the greater indigni-
the proportion prejudiced," consistent with previous studies); Thomas Pavlak, Social Class, Ethnicity, and
Racial Prejudice, 37 PuB. OP. Q. 225, 229-30 (1973) (finding "moderately strong inverse relationship
between racial prejudice and each of ... three indicators of social status," occupation, education and income;
consistent with previous studies).
376. John J. Donohue MII & James L Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1713, 1723 (1991) ("[W]here the employer gets positive utility from hiring workers of a given racial
group, if this conduct serves to brand the nonpreferred races as inferior... the positive utility... is
sufficient to compensate for the lower earnings that result from the failure to look only to productivity
narrowly defined.").
377. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 Soc. PHIL. & PoLIcY
22(1991).
378. See supra text accompanying notes 345-347.
379. See supra notes 188-191 and accompanying text.
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ty of being paid less than equally productive workers, possibly even less than
less productive workers. In addition, while a firm in Frank's model might find
it desirable to keep salaries confidential to preserve the morale of lower paid
employees, the prejudiced white employer has every reason to extract the
greatest symbolic significance from race-based wage discrimination. After all,
a lower wage track is not just an economic bribe of the employer, it is one
means of subordinating blacks (even while associating with them) and thereby
producing group status. Finally, although being paid less than one's coworkers
may say little about one's worth or status in the world outside one's job, the
loss of status from accepting a wage inferior to white coworkers is likely to
adversely affect one's status vis4t-vis all whites. Thus, a black worker earning
$75/day might refuse the lower track job because the status loss it carries
exceeds the $15 gain in absolute wages.
The antidiscrimination law allows this black worker to gain $25/day from
the higher paying job, while the white employer must only pay him $ 10/day
more than he previously offered. But one should not too quickly conclude that
the white employer only loses only $10/day per black employee. Under the
theory of group status competition, the lower wage track not only saved wage
costs but produced status for whites. Under the antidiscrimination law, black
workers lose the stigma of relatively poor wages, while the white employer
loses the status derived from paying whites relatively superior wages.
Here, one may be tempted to reassert the inferences of Coasean bargaining:
if the total status gains (to blacks) from equal pay outweighed the total status
losses (to whites), then the parties would achieve the efficient outcome volun-
tarily. But this inference is also unavailable. Previously, I discussed a special
impediment to bargaining for status: the impossibility of attaining status by
paying for it.380 This problem arises here: a black worker seeking equality
cannot "bribe" a white employer (e.g., by offering to accept a lower wage)
without by the fact of the bribe losing equal status. Where equal pay (for equal
productivity) is a critical symbol of equal status, one cannot accept less than
equal pay and still obtain that status; the bargaining itself implies inequality.
Thus, if blacks lose more in status from unequal pay than whites gain, the
market will not achieve what would be the efficient outcome: equal wages.
Conversely, that the market produces unequal wages is no evidence that whites
lose more from antidiscrimination laws than blacks gain.
Of course, if whites were to gain more from enhanced status than blacks
lose, then the discriminatory behavior produces an efficient result. But even if
the status gains and losses between whites and blacks are exactly equal, this
group competition presents a wasteful example of competitive consumption.
Competing racial preferences create an inherent preference conflict. The desire
of whites for a higher social rank than blacks and the desire of blacks for equal
380. See supra notes 245-252 and accompanying text.
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social rank are reciprocal and incompatible. Although there are many instances
in which social status is difficult to measure, ostracism by the vast majority of
individuals in society is objectively and observably inconsistent with having
equal status. Consequently, the resulting competition for status is zero sum; a
gain by one group comes at the expense of the other.
Note how discrimination consumes resources in a zero sum competition
for status. The "forgone trade" that Becker identifies as the harm of discrimi-
nation is the investment whites make in improving their social status at the
expense of blacks.381 Whites forgo transactions that would increase their own
absolute income because refusing to associate with blacks in ways that imply
equal standing preserves or increases their relative status vis-a-vis blacks.
Unless the parties would have invested all the resources generated by the
"forgone trade" into satisfying some other inherently conflicting preferences
(e.g., if a white refused to buy from a black certain jewelry valued only for its
relative value), this discriminatory behavior constitutes competitive consump-
tion. If only whites discriminate, i.e., if whites alone invest in group status, race
discrimination represents the first form of competitive consumption, in which
case we cannot know whether laws prohibiting discrimination are efficient or
not. The possibility remains that discriminatory behavior not only benefits
whites more than it harms blacks, but benefits them sufficiently to outweigh
the lost wealth from these forgone trades. Of course it is at least equally
possible that the status loss to blacks exceeds the gain to whites in which case
the forgone trades merely increase the net welfare loss. Most importantly, even
if one believes that the status gain to whites exactly equals the loss to blacks,
then the investment by whites wastes resources by forgoing wealth-creating
transactions without producing a net status gain.
It becomes more likely that antidiscrimination laws are efficient if blacks
also engage in group status competition. Such "investment" might take the form
of blacks discriminating against other groups to raise the status of their own,
or blacks distancing themselves from their own racial group and discriminating
against other blacks in an effort to raise their individual status. To the extent
such behavior is significant, race discrimination may present the second or third
form of competitive consumption, in which competing groups (or individuals)
match each other's investment in gaining status at the expense of the other. If
so, antidiscrimination laws may efficiently terminate a repetitive cycle of invest-
ment in a zero sum competition for status.
Intended as an illustration, this analysis is necessarily incomplete. When
a market failure is identified, it does not inevitably follow that collective
regulation will correct the failure, or that it will save more resources than
market intervention costs. But rejection of Becker's model of race discrimina-
381. This "investment" is in the form of opportunity costs rather than direct expenditures, but it is an
investment nonetheless.
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tion, and consideration of the above theory, fundamentally alters how one
evaluates the efficiency of antidiscrimination laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
Humans are social animals, and it should come as no surprise that among
the strongest of human desires is that for social position: to be respected by
others, to have status, and to consume at levels that match or exceed the
prevailing standard of living. Adam Smith saw this clearly, but classical and
neoclassical economics developed along simpler lines. The irony is that even
as economics shunned analysis of these preferences, individual economists
occasionally acknowledged their existence and strength. Milton Friedman once
provided an example of a positional desire that is accessible to economic and
legal scholars alike:
The college professor whose colleague wins a sweepstake will envy
him but is unlikely to bear him any malice or to feel unjustly treated.
Let the colleague receive a trivial raise that makes his salary higher
than the professor's own, and the professor is far more likely to feel
aggrieved. After all, the goddess of chance, as of justice, is blind. The
salary raise was a deliberate judgment of relative merit.382
But however obvious it is that people value salary and goods, in part, as a
symbol of their place in a particular hierarchy, mainstream economic theory
and "law and economics" have failed to perceive how pervasive these prefer-
ences are and how useful a general analysis of such preferences might be.
This Article, I hope, will stimulate an increased awareness of and interest
in the effect of relative preferences. The social science evidence strongly
suggests that relative wants are too important to be ignored: people habitually
compare themselves with others, and through this process they gain or lose self-
esteem. When, after social comparison, one realizes that one lacks what others
have, there is a resulting sense of relative deprivation which explains a wide
range of human behavior. The pervasiveness of status symbols provides further
support for the importance of positional desires: if people did not strongly
desire status, they would not invest in symbols of status. Finally, a variety of
economic data (savings, wages, gambling, insurance, and fashion) are well-
explained by the existence of relative desires.
A number of conclusions follow from the reality and power of relative
preferences. First, I have shown, following Frank, that investments in relative
position may be socially wasteful. Second, I have isolated the conditions under
which such investments will be wasteful. Relative preferences inherently
382. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 166 (1962). I am indebted to Coelho, supra note
76, at 96, for this example.
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conflict when (1) people make a comparison among one another, (2) the
comparison concerns the same characteristic, (3) people desire incompatible
positions regarding one another and that characteristic, and (4) people's posi-
tions are reasonably observable and objective. By specifying in some detail
what makes positions "incompatible," I have shown that the market failure of
competitive consumption may exist even when the positions desired are less
than the top position, and consequently that the analysis has broad application
even when making only minimal assumptions about the type of position people
seek. By specifying some special transaction costs of resolving conflicts caused
by relative preferences, I have shown that the market failure is unlikely to
correct itself.
Finally, I have provided some examples of how this market failure may
explain and justify certain market regulations. Laws setting minimum levels of
safety, health, and savings may efficiently limit wasteful investment in competi-
tive consumption. The effects of income and "luxury" taxation on social welfare
are quite different once relative preferences are considered; taxation is even
necessary in some cases to correct competitive consumption. Finally, a theory
explaining race discrimination as the product of group-based status competition
is superior to the prevailing economic model. The economic rationale for
antidiscrimination laws is best explained by an efficiency analysis sensitive to
relative preferences.
Ultimately, recognizing the waste of competitive efforts to satisfy inherently
conflicting relative preferences may not definitively resolve any particular legal
controversy. A thorough assessment of the importance of competitive consump-
tion requires a complete theory of relative preferences for which this Article
has only begun to lay the groundwork. However, the analysis I have advanced
suggests the power of relative preferences and points the way to future applica-
tions.
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